The Arrow Impossibility Theorem

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Publisher : Columbia University Press
ISBN 13 : 0231153287
Total Pages : 164 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (311 download)

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Book Synopsis The Arrow Impossibility Theorem by : Eric Maskin

Download or read book The Arrow Impossibility Theorem written by Eric Maskin and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-07-08 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Kenneth Arrow's pathbreaking Òimpossibility theoremÓ was a watershed in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book, Amartya Sen and Eric Maskin explore the implications of ArrowÕs theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theoremÕs value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, while Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the idealÑgiven that achieving the ideal is impossible. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth Arrow himself, as well as essays by Sen and Maskin outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.

Social Choice and Individual Values

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Publisher : Yale University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780300013641
Total Pages : 152 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (136 download)

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Book Synopsis Social Choice and Individual Values by : Kenneth Joseph Arrow

Download or read book Social Choice and Individual Values written by Kenneth Joseph Arrow and published by Yale University Press. This book was released on 1963-01-01 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The literature on the theory of social choice has grown considerably beyond the few items in existence at the time the first edition of this book appeared in 1951. Some of the new literature has dealt with the technical, mathematical aspects, more with the interpretive. My own thinking has also evolved somewhat, although I remain far from satisfied with present formulations. The exhaustion of the first edition provides a convenient time for a selective and personal stocktaking in the form of an appended commentary entitled, 'Notes on the Theory of Social Choice, 1963, ' containing reflections on the text and its omissions and on some of the more recent literature. This form has seemed more appropriate than a revision of the original text, which has to some extent acquired a life of its own.

Arrow Impossibility Theorems

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Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 1483271269
Total Pages : 206 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (832 download)

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Book Synopsis Arrow Impossibility Theorems by : Jerry S. Kelly

Download or read book Arrow Impossibility Theorems written by Jerry S. Kelly and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-10 with total page 206 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Arrow Impossibility Theorems is a 10-chapter text that describes existing impossibility theorems. This book explores a number of formalizations of ethical constraints of the theorems. After an introduction to the framework and notation for Arrow impossibility theorems, this book goes on discussing some concepts and an apparatus of relations among those concepts which are important for the theorems. Other chapters present some impossibility results that serve to point out serious difficulties in some plausible escape routes from the theorems of earlier chapters. The final chapter describes important areas of research that have arisen in the collective choice field in the transition away from studying the conditions of Arrow's theorem alone to the totality of all impossibility theorems. This book is intended primarily for economists.

Social Choice and Individual Values

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Publisher : Yale University Press
ISBN 13 : 0300186983
Total Pages : 347 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (1 download)

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Book Synopsis Social Choice and Individual Values by : Kenneth J. Arrow

Download or read book Social Choice and Individual Values written by Kenneth J. Arrow and published by Yale University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-26 with total page 347 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Originally published in 1951, "Social Choice and Individual Values" introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem, ' has changed the way we think."--Donald G. Saari, author of "Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected "

Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory

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Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 038729368X
Total Pages : 401 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (872 download)

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Book Synopsis Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory by : Allan M. Feldman

Download or read book Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory written by Allan M. Feldman and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-06-14 with total page 401 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.

The Theory of Social Choice

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Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 1400868335
Total Pages : 277 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (8 download)

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Book Synopsis The Theory of Social Choice by : Peter C. Fishburn

Download or read book The Theory of Social Choice written by Peter C. Fishburn and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2015-03-08 with total page 277 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is divided into three main parts: social choice between two alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions; simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in Practice

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Publisher : GRIN Verlag
ISBN 13 : 3668832617
Total Pages : 21 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (688 download)

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Book Synopsis Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in Practice by : Johannes König

Download or read book Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in Practice written by Johannes König and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2018-11-12 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Politics - General and Theories of International Politics, grade: 1,7, University of Bayreuth, language: English, abstract: Accurately figuring out the cumulative ordering of preferences of an entire society as an aggregation of the orderings of preferences of many individuals would inherently simplify democratic decision processes. However, the social preference ordering is contingent on the specific procedure, or voting rule, used to aggregate the individual preference orderings. This means that different voting rules can lead to different social preference orderings under the input of the same individual preference orderings. This issue effectuates the questions which of the different possible outcomes is the most legitimate, and by extension which voting rule should be used. Arrow sought to answer these questions by demanding that voting rules satisfy a particular set of democratically desirable qualities – these are referred to as axioms or conditions. A voting rule that succeeds in complying with all the conditions could be considered democratically legitimate. The emerging issue is that no voting rule can possibly satisfy all theconditions simultaneously. The blatant preliminary conclusion of this impossibility theorem is somewhat bleak: our faith in democratic voting procedures might be entirely misguided. The aim of this paper is to ascertain, whether the implications of this impossibility theorem constitute an actual issue for the practical application of preference aggregation – or voting – in a democratic political system. Having argued that certain evasions of the impossibility can be practically justified in most cases, the paper will conclude that the impossibility is only relevant for a negligible number of scenarios. Thus, inferring that in most cases Arrow’s impossibility theorem, albeit theoretically relevant, does not constitute a profound issue for voting procedures in a democratic political system.

Finance & Development, September 2014

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Publisher : International Monetary Fund
ISBN 13 : 1475566980
Total Pages : 60 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (755 download)

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Book Synopsis Finance & Development, September 2014 by : International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept.

Download or read book Finance & Development, September 2014 written by International Monetary Fund. External Relations Dept. and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2014-08-25 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chapter discusses various past and future aspects of the global economy. There has been a huge transformation of the global economy in the last several years. Articles on the future of energy in the global economy by Jeffrey Ball and on measuring inequality by Jonathan Ostry and Andrew Berg are also illustrated. Since the 2008 global crisis, global economists must change the way they look at the world.

How Markets Fail

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Publisher : Penguin UK
ISBN 13 : 0141939427
Total Pages : 485 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (419 download)

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Book Synopsis How Markets Fail by : Cassidy John

Download or read book How Markets Fail written by Cassidy John and published by Penguin UK. This book was released on 2013-01-31 with total page 485 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: How did we get to where we are? John Cassidy shows that the roots of our most recent financial failure lie not with individuals, but with an idea - the idea that markets are inherently rational. He gives us the big picture behind the financial headlines, tracing the rise and fall of free market ideology from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan. Full of wit, sense and, above all, a deeper understanding, How Markets Fail argues for the end of 'utopian' economics, and the beginning of a pragmatic, reality-based way of thinking. A very good history of economic thought Economist How Markets Fail offers a brilliant intellectual framework . . . fine work New York Times An essential, grittily intellectual, yet compelling guide to the financial debacle of 2009 Geordie Greig, Evening Standard A powerful argument . . . Cassidy makes a compelling case that a return to hands-off economics would be a disaster BusinessWeek This book is a well constructed, thoughtful and cogent account of how capitalism evolved to its current form Telegraph Books of the Year recommendation John Cassidy ... describe[s] that mix of insight and madness that brought the world's system to its knees FT, Book of the Year recommendation Anyone who enjoys a good read can safely embark on this tour with Cassidy as their guide . . . Like his colleague Malcolm Gladwell [at the New Yorker], Cassidy is able to lead us with beguiling lucidity through unfamiliar territory New Statesman John Cassidy has covered economics and finance at The New Yorker magazine since 1995, writing on topics ranging from Alan Greenspan to the Iraqi oil industry and English journalism. He is also now a Contributing Editor at Portfolio where he writes the monthly Economics column. Two of his articles have been nominated for National Magazine Awards: an essay on Karl Marx, which appeared in October, 1997, and an account of the death of the British weapons scientist David Kelly, which was published in December, 2003. He has previously written for Sunday Times in as well as the New York Post, where he edited the Business section and then served as the deputy editor. In 2002, Cassidy published his first book, Dot.Con. He lives in New York.

The Limits of Organization

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Publisher : W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN 13 : 0393355799
Total Pages : 61 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (933 download)

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Book Synopsis The Limits of Organization by : Kenneth J. Arrow

Download or read book The Limits of Organization written by Kenneth J. Arrow and published by W. W. Norton & Company. This book was released on 1974-02-17 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The tension between what we wish for and what we can get, between values and opportunities, exists even at the purely individual level. A hermit on a mountain may value warm clothing and yet be hard-pressed to make it from the leaves, bark, or skins he can find. But when many people are competing with each other for satisfaction of their wants, learning how to exploit what is available becomes more difficult. In this volume, Nobel Laureate Kenneth J. Arrow analyzes why - and how - human beings organize their common lives to overcome the basic economic problem: the allocation of scarce resources. The price system is one means of organizing society to mediate competition, and Arrow analyzes its successes and failures. Alternative modes of achieving efficient allocation of resources are explored: government, the internal organization of the firm, and the 'invisible institutions' of ethical and moral principles. Professor Arrow shows how these systems create channels to make decisions, and discusses the costs of information acquisition and retrieval. He investigates the factors determining which potential decision variables are recognized as such. Finally, he argues that organizations must achieve some balance between the power of the decision makers and their obligation to those who carry out their decisions - between authority and responsibility.

