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Risk Shifting And The Regulation Of Bank Ceos Compensation
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Book Synopsis Risk-Shifting and the Regulation of Bank CEOs' Compensation by : Pierre Chaigneau
Download or read book Risk-Shifting and the Regulation of Bank CEOs' Compensation written by Pierre Chaigneau and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk shifting. We extend a standard model of CEO compensation by incorporating leverage and an investment decision. To the extent that bank depositors and creditors are even partially protected by public guarantees, we show that it is in the interests of bank shareholders to choose more risky investments than would be socially optimal, and therefore to design a CEO contract with excessive risk taking incentives. Thus, we argue that current corporate governance arrangements in the banking sector are not efficient. In this setting, we show that putting in place one of the aforementioned mechanisms could yield the socially optimal outcome at no cost. We also identify some limitations and potential perverse effects of these mechanisms.
Book Synopsis Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards by : Julian Kolm
Download or read book Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards written by Julian Kolm and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders' incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation.
Download or read book Bank CEOs written by Claudia Curi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-05-22 with total page 61 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book thoroughly explores the characteristics and importance of bank CEOs against the backdrop of growing awareness of the social implications of CEO behavior for the performance and stability of the financial and economic system. After an introductory section on the relevance of CEOs in the banking industry, the connections between the bank CEO labor market, contractual incentives, and compensation structures are examined. The focus then turns to empirical findings concerning the impact that bank CEO compensation has on various firm-level outcomes, such as bank performance and strategies. In addition, the relation between CEO turnover and changes in compensation policies since the financial crisis is discussed. A concluding section presents some fresh empirical evidence deriving from an up-to-date database of traits of CEOs operating in the largest European banks. For PhD students and academics, the surveys offer detailed roadmaps on the empirical research landscape and provide suggestions for future work. The writing style ensures that the content will be readily accessible to all industry practitioners.
Book Synopsis Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry by : Kose John
Download or read book Regulation, Subordinated Debt, and Incentive Features of CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by considering banks' unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debt holders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation (1) decreases with the total leverage ratio and (2) increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and non-depository (subordinated) debt holders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider monitoring based on four variables: the subordinated debt ratio, subordinated debt rating, nonperforming loan ratio, and BOPEC rating (regulators' assessment of a bank's overall health and financial condition). We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses. Our results hold after controlling for the endogeneity among compensation, leverage, and monitoring; they are robust to various regression specifications and sample criteria.
Book Synopsis Regulating Bank CEO Compensation and Active Boards by : Julian Kolm
Download or read book Regulating Bank CEO Compensation and Active Boards written by Julian Kolm and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the role of using CEO compensation and capital requirements in bank regulation. With a passive uninformed board that delegates the choice of bank strategy to the CEO, requiring a compensation contract where the CEO receives a fixed fraction of total bank payoff eliminates the risk shifting problem and can implement first best; no additional regulatory limit on bank leverage is needed. With an informed, active board that represents shareholder interests, however, there exists no CEO compensation that assures that the socially optimal level of risk is chosen. The optimal policy mix consists of deferred compensation for the CEO, a bonus cap or a compensation that is linear in total payoff, and a constraint on bank leverage. Regulating CEO compensation allows to relax regulatory capital requirements.
Book Synopsis Incentive Features in CEO Compensation by : Kose John
Download or read book Incentive Features in CEO Compensation written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO compensation in the banking industry by taking into account banks unique claim structure in the presence of two types of agency problems: the standard managerial agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. We empirically test two hypotheses derived from this framework: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation decreases with the total leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation increases with the intensity of monitoring provided by regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders. We construct an index of the intensity of outsider monitoring based on four variables: subordinated debt ratio, subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and BOPEC rating assigned by regulators. We findsupporting evidence for both hypotheses. Our results hold after controlling for the endogeneity among compensation, leverage and monitoring. They are robust to various regression specifications and sample criteria.
