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Four Essays On Economic Networks
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Book Synopsis Four Essays on Economic Networks by : Lucas Vernet
Download or read book Four Essays on Economic Networks written by Lucas Vernet and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 117 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation lies at the intersection of two fields of research in economics that have recently substantially developed: on the one hand, the modeling and study of economic networks, and on the other hand, transport theory and its applications in economics. The four chapters of this dissertation present theoretical results in relation with these two topics and put stress on their connections. The first chapter models bipartite contracts on a decentralized market as an equilibrium flow problem. We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium outcome and discuss its effciency. We interpret this equilibrium in the case of indivisible commodities. As an illustration, we build a model for the overnight interbank loan market with counterparty risk and collateralization costs. In the second one, written in collaboration with Alfred Galichon and Larry Samuelson, we prove a monotone comparative statics theorem that we then apply to several classical economic models (matching models, min-cost flow problems and hedonic models). The third chapter is a joint work with Alfred Galichon and Arthur Charpentier. It presents tools to solve for matching problems on large geographic networks before applying them to examples. Finally, the fourth chapter, written with Rakesh Vohra, shows how a monopolistic insurer can use externalities between agents - modeled as a network - to maximize his profit. We show that a monopolistic insurer decreases the welfare of all agents.
Book Synopsis Essays on Economic Networks by : Benjamin Golub
Download or read book Essays on Economic Networks written by Benjamin Golub and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation theoretically analyzes how networks of relationships among decision-makers affect two kinds of economic processes: (i) investment in public goods; and (ii) repeated updating of beliefs or behaviors based on observing neighbors. The results connect these processes to the spectral properties of networks -- that is, eigenvalues and eigenvectors -- and use the connection to shed light on economic outcomes. The first essay, based on joint work with Matthew Elliott, focuses on games in which each player simultaneously exerts costly effort that provides different benefits to each other player. The goal is to find and describe effort profiles that are immune to coordinated coalitional deviations when such a game is played repeatedly. Formally, these effort profiles are the ones that can be sustained in a strong Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. We introduce a class of effort profiles that are called centrality-stable. These are characterized by a network centrality condition: agent A's contribution (defined as effort level times marginal cost) is equal to a weighted sum of the contributions of those who help A; the weight on B's contribution measures the marginal benefit B's effort provides to A. Under certain assumptions (mainly concavity of utility functions), centrality-stable profiles exist, are Pareto-efficient, and any such profile is sustainable in a coalitionally robust equilibrium of the repeated game. Centrality-stable profiles also have an alternative definition: they are those at which all agents are first-order indifferent to scaling all efforts by a factor near $1$. This single condition rules out all profitable coalitional deviations. The results are obtained without parametric assumptions, using the theory of general equilibrium and its relation to the core, along with the Perron-Frobenius spectral theory of nonnegative matrices. When agents are uncertain about each other's utility functions but can verify marginal costs and benefits at an implemented effort profile, then the centrality-stable profiles are the only ones that are immune to manipulation through misreporting of preferences. The second essay, based on joint work with Matthew O. Jackson, studies learning in a setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the true value of a variable and then communicate in a network. They naively update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent on the long-run beliefs vanishes as the society grows. We also identify obstructions to this, including the existence of prominent groups, and provide structural conditions on the network ensuring efficient learning. The third essay, also based on joint work with Matthew O. Jackson, examines how the speed of such an updating process depends on homophily: the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately with those having similar traits. When agents' beliefs or behaviors are developed by averaging what they see among their neighbors -- as in the learning model discussed above or in a myopic best-reply dynamic -- convergence to a consensus is slowed by the presence of homophily, but is not influenced by network density. This is in stark contrast to the viral spread of a belief or behavior along shortest paths -- a process whose speed is increasing in network density but does not depend on homophily. In deriving these results, we propose a new, general spectral measure of homophily based on the relative frequencies of interactions among different groups.
Book Synopsis Essays on Economic Networks by : Hemant Patil
Download or read book Essays on Economic Networks written by Hemant Patil and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the first Essay, we present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result. Second essay studies the social networks of economic publishing. We focus on connections between the editors of the journal and the authors of the paper. The links between authors and editors are defined based on their institutional ties. We provide a model in which non-linked authors do not have access to the exact quality standards at the journal as opposed to the linked authors who have such information. We show how such asymmetry coupled with measurement errors associated with quality leads to fewer low quality papers published by the linked authors. We support this finding empirically using data from ten top economic journals. We also show that if links are classified using the identity of nodes such as authors being students or faculty members in an institution then there are significant variations among journals with regard to the information dissemination through different types of links. In the third essay, we present a model in which agents use links to trade with each other. We divide the agents into two categories stayers and travellers. Stayers cannot travel whereas travellers can travel to the stayers to exchange. There are three types of goods. Stayers are subject to endowment shock which determines the type of one indivisible unit of the good is determined. Travellers are subject to preference shock wherein the type of good they prefer for consumption is determined. Travellers cannot travel to the stayer unless they have a prior link. In such environment, we determine the optimum travel patterns in a complete network and show that the set of possible Nash equilibria support both Walrasian exchange and commodity money for shocks which do not support double coincidence of wants. We also show the efficient link patterns which support optimum travel strategies and determine the stability of such link patterns.
