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Three Essays On Compensation And The Board Of Directors
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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Compensation and the Board of Directors by : Ian Cherry
Download or read book Three Essays on Compensation and the Board of Directors written by Ian Cherry and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My second essay concerns the compensation of directors themselves. I find that institutional ownership is positively related to the level of director compensation and the proportion of equity based compensation that directors receive. These results are consistent with the interpretation that institutions prefer stronger links between firm performance and board compensation and are willing to pay higher levels of compensation for better governance. I also investigate the difference between the effects of active versus passive institutional investment and find that active institutions appear to have a larger economic impact on director compensation. However, I do not find a statistical difference between the effects of active and passive ownership.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Compensation, Structure, and Decision Making of the Board of Directors by : Duong Thuy Pham
Download or read book Three Essays on the Compensation, Structure, and Decision Making of the Board of Directors written by Duong Thuy Pham and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 98 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My second essay explores the role CEO gender plays in shaping the board of directors. The literature provides strong evidence that male CEOs are more overconfident than female CEOs. I contend that a male CEO, who may overestimate his ability and/or underestimate the monitoring role of the board, will prefer to exert as much control over the board as possible and thus prefer a weaker board. I find consistent results that new male CEOs are more likely to increase board size, decrease board independence, reduce board gender diversification, have worse director attendance and have lower overall board monitoring. In contrast, new female CEOs have more gender diversified boards and are associated with an increase in overall board monitoring intensity. I also find supporting evidence in terms of CEO compensation, where new male CEOs gain more control and are compensated more in both total compensation and equity compensation post transition, consistent with what we expect from a weaker board.
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Executive Compensation by : Randy Beavers
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Randy Beavers and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO. In essay two, I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M & A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M & A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders. In essay three, I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate compensation incentives of risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage. These types of firms use a higher percentage of term loans and other debt but a lower percentage of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Brandon Neil Cline
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Brandon Neil Cline and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance by : Swarnodeep Homroy
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance written by Swarnodeep Homroy and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Moritz Heimes
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Moritz Heimes and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Robert R. Johnson
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Robert R. Johnson and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control by : Susan Christine Sassalos
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control written by Susan Christine Sassalos and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation by : Anamarija Delic
Download or read book Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation written by Anamarija Delic and published by . This book was released on 2024 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Executive Compensation by : Zenu Sharma
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Zenu Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Top Management Team Compensation by : Tim Kettenring
Download or read book Three Essays on Top Management Team Compensation written by Tim Kettenring and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value by : Mustafa A. Dah
Download or read book Essays on the Effect of Excess Compensation and Governance Changes on Firm Value written by Mustafa A. Dah and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm's performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm's future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators' objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm's governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders' wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Executive Compensation by : Jinsha Zhao
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Jinsha Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Dark Side of Managerial Compensation by : Yilun Shi
Download or read book Three Essays on the Dark Side of Managerial Compensation written by Yilun Shi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation by : Patrick Bernard Washington
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation written by Patrick Bernard Washington and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interconnections between blockholders and CEO power, and the link between deferred compensation (inside debt) and financial performance/firm behavior. In the first chapter, I consider agency theory's prediction that a large shareholder, "blockholder," can serve as an effective governance mechanism when monitoring man- agers by reducing CEO dominance. However, not all blockholders are created equally. Inside blockholders with large equity stakes may be subject to CEO influence. Outside blockholders may not fear the same career concerns. Using a novel approach, I sepa- rate blockholders into insiders (officers & directors) and outsiders when considering their relationship to CEO power, which is proxied by the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). However, separating blockholders into outside and officer specifications reveals that director block- holders reduce CEO power. Economic theory suggests that firms with multiple classes of shares have weak governance structures. A significant difference in CEO dominance inside dual class share firms versus single class share firms has been documented. This paper expounds on previous research and shed's light on the effect of insiders' differential shareholder rights in dual class share firms. Evidence is provided that shows as insiders' percentage of voting rights increase then CEO power (CPS) decreases. Also, the results reveal that as insiders' percentage of cash flow rights increase then CEO power (CPS) increases. In the second chapter, I study recent literature's documentation that inside debt is widely used in executive compensation contracts. Prior research has only focused on the CEO's level of inside debt. However, the inner workings of the top executive team, and their importance for firm performance are difficult to observe and measure. In this essay, I aim to contribute to the subject by introducing new measures pertaining to the rela- tionship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team, as well as studying the relation between these measures and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. My novel measure is the Slice of CEO Inside Debt (SCID) -- the frac- tion of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO. The effects of total deferred compensation account balances, firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID. This research provides evidence of increased CEO tenure (entrenchment) in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, reduced spending on research and development in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, increased spend- ing on capital expenditures in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID, and a lower probability of bankruptcy in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID. Also, this paper shows that as the CEO's slice of deferred compensation from firm contributions and executive contributions increases then firm liquidity, i.e. working capital, decreases. In the final chapter, I consider prior research that has shown firms with CEOs who have less power take less risk. Thus, theory suggests that reducing CEO power through the use of deferred compensation, "inside debt," should motivate executives to become more risk averse. This essay investigates the relationship between the Slice of CEO Inside- Debt (SCID) — the fraction of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO — and CEO power (CPS--CEO Pay Slice) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The effects of firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID in relation to CPS and CSR. This research provides evidence of increased CEO power by showing that firms with CEOs who contribute more money to their deferred compensation accounts relative to the total amount deferred by the top five executives, including the CEO, have CEOs with greater power in the following year. Additionally, this essay studies firms use of inside debt and its effect on corporate social responsibility. Empirical evidence is provided that firms with CEOs who experience increased earnings on their deferred compensation accounts relative to the account earnings of top five executives are positively correlated with being more socially responsible.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Corporate Debt and CEO Compensation by : Maya Waisman
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Debt and CEO Compensation written by Maya Waisman and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2007 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Board of Director Compensation by : Gyoungsin Park
Download or read book Essays on Board of Director Compensation written by Gyoungsin Park and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 434 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
