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Optimal Incentive Contracting
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Book Synopsis Optimal Incentive Contracting by : Joseph L. Midler
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracting written by Joseph L. Midler and published by . This book was released on 1970 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Several versions of the negotiation of the parameters of incentive contracts between a government and private contractors are formulated as game theoretical models. This framework permits one focus upon a number of aspects that have previously been overlooked such as the interaction of the participants, the lack of domination by one side or the other, constraints upon the player's strategies, and the possible joint interests of the one party in the other player's outcome. Computational methods of solution are suggested. (Author).
Book Synopsis The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management by : Ershi Qi
Download or read book The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management written by Ershi Qi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-03 with total page 1388 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management is sponsored by the Chinese Industrial Engineering Institution, CMES, which is the only national-level academic society for Industrial Engineering. The conference is held annually as the major event in this arena. Being the largest and the most authoritative international academic conference held in China, it provides an academic platform for experts and entrepreneurs in the areas of international industrial engineering and management to exchange their research findings. Many experts in various fields from China and around the world gather together at the conference to review, exchange, summarize and promote their achievements in the fields of industrial engineering and engineering management. For example, some experts pay special attention to the current state of the application of related techniques in China as well as their future prospects, such as green product design, quality control and management, supply chain and logistics management to address the need for, amongst other things low-carbon, energy-saving and emission-reduction. They also offer opinions on the outlook for the development of related techniques. The proceedings offers impressive methods and concrete applications for experts from colleges and universities, research institutions and enterprises who are engaged in theoretical research into industrial engineering and engineering management and its applications. As all the papers are of great value from both an academic and a practical point of view, they also provide research data for international scholars who are investigating Chinese style enterprises and engineering management.
Book Synopsis The Innovative Entrepreneur by : Daniel F. Spulber
Download or read book The Innovative Entrepreneur written by Daniel F. Spulber and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2014-06-16 with total page 385 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book presents an economic framework that addresses the motivation of the innovative entrepreneur.
Book Synopsis Game Theory in Management Accounting by : David Mueller
Download or read book Game Theory in Management Accounting written by David Mueller and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-09-21 with total page 453 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.
Book Synopsis Incentives in Government Contracting by : R. Preston McAfee
Download or read book Incentives in Government Contracting written by R. Preston McAfee and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Getting Incentives Right by : Robert D. Cooter
Download or read book Getting Incentives Right written by Robert D. Cooter and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-12-13 with total page 241 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How tort, contract, and restitution law can be reformed to better serve the social good Lawyers, judges, and scholars have long debated whether incentives in tort, contract, and restitution law effectively promote the welfare of society. If these incentives were ideal, tort law would reduce the cost and frequency of accidents, contract law would lubricate transactions, and restitution law would encourage people to benefit others. Unfortunately, the incentives in these laws lead to too many injuries, too little contractual cooperation, and too few unrequested benefits. Getting Incentives Right explains how law might better serve the social good. In tort law, Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat propose that all foreseeable risks should be included when setting standards of care and awarding damages. Failure to do so causes accidents that better legal incentives would avoid. In contract law, they show that making a promise often causes the person who receives it to change behavior and undermine the cooperation between the parties. They recommend several solutions, including a novel contract called "anti-insurance." In restitution law, people who convey unrequested benefits to others are seldom entitled to compensation. Restitution law should compensate them more than it currently does, so that they will provide more unrequested benefits. In these three areas of law, Getting Incentives Right demonstrates that better law can promote the well-being of people by providing better incentives for the private regulation of conduct.
Book Synopsis Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty by : Michael Balch
Download or read book Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty written by Michael Balch and published by North-Holland. This book was released on 1974 with total page 464 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns by : Robert Gibbons
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a worker's current output to update its belief about the worker's ability and competition then forces future wages (or wage contracts) to reflect these updated beliefs. Career concerns are stronger when a worker is further from retirement, because a longer prospective career increases the return to changing the market's belief. In the presence of career concerns, the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives -- the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus, the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest when a worker is close to retirement. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief-executive compensation and stock-market performance.