Book Synopsis Essays on Social and Economic Networks by : Timo Hiller
Download or read book Essays on Social and Economic Networks written by Timo Hiller and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three papers in the field of social and economic networks. In the first, called Peer Effects in Endogenous Networks, I build a model of endogenous net- work formation in the presence of peer effects, which play an important role for decisions concerning educational attainment, criminal activity, labor market participation and R&D expenditures of firms. The class of payoff functions assumed induce local complementar- ities in effort levels and positive local externalities. Links are one-sided and agents move simultaneously in links and effort levels. I find that equilibrium networks display - other than the complete and the empty network - a core-periphery structure, which is commonly observed in empirical studies. Ex-ante homogenous agents may obtain very different ex-post outcomes, depending on the network that arises in equilibrium. Multiplicity of equilibria serves as an explanation for large differences in behaviour across otherwise identical groups. The second paper, titled Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks, presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric. The model also provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a long-standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of alliance formation in international relations. The third paper, A Note on Stochastically Stable States for Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks, introduces dynamics into the model of the second paper and provides a conjecture for stochastically stable states. At every time period t and with fixed probability p, each agent adjusts his strategy myopically, while with small probability E chooses his strategy at random. The configuration where all agents sustain only positive links is shown to not be stochastically stable. Stochastically stable state are thought to be such that the number of cliques is maximal, under a restriction on the relative size of groups.
Book Synopsis Essays on Economic Networks by : Cristian Emerson Melo Sanchez
Download or read book Essays on Economic Networks written by Cristian Emerson Melo Sanchez and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest. In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium. We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the "global" structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more "local". Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets. As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions. Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.
Book Synopsis Social Networks, Optimal Contract Design, and Present BIAS by : Marco Alexander Schwarz
Download or read book Social Networks, Optimal Contract Design, and Present BIAS written by Marco Alexander Schwarz and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on the Formation of Social and Economic Networks by : Liza Charroin
Download or read book Essays on the Formation of Social and Economic Networks written by Liza Charroin and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a world where networks become a dominant form of organization, the structure of networks and the position of individuals in these networks affect individual behavior and aggregate economic outcomes. The analysis of network formation by a central planner or by individuals themselves is at the heart of this thesis on the economics of networks.Chapter 1 theoretically studies the optimal formation and protection of networks by a central planner knowing that an external agent can destroy k links. The protection of the network can be guaranteed either by densifying the links between nodes, or by protecting the links. When the cost of protection is relatively small, a minimally connected network composed of protected links guarantees the communication flow; if this cost is high, the optimal solution is to form a symmetric network where each node has at least k+1 non-protected links.Chapter 2 explores the decentralized formation of networks in the laboratory by analyzing individual linking formation decisions when one agent has a higher value than others and that the linking formation process is sequential. The results show that sequentiality facilitatesthe coordination on efficient networks but that do not correspond to the Subgame PerfectEquilibrium. The heterogeneity across agents increases the asymmetry of networks because of the polarization of links on the agent with a higher value.Chapter 3 studies the impact of the endogenous formation of networks on the importance of peer effects, applied to dishonest behavior. In order to identify the effects of social comparisons, two controlled environments are designed in the laboratory in which individuals choose or not their peers, and then observe their behavior. The results show that peer effects on dishonest behavior are significantly higher when individuals can choose their peers.
Book Synopsis Principles of Political Economy - by : John Stuart Mill
Download or read book Principles of Political Economy - written by John Stuart Mill and published by Cosimo, Inc.. This book was released on 2006-09-01 with total page 477 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Can national growth be sustained indefinitely? How much should government intervene in a competitive market economy? The questions John Stuart Mill raised a century and a half ago, in 1848's Principles of Political Economy, and the answers he found, are just as critical-and just as contentiously debated-today. Through a lens of what the philosopher himself termed "philosophical radicalism"-and what some today call "democratic liberalism"-Mill takes a fresh look at Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and other influential works of political thought of his time, and recasts them from a more scientific viewpoint, suggesting that such realities as the unequal distribution of wealth were not "natural" but rather a matter of human choice... choices we continue to have to make in our ever more complicated economy. Also available from Cosimo Classics: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill and On Liberty. English philosopher and politician JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873) was one of the foremost figure of Western intellectual thought in the late 19th century. He served as an administrator in the East Indian Company from 1823 to 1858, and as a member of parliament from 1865 to 1868. Among his essays on a wide range of political and social thought are On Liberty (1859), Considerations on Representative Government (1861), and The Subjection of Women (1869).
Book Synopsis Essays on the Economics of Networks by : Alexander Graupner
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Networks written by Alexander Graupner and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three chapters on how economic networks affect various market situations. Broadly, they cover contracting and monopoly pricing in the presence of economic networks. The first chapter considers a principal, many agents contracting problem. Agents sit on a network of complementarities. That is, the effort of one agent affects the value of effort for those with whom he connects. Given this structure on effort, I characterize the first best contract. This contract induces efforts that reflect the agents Bonacich centrality in the symmetrized network. I then consider a variety of bilateral contracts, and compare their values for the principal. First, I consider bