Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Repeated Games With Long Run And Short Run Players
Download Repeated Games With Long Run And Short Run Players full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Repeated Games With Long Run And Short Run Players ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players by : Drew Fudenberg
Download or read book Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players written by Drew Fudenberg and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games by : Drew Fudenberg
Download or read book A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Repeated Games Without Perfect Information by : Illtae Ahn
Download or read book Three Essays on Repeated Games Without Perfect Information written by Illtae Ahn and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 134 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Book Synopsis A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games by : Drew Fudenberg
Download or read book A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1991-08-29 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Book Synopsis The Social Contract of the Firm by : Lorenzo Sacconi
Download or read book The Social Contract of the Firm written by Lorenzo Sacconi and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm's stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games by : Jean-François Mertens
Download or read book Repeated Games written by Jean-François Mertens and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-02-02 with total page 597 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Book Synopsis A Course in Microeconomic Theory by : David M. Kreps
Download or read book A Course in Microeconomic Theory written by David M. Kreps and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-06-23 with total page 869 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Book Synopsis Introduction to Industrial Organization by : Luis M. B. Cabral
Download or read book Introduction to Industrial Organization written by Luis M. B. Cabral and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2000-08-14 with total page 374 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. Over the past twenty years, the study of industrial organization—the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets—has grown from a niche area of microeconomics to a key component of economics and of related disciplines such as finance, strategy, and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. While formal in its approach, the book is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. Supplemental materials posted on the Web make more extensive use of algebra and calculus.
Book Synopsis State, Anarchy, Collective Decisions by : A. Coram
Download or read book State, Anarchy, Collective Decisions written by A. Coram and published by Springer. This book was released on 2001-05-04 with total page 190 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions provides an introduction to the applications of game theory to a series of questions that are fundamental in political economy. These questions include: Why do we need states? What might happen without protection for life and property? How might tribes or criminal gangs behave in struggles over material possessions? Would people tell the truth if asked what they wanted?
Book Synopsis Algorithmic Game Theory by : Guido Schäfer
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Guido Schäfer and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on with total page 549 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steven N. Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-14 with total page 391 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Author :Econometric Society. World Congress Publisher :Cambridge University Press ISBN 13 :9780521484596 Total Pages :342 pages Book Rating :4.4/5 (845 download)
Book Synopsis Advances in Economic Theory: Volume 1 by : Econometric Society. World Congress
Download or read book Advances in Economic Theory: Volume 1 written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992 with total page 342 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.
Book Synopsis Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics by : Christopher Adolph
Download or read book Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics written by Christopher Adolph and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-04-15 with total page 389 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.