Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Managerial Incentives For Takeovers
Download Managerial Incentives For Takeovers full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Managerial Incentives For Takeovers ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives for Takeovers by : Ramon Faulí-Oller
Download or read book Managerial Incentives for Takeovers written by Ramon Faulí-Oller and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains by :
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers' incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers' incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their firms' stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target managers' incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments.
Book Synopsis Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy by : Ray Ball
Download or read book Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance: Effects of Executive Compensation, Organzational Structure, Takeovers, and Government Policy written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives by : Caspar Rose
Download or read book Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives written by Caspar Rose and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Takeover Defenses and Managerial Incentives Under Alternative Legal Regimes by : Richard E. Kihlstrom
Download or read book Takeover Defenses and Managerial Incentives Under Alternative Legal Regimes written by Richard E. Kihlstrom and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance by : Ray Ball
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managing through Incentives by : Richard B. McKenzie
Download or read book Managing through Incentives written by Richard B. McKenzie and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1998-09-24 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Incentives are the most powerful tools executives can use to improve worker performance. This is particularly true in today's empowered workplace, where incentives can ensure that workers apply their initiative toward company goals. Now, in this groundbreaking book, Richard McKenzie and Dwight Lee show how to select the right incentives and how to use them for best results. Generously illustrated with examples from business, industry, government, academia, and professional sports, this superb volume offers a comprehensive overview of incentives, both in theory and in practice, providing a wealth of ideas managers can use to get employees to work harder, smarter, and more cooperatively. Much of the book is quite eye-opening. For instance, while McKenzie and Lee recognize that money is the prime motivator, they urge managers not to overlook the power of non-monetary incentives, carefully evaluating such motivators as fringe benefits, psychological incentives, education, and training. And they examine a host of other issues, including how to take advantage of executive "overpayment" to increase profits; the limits of piece-rate and other pay-for-performance schemes; finding the right balance between current pay and a more generous pension plan; the value of tough bosses; and hostile takeovers as a form of managerial incentive. How workers are rewarded is often more important than how much they are rewarded, say the authors. The job of good managers is getting the incentives right. Managing Through Incentives shows managers how to apply proven motivators to help any size firm energize the work force, increase its profits, and meet the awesome challenges of today's fiercely competitive global economy.
Book Synopsis Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives - Evidence from Copenhagen Stock Exchange by : Caspar Rose
Download or read book Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial Incentives - Evidence from Copenhagen Stock Exchange written by Caspar Rose and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The article studies how takeover defenses influence managerial incentives with respect to long term investments, excess liquidity and the amount of debt relative to equity. The article conducts a cross sectional regression based on a sample of Danish listed firms, dealing explictly with the problem of causation between the variables. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consists of shares with dual class voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. The article finds that protected firms have significantly less debt to equity. However, protected firms are not significantly more oriented towards the long term and do not have significantly more excess liquidity.
Book Synopsis Managerial Incentives and Corporate Acquisitions by : Athanasios Tsekeris
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Acquisitions written by Athanasios Tsekeris and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the impact of executive compensation on the quality of corporate acquisition decisions. A number of different issues are empirically investigated. The analysis begins with the examination of the relation between the incentives managers are provided with via their compensation contracts and the riskiness of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) investigating whether this relation is affected by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. The study then focuses on the performance of acquiring firms exploring how and whether managerial incentives can induce value-increasing acquisitions conditional on the intensity of M&A activity. The final part of the empirical analysis examines whether the legal status of the target firm has any implications for the effectiveness of incentive compensation to mitigate managerial risk-aversion and increase shareholder value. The thesis contributes both to academic literature and to practice by identifying areas of inefficiencies of equity-based compensation contracts to mitigate agency costs. More specifically, new evidence is provided on the effectiveness of incentive compensation to induce risk-taking activity under the impact of stricter regulation. While compensation-related incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition decisions before 2002, managers have become considerably less responsive to such incentives after the enactment of SOX. Moreover, although incentive compensation can improve deal performance and overcome adverse selection concerns by inducing managers to acquire when it is optimal to do, it is not related to value-increasing decisions when acquisitions are initiated during periods of merger waves. It is further found that equity-based compensation can be rendered ineffective to mitigate agency costs when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Given these inefficiencies, a number of recommendations are made for the improvement of the design of executive compensation contracts that could provide valuable guidelines to remuneration committees to reduce excessive compensation costs and benefit shareholders.
Book Synopsis The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions and Corporate Mergers and Top Management Turnover by : David Scott North
Download or read book The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions and Corporate Mergers and Top Management Turnover written by David Scott North and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Managerial Performance Measures and Their Effect on Incentives for Takeovers by : Barbara Pirchegger
Download or read book Managerial Performance Measures and Their Effect on Incentives for Takeovers written by Barbara Pirchegger and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Impact of Managerial Incentives on Shareholder Value Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions by : J. Huang
Download or read book Impact of Managerial Incentives on Shareholder Value Creation in Mergers and Acquisitions written by J. Huang and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?. by : Lianzheng Li
Download or read book Do Managerial Incentives Affect Mergers and Acquisitions?. written by Lianzheng Li and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Merger Decisions by : Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Download or read book Merger Decisions written by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and published by . This book was released on with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Corporate Takeovers by : Alan J. Auerbach
Download or read book Corporate Takeovers written by Alan J. Auerbach and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2013-12-30 with total page 354 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself.
Book Synopsis Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Control Contests--evidence of Management Earnings Forecast Characteristics and Consequences by : Jinqiu Yan
Download or read book Voluntary Disclosure in Corporate Control Contests--evidence of Management Earnings Forecast Characteristics and Consequences written by Jinqiu Yan and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines how managerial incentives in contested takeovers affect voluntary disclosure strategies. I study characteristics of voluntary disclosure around contested takeovers, based on the conjecture that good news in earnings forecasts serves as a defensive strategy to resist a takeover and/or to negotiate a higher offer price. To gauge the relation of voluntary disclosure on takeover consequences, I examine the association between voluntary disclosure and target premiums as well as the length of time to resolve the acquisition. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I find that relative to friendly targets, target management in contested target firms alters the timing of normal information flows by forecasting more good news during the takeover. Managers also manipulate the content of information by releasing optimistically biased forecasts during the takeover to favorably influence the market. Further investigations indicate that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter strategies at the time of contested takeover as a means to convey favorable inside information. The stock market responds positively to optimistic forecasts issued during the contested takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure influences contested takeovers by helping target firms negotiate better offers and postpone the M&A process. As a whole, this study demonstrates that target firms adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to reveal their true worth and enhance their bargaining power. Unlike prior literature that documents value-destroying managerial entrenchment resistance, voluntary disclosure by targets with favorable information induces information leakage and is one of the resistance tactics that potentially benefits target shareholders.
Book Synopsis Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers by : Mike Burkart
Download or read book Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers written by Mike Burkart and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal in the replacement of poorly performing managers. The joint impact of the two mechanisms on managerial turnover is, however, multi-faceted: In firms with strong boards, turnover and performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality of its board, each firm ignores the adverse effect on other firms' acquisition opportunities and takeover threat. As a result, the takeover market is not sufficiently liquid and too few takeovers occur.