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Tariffs Optimal Taxes And Collection Costs
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Book Synopsis Tariffs, Optimal Taxes, and Collection Costs by : Dubravko Mihaljek
Download or read book Tariffs, Optimal Taxes, and Collection Costs written by Dubravko Mihaljek and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies an optimal tax problem for a small open economy where collecting taxes is costly. It is shown that, in the presence of collection costs modeled as an increasing function of the tax rate: (a) the standard rules of optimal commodity taxation (the Ramsey, the inverse elasticity, the Corlett-Hague rules) may no longer be valid; (b) tariffs may replace domestic taxes as a second-best revenue-raising device; and (c) the optimal tariff/tax structure may be uniform rather than differentiated.
Book Synopsis Optimal Taxation in an Open Economy with Tariffs and Inflation by : George Thomas McCandless
Download or read book Optimal Taxation in an Open Economy with Tariffs and Inflation written by George Thomas McCandless and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Tariff Policy and Taxation in Developing Countries by :
Download or read book Tariff Policy and Taxation in Developing Countries written by and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Optimal Tax Administration by : Mr.Michael Keen
Download or read book Optimal Tax Administration written by Mr.Michael Keen and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2017-01-20 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.
Book Synopsis The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags by : Mr.Avinash K. Dixit
Download or read book The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags written by Mr.Avinash K. Dixit and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1990-09-01 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.
Book Synopsis Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes, and Economic Development by : Michael B. Loewy
Download or read book Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes, and Economic Development written by Michael B. Loewy and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Cross-section and time-series data show that nations substitute income taxes for tariffs as they develop. This paper confronts this observation within the context of a two-country open-economy endogenous growth model in which public expenditure is financed by an optimal tariff and income tax the second of which is subject to an administrative cost. The model is calibrated and its transition is shown to yield time paths for the shares of total government revenue derived from the tariff and the income tax that are consistent with the data.
Book Synopsis Optimal Tariffs and Financial Assets by : Hal R. Varian
Download or read book Optimal Tariffs and Financial Assets written by Hal R. Varian and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Distributional and Revenue Raising Arguments for Tariffs by : Christopher John Heady
Download or read book Distributional and Revenue Raising Arguments for Tariffs written by Christopher John Heady and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs by : Joshua Aizenman
Download or read book Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs written by Joshua Aizenman and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper derives the dependency of optimal tariff and inflation tax on tax collection and enforcement costs. The analysis is done for a small, open economy. The existence of such costs can justify tariff and inflation tax policies as optimal revenue-raising devices. This paper suggests that greater government demand for revenue will increase the use of inflation and tariffs as revenue devices. The analysis derives elasticity rules that tie optimal tariff and inflation rates to the costs of tax collection
Book Synopsis Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, and Trade Policies by : Keiko Kubota
Download or read book Fiscal Constraints, Collection Costs, and Trade Policies written by Keiko Kubota and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that when tariffs and export taxes are important sources of revenue for developing countries, and when those countries have narrow tax bases and high tax rates, trade liberalization will come about when the governments diversify their revenue sources through efficiency-enhancing, revenue-increasing tax reform.
Book Synopsis Tariff Policy and Taxation in Developing Countries by : Bela A. Balassa
Download or read book Tariff Policy and Taxation in Developing Countries written by Bela A. Balassa and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In moving toward an ideal policy scheme, value -added taxes and excises on luxury commodities and on commodities that create negative consumption externalities can be established instantaneously while a tariff reform will take time. At the same time, tariffs should be reformed according to a predetermined timetable, made public in advance, that permits producers to adjust.
Book Synopsis Clashing Over Commerce by : Douglas A. Irwin
Download or read book Clashing Over Commerce written by Douglas A. Irwin and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2017-11-29 with total page 873 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A Foreign Affairs Best Book of the Year: “Tells the history of American trade policy . . . [A] grand narrative [that] also debunks trade-policy myths.” —Economist Should the United States be open to commerce with other countries, or should it protect domestic industries from foreign competition? This question has been the source of bitter political conflict throughout American history. Such conflict was inevitable, James Madison argued in the Federalist Papers, because trade policy involves clashing economic interests. The struggle between the winners and losers from trade has always been fierce because dollars and jobs are at stake: depending on what policy is chosen, some industries, farmers, and workers will prosper, while others will suffer. Douglas A. Irwin’s Clashing over Commerce is the most authoritative and comprehensive history of US trade policy to date, offering a clear picture of the various economic and political forces that have shaped it. From the start, trade policy divided the nation—first when Thomas Jefferson declared an embargo on all foreign trade and then when South Carolina threatened to secede from the Union over excessive taxes on imports. The Civil War saw a shift toward protectionism, which then came under constant political attack. Then, controversy over the Smoot-Hawley tariff during the Great Depression led to a policy shift toward freer trade, involving trade agreements that eventually produced the World Trade Organization. Irwin makes sense of this turbulent history by showing how different economic interests tend to be grouped geographically, meaning that every proposed policy change found ready champions and opponents in Congress. Deeply researched and rich with insight and detail, Clashing over Commerce provides valuable and enduring insights into US trade policy past and present. “Combines scholarly analysis with a historian’s eye for trends and colorful details . . . readable and illuminating, for the trade expert and for all Americans wanting a deeper understanding of America’s evolving role in the global economy.” —National Review “Magisterial.” —Foreign Affairs
Book Synopsis Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion by : Louis Kaplow
Download or read book Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion written by Louis Kaplow and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation -- where the literature considers raising revenue with minimum distortion -- and optimal tax enforcement where much of the literature emphasizes raising revenue at the least cost. A central question concerns the extent to which revenue should be raised through higher tax rates, which distort behavior, or greater enforcement, which distorts behavior because it raises marginal effective tax rates and also entails direct resource costs. It is demonstrated that, under each of several assumptions about evasion and enforcement, some expenditure on enforcement is optimal despite its resource cost, its distortionary effect, and the availability of other revenue sources having no enforcement costs. Rules for optimal tax rates and enforcement expenditures are derived, which also indicate the marginal cost of government funds and optimal enforcement priorities for a tax collection agency.
Book Synopsis Corruption and Trade Tariffs, or a Case for Uniform Tariffs by : Roberta Gatti
Download or read book Corruption and Trade Tariffs, or a Case for Uniform Tariffs written by Roberta Gatti and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A highly diversified trade tariff menu may fuel bribe-taking behavior. Setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public officials' ability to extract bribes from importers.By explicitly accounting for the interaction between importers and corrupt customs officials, Gatti argues that setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level limits public officials' ability to extract bribes from importers.If the government's main objective is to raise revenues at the minimum cost to welfare, optimally-set tariff rates will be inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand for imports. So they will generally differ across goods.Such a menu of tariff rates endows customs officials with the opportunity to extract rent from importers. If officials have enough discretionary power, they might threaten to misclassify goods into more heavily taxed categories unless importers pay them a bribe. Because of the bribe, the effective tariff rate for the importing firm increases, so demand for the good decreases.The resulting drop in import demand implies an efficiency loss as well as lower government revenues, compared with the optimal taxation benchmark without corruption.A similar argument applies when customs officials offer to classify goods into low-tariff categories in exchange for a bribe.Setting trade tariffs at a uniform level eliminates officials' opportunities to extract rents. Thus, when corruption is pervasive, a uniform tariff can deliver more government revenues and welfare than the optimally set (Ramsey) tariff benchmark.The empirical evidence confirms that these considerations are relevant to policymaking, since a robust association between the standard deviation of trade tariffs - a measure of the diversification of tariff menus - and corruption emerges across countries.This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study corruption. Please contact Roberta Gatti, Internet address [email protected].
Book Synopsis Collection Lags and the Optimal Inflation Tax by : Mr.Alex Mourmouras
Download or read book Collection Lags and the Optimal Inflation Tax written by Mr.Alex Mourmouras and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1993-07 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The observation that collection lags combine with inflation to erode fiscal revenues has long been a strong argument against seigniorage (Tanzi (1978)). However, with the exception of Dixit (1991), who used a general equilibrium model to reject this argument, the optimal tax literature has not analyzed how collection lags affect desired tax structures. In this paper, this issue is re-examined using an overlapping generations version of Dixit’s model. It is shown that depending on the specification of the collection cost function and the size of government spending in GDP, collection lags may increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the desired rate of inflation.
Book Synopsis Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates by : Pinar Yesin
Download or read book Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates written by Pinar Yesin and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate to what extent the cross-country variation in nominal interest rates can be explained as being due to governments' optimal response to economic conditions such as tax collection costs, tax evasion and government consumption needs. In particular, I study the effects of costly income taxes in the presence of an informal sector on the solution to a Ramsey problem in a general equilibrium framework. Unlike most of the previous analyses of optimal inflationary finance, the model postulates that conventional taxes carry collection costs whereas fiat money can be printed costlessly. Using estimates of tax collection costs and tax evasion reported in the literature, I calculate the optimal interest rate based on the model. Comparison of the actual and optimal interest rates demonstrates that the model can in fact partly explain the observed deviations from the Friedman Rule. Furthermore, allowing cross-country differences in the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal sectors can increase the model's explanatory power.
Book Synopsis The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags by : Avinash Dixit
Download or read book The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags written by Avinash Dixit and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.