Social Choice Theory

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Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 366209925X
Total Pages : 174 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (62 download)

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Book Synopsis Social Choice Theory by : Jerry S. Kelly

Download or read book Social Choice Theory written by Jerry S. Kelly and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-03-09 with total page 174 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is a textbook introducing selected topics in formal social choice theory. Social choice theory studies group choices that are based on information about preferences of members of the group (voting rules being one important special case). This involves economics, which provides the method of modelling individual decision making; political philosophy, which provides criteria about the allocation of decision-influencing power; and game theory, which provides a framework for thinking about the strategies individuals employ in trying to influence the group choice. The goal of this book is to take basic ideas like impossibility theorems, rights exercising and strategy proofness and give the student just enough technical background to be able to understand these ideas in a logically rigorous way. This is done through a set of 250 exercises that constitute the heart of the book and which differentiate this book from all other texts in social choice theory.

A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 114 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)

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Book Synopsis A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem by : Howard DeLong

Download or read book A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem written by Howard DeLong and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 114 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

Arrovian Aggregation Models

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Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 9780792384519
Total Pages : 260 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (845 download)

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Book Synopsis Arrovian Aggregation Models by : Fuad T. Aleskerov

Download or read book Arrovian Aggregation Models written by Fuad T. Aleskerov and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1999-03-31 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the `best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow formulated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the `local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures. Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of local rules, Arrovian Aggregation Models investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in all models some analogue of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition is used, which is why we call these models Arrovian aggregation models. Chapter 1 presents a general description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules, and introduces problem formulations for various versions of formalization of individual opinions and collective decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of `rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 deals with the aggregation model for the case of individual opinions and social decisions formalized as binary relations. Chapter 4 deals with Functional Aggregation Rules which transform into a social choice function individual opinions defined as choice functions. Chapter 5 considers another model – Social Choice Correspondences when the individual opinions are formalized as binary relations, and the collective decision is looked for as a choice function. Several new classes of rules are introduced and analyzed.

Decisions and Elections

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Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780521004046
Total Pages : 258 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (4 download)

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Book Synopsis Decisions and Elections by : Donald Saari

Download or read book Decisions and Elections written by Donald Saari and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-10-22 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this bad result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow s famed theorem has been interpreted to mean no decision procedure is without flaws . Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow s and Sen s theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.

Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

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Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780521008839
Total Pages : 196 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (88 download)

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Book Synopsis Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation by : Alan D. Taylor

Download or read book Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation written by Alan D. Taylor and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2005-05-09 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Honesty in voting, it turns out, is not always the best policy. Indeed, in the early 1970s, Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, building on the seminal work of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, proved that with three or more alternatives there is no reasonable voting system that is non-manipulable; voters will always have an opportunity to benefit by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The ensuing decades produced a number of theorems of striking mathematical naturality that dealt with the manipulability of voting systems. This book presents many of these results from the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially the contributions of economists and philosophers, from a mathematical point of view, with many new proofs. The presentation is almost completely self-contained, and requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments. Mathematics students, as well as mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers will learn why it is impossible to devise a completely unmanipulable voting system.

Majority Judgment

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Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262545713
Total Pages : 431 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (625 download)

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Book Synopsis Majority Judgment by : Michel Balinski

Download or read book Majority Judgment written by Michel Balinski and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-06-07 with total page 431 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An account of a new theory and method of voting, judging and ranking, majority judgment, shown to be superior to all other known methods. In Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model—transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method—majority judgment—proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's. They offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on insights from wine, sports, music, and other competitions, Balinski and Laraki argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking, but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm—to evaluate.

Numbers Rule

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Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691209081
Total Pages : 240 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (912 download)

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Book Synopsis Numbers Rule by : George Szpiro

Download or read book Numbers Rule written by George Szpiro and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-11-03 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author takes the general reader on a tour of the mathematical puzzles and paradoxes inherent in voting systems, such as the Alabama Paradox, in which an increase in the number of seats in the Congress could actually lead to a reduced number of representatives for a state, and the Condorcet Paradox, which demonstrates that the winner of elections featuring more than two candidates does not necessarily reflect majority preferences. Szpiro takes a roughly chronological approach to the topic, traveling from ancient Greece to the present and, in addition to offering explanations of the various mathematical conundrums of elections and voting, also offers biographical details on the mathematicians and other thinkers who thought about them, including Plato, Pliny the Younger, Pierre Simon Laplace, Thomas Jefferson, John von Neumann, and Kenneth Arrow.