Book Synopsis Basel III and CEO Compensation in Banks: Pay Structures as a Regulatory Signal by : Christian Eufinger
Download or read book Basel III and CEO Compensation in Banks: Pay Structures as a Regulatory Signal written by Christian Eufinger and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Book Synopsis Managerial Compensation, Regulation and Risk in Banks by : Vittoria Cerasi
Download or read book Managerial Compensation, Regulation and Risk in Banks written by Vittoria Cerasi and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes the relation between CEOs monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in banks. We present a model where banks lend to opaque entrepreneurial projects to be monitored by managers; managers are remunerated according to a pay-for-performance scheme and their effort is unobservable to depositors and shareholders. Within a prudential regulatory framework that defines a capital requirement and a deposit insurance, we study the effect of increasing the variable component of managerial compensation on risk taking. We then test empirically how monetary incentives provided to CEOs in 2006 affected banks' stock price and volatility during the 2007-2008 financial crisis on a sample of large banks around the World. The cross-country dimension of our sample allows us to study the interaction between CEO incentives and financial regulation. The empirical analysis suggests that the sensitivity of CEOs equity portfolios to stock prices and volatility has been indeed related to worse performance in countries with explicit deposit insurance and weaker monitoring by shareholders. This evidence is coherent with the main prediction of the model, that is, the variable part of the managerial compensation, combined with weak insiders' monitoring, exacerbates the risk-shifting attitude by managers.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks by : Robert DeYoung
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U. S. Commercial Banks written by Robert DeYoung and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2010-08 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.
Book Synopsis CEO Remuneration and Bank Default Risk by : Francesco Vallascas
Download or read book CEO Remuneration and Bank Default Risk written by Francesco Vallascas and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the impact of incentive mechanisms embedded in executive remuneration contracts on the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a panel of US and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to estimate how bonus payments and option holdings impact the level of bank default risk targeted by CEOs. We find that CEO cash bonuses reduce default risk, while stock options increase the preferred risk level. We argue that the convex payoff structure of stock options induces CEOs to shift risk to bondholders and regulators, whereas the (typically) non-convex payoffs linked to managerial bonus plans constrain managerial risk preferences. Further, we show that CEO pay promotes excess risk-taking predominantly in weaker regulatory environments and at financially distressed banks. Our results link executive compensation in the banking industry to financial stability and caution that any attempt to regulate compensation in banking needs to tie compensation practices to regulatory regimes and the riskiness of banks.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks* by : Robert DeYoung
Download or read book Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks* written by Robert DeYoung and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with standard measures of vega and delta, to risk-increasing business policy choices. Moreover, these linkages became stronger after 1999, when financial industry deregulation created new growth opportunities for commercial banks. Our results suggest that compensation committees provided new incentives for bank CEOs to exploit these growth opportunities, and also to shift from traditional on-balance sheet portfolio lending to less traditional investments (e.g., private-issue mortgage-backed securities) and nontraditional fee-generating activities. Apart from these strategic reallocations, our results also suggest that bank boards designed CEO compensation contracts to limit excessive risk taking, especially after deregulation.
Book Synopsis Executive Pay and Performance by : R. Glenn Hubbard
Download or read book Executive Pay and Performance written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
Book Synopsis Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry by : Kose John
Download or read book Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the Banking Industry written by Kose John and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We hypothesize that CEO compensation is optimally designed to trade off two types of agency problems: the standard shareholder-management agency problem as well as the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and debtholders. Analyses in this setup produces two predictions: (1) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio; and (2) the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation increases with the intensity of outside monitoring on the firm's risk choice. We test these two hypotheses for the banking industry where regulators and nondepository (subordinated) debtholders provide outside monitoring on the risk choice. We construct an index of the intensity of outside monitoring based on three variables: subordinated debt rating, non performing loan ratio and examination rating assigned by regulators. We find supporting evidence for both hypotheses.
Book Synopsis Bankers' Pay and Excessive Risk by : John E. Thanassoulis
Download or read book Bankers' Pay and Excessive Risk written by John E. Thanassoulis and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If a bank might be too-big-to-fail, then shareholders' optimal compensation contract encourages the executive to risk-shift on to the taxpayer. Standard risk-reducing regulatory compensation rules -- deferred pay, equity-linked pay, debt-like instruments in pay -- do not fully correct for excessive risk-taking caused by too-big-to-fail. By contrast, clawback regulations, or equivalently the performance bond, can incentivise the executive to make society's first-best risk choices, but only if accompanied by appropriate restrictions on the curvature of pay. Without these, optimising bank shareholders can neutralise the effect of clawback on the executive's project choice by offering a bonus which is sufficiently convex in equity value.
Book Synopsis The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance by : Benjamin Hermalin
Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Book Synopsis Pay Without Performance by : Lucian A. Bebchuk
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Book Synopsis Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition by : Simone M. Sepe
Download or read book Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition written by Simone M. Sepe and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line-using incentives to manage risk-taking-once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank's best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises from that competition. Greater risk-taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the amount a non-executive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank value. Non-executives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses materialize. The result is an upward spiral in compensation-reducing an executive's ability to set non-executive pay and the ability of any one bank to adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes. New regulation must address the tension between compensation and competition. Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay, including by non-banks who compete for talent. The ability of non-executives to jump from a bank employer to another financial firm should also be limited. In addition, banks should be required to include a long-term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs related to her prior work.
