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Managerial Incentives In Duopoly
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Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives in Duopoly by : Rupayan Pal
Download or read book Managerial Incentives in Duopoly written by Rupayan Pal and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies with the incentive schemes offered by the owners, then the well-known results of equilibrium incentive scheme (by Fershtman and Judd, 1987, A.E.R.) get modified. In case of quantity competition the incentive scheme offered by the owners depend on the proportion of the incentive scheme that the managers get as a part of their salary, i.e. in equilibrium owners will not necessarily deviate from profit maximization to sales maximization, where as under price competition, demand and cost parameters plays crucial role to determine the equilibrium incentive structure.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Timing and Strategic Managerial Incentives in a Duopoly Game by : Michael Kopel
Download or read book Endogenous Timing and Strategic Managerial Incentives in a Duopoly Game written by Michael Kopel and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It is shown that in our quantity-setting model Stackelberg-type outcomes can occur. In these outcomes the Stackelberg leader is owner-managed and the follower delegates the quantity choice to a manager, who is compensated based on profits and sales. Furthermore, the follower has a second-mover advantage, i.e. achieves a higher profit than the leader.
Book Synopsis Collusion, Managerial Incentives and Antitrust Fines by : Florence Thépot
Download or read book Collusion, Managerial Incentives and Antitrust Fines written by Florence Thépot and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Based on a price setting duopoly model, this paper argues that collusion on managerial incentive compensation may have the equivalent effect to collusion on prices. This paper also provides an analysis of the effect of different antitrust fines regimes in the context of a game between two companies each composed of two-level of decision making (the board of directors and the sales manager). The contribution of this paper is two-fold: it identifies "backstage arrangements" that may be used by companies in order to achieve monopoly outcome without entering into explicit price-fixing practices. It also highlights the inefficiency of fining regimes based on sales when companies have a multi-layer decision-making structure.
Book Synopsis Essays on Product Market Competition and Managerial Incentives in Oligopoly Firms by : Ismo Linnosmaa
Download or read book Essays on Product Market Competition and Managerial Incentives in Oligopoly Firms written by Ismo Linnosmaa and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Tiivistelmä: Tuotemarkkinoiden kilpailu ja yritysjohdon kannustinjärjestelmät epätäydellisen kilpailun yrityksissä.
Book Synopsis Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives by : Sandrine Labory
Download or read book Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives written by Sandrine Labory and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Delegation Games by : Cigdem Akbulut Merchant
Download or read book Delegation Games written by Cigdem Akbulut Merchant and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Companies employ managers for either practical, legal or administrative reasons. However, no matter what the reason, the good performance of managers and the success of companies are vital elements for firms. At this point, managerial incentives play a key role. In this paper, we use the VFJS model proposed by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). We assume that owners in a duopoly each hire a manager with a publicly observable contract which is not renegotiable. The remuneration of a manager consists of a fixed part and a bonus (incentive), which can be based on pure profits, sales, relative profit or market share. We assume that firms have different marginal costs. We find that even an inefficient firm can obtain Stackelberg leadership profits if it compensates its manager with a market share or a relative profit incentive whereas its rival is just owner-led. We also consider duopolies where the efficient firm remunerates its manager with a market share incentive and the rival firm uses a sales, a relative profit or a market share incentive. We find that the efficient firm could achieve Stackelberg leadership profits if the difference between marginal costs of two firms exceeds a certain benchmark. Finally, we determine that the less efficient firm owner always prefers to use a managerial bonus based on relative profits. If the difference between marginal costs is large enough, the owner of the more efficient firm prefers to use a managerial bonus based on market share.
Book Synopsis Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives by : Ishita Chatterjee
Download or read book Wage Bargaining and Managerial Incentives written by Ishita Chatterjee and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting interests in designing managerial incentives: one for profit orientation to reduce wage, and the other for sales orientation to gain in output competition. The net effect depends on the workers' bargaining power.
Book Synopsis Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing by : William Novshek
Download or read book Capacity Choice and Duopoly Incentives for Information Sharing written by William Novshek and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms by : Luca Lambertini
Download or read book An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms written by Luca Lambertini and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-04-21 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
Book Synopsis Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly by : Byoung Jun
Download or read book Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly written by Byoung Jun and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managing through Incentives by : Richard B. McKenzie
Download or read book Managing through Incentives written by Richard B. McKenzie and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1998-09-24 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Incentives are the most powerful tools executives can use to improve worker performance. This is particularly true in today's empowered workplace, where incentives can ensure that workers apply their initiative toward company goals. Now, in this groundbreaking book, Richard McKenzie and Dwight Lee show how to select the right incentives and how to use them for best results. Generously illustrated with examples from business, industry, government, academia, and professional sports, this superb volume offers a comprehensive overview of incentives, both in theory and in practice, providing a wealth of ideas managers can use to get employees to work harder, smarter, and more cooperatively. Much of the book is quite eye-opening. For instance, while McKenzie and Lee recognize that money is the prime motivator, they urge managers not to overlook the power of non-monetary incentives, carefully evaluating such motivators as fringe benefits, psychological incentives, education, and training. And they examine a host of other issues, including how to take advantage of executive "overpayment" to increase profits; the limits of piece-rate and other pay-for-performance schemes; finding the right balance between current pay and a more generous pension plan; the value of tough bosses; and hostile takeovers as a form of managerial incentive. How workers are rewarded is often more important than how much they are rewarded, say the authors. The job of good managers is getting the incentives right. Managing Through Incentives shows managers how to apply proven motivators to help any size firm energize the work force, increase its profits, and meet the awesome challenges of today's fiercely competitive global economy.
Book Synopsis An Experimental Evaluation of the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentive Contracts by : Walter P. Smith
Download or read book An Experimental Evaluation of the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentive Contracts written by Walter P. Smith and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Much accounting research has focused on cost allocation strategies. New cost-allocation systems, such as activity-based costing, have been developed and explored. Even with these new systems, some firms continue to employ less precise allocation methods that over or under-allocate costs. This paper attempts to demonstrate an explanation of why firms might wish to over or under-allocate costs by experimentally examining a duopoly market.
Book Synopsis Innovation and Managerial Incentives: a Tale of Two Systems by :
Download or read book Innovation and Managerial Incentives: a Tale of Two Systems written by and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper describes R & D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R & D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives with Endogenous Market Structure by : Murray Brown
Download or read book Managerial Incentives with Endogenous Market Structure written by Murray Brown and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms by : Luca Lambertini
Download or read book An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms written by Luca Lambertini and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2017-04-21 with total page 231 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.
Book Synopsis Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Valuation by : Stefan Beiner
Download or read book Product Market Competition, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Valuation written by Stefan Beiner and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyze the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand-collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002 to 2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.
Book Synopsis Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives by : Michael Raith
Download or read book Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives written by Michael Raith and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry affects the incentives that firms provide to their managers. A central assumption is that there is free entry and exit in the industry, which implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure. I show that with greater product market competition as a result of greater product substitutability or a larger market, principals unambiguously provide stronger incentives to their agents to reduce costs. At the same time, more intense competition also leads to more volatile firm-level profits. Consequently, managers' incentives are positively correlated with firm-level risk, consistent with empirical evidence. A decrease in the cost of entering the market has the opposite effect on incentives, but still induces a positive correlation between risk and incentives.