Book Synopsis The Handbook of Organizational Economics by : Robert Gibbons
Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Book Synopsis Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting by : Gregory Sanders
Download or read book Use of Incentives in Performance-Based Logistics Contracting written by Gregory Sanders and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2018-04-19 with total page 74 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traditional contracting is primarily transactional, rewarding contractors when deliveries are made or certain process milestones are met. Performance-Based Logistic (PBL) contracting seeks to base contractor incentives on ongoing performance measures to achieve reliability and cost savings. Key to the success of these arrangements are the incentives that align the interests of the customer and the vendor. This report describes the incentives used in PBL contracts, identifies best practices, and provides recommendations for effective incentives going forward. The study team interviewed PBL practitioners including defense-unique contractors, defense-commercial contractors, and experts who are knowledgeable in the government perspective in the United States and abroad. The team supplemented these interviews by analyzing a PBL dataset of U.S. Department of Defense contracts. Of the four identified categories of incentives—time-based, financial, scope, and other—interviews found that time-based incentives stood out for their reliable appeal and relative underuse in the United States.
Book Synopsis Incentives and Political Economy by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book Incentives and Political Economy written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2000-03-30 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models by : Jakša Cvitanic
Download or read book Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models written by Jakša Cvitanic and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-09-26 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years there has been a significant increase of interest in continuous-time Principal-Agent models, or contract theory, and their applications. Continuous-time models provide a powerful and elegant framework for solving stochastic optimization problems of finding the optimal contracts between two parties, under various assumptions on the information they have access to, and the effect they have on the underlying "profit/loss" values. This monograph surveys recent results of the theory in a systematic way, using the approach of the so-called Stochastic Maximum Principle, in models driven by Brownian Motion. Optimal contracts are characterized via a system of Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations. In a number of interesting special cases these can be solved explicitly, enabling derivation of many qualitative economic conclusions.
Download or read book The Corporation written by Dennis Mueller and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2020-04-15 with total page 261 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book reviews the theory of the firm and the large modern corporation. Examining the process of entrepreneurial capitalism in which firms come into existence, then managerial capitalism and the changing motives of management in corporations - The Corporation is a thorough and thoughtful account. Of interest to students and academics in
Book Synopsis Trump: The Art of the Deal by : Donald J. Trump
Download or read book Trump: The Art of the Deal written by Donald J. Trump and published by Ballantine Books. This book was released on 2009-12-23 with total page 401 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: President Donald J. Trump lays out his professional and personal worldview in this classic work—a firsthand account of the rise of America’s foremost deal-maker. “I like thinking big. I always have. To me it’s very simple: If you’re going to be thinking anyway, you might as well think big.”—Donald J. Trump Here is Trump in action—how he runs his organization and how he runs his life—as he meets the people he needs to meet, chats with family and friends, clashes with enemies, and challenges conventional thinking. But even a maverick plays by rules, and Trump has formulated time-tested guidelines for success. He isolates the common elements in his greatest accomplishments; he shatters myths; he names names, spells out the zeros, and fully reveals the deal-maker’s art. And throughout, Trump talks—really talks—about how he does it. Trump: The Art of the Deal is an unguarded look at the mind of a brilliant entrepreneur—the ultimate read for anyone interested in the man behind the spotlight. Praise for Trump: The Art of the Deal “Trump makes one believe for a moment in the American dream again.”—The New York Times “Donald Trump is a deal maker. He is a deal maker the way lions are carnivores and water is wet.”—Chicago Tribune “Fascinating . . . wholly absorbing . . . conveys Trump’s larger-than-life demeanor so vibrantly that the reader’s attention is instantly and fully claimed.”—Boston Herald “A chatty, generous, chutzpa-filled autobiography.”—New York Post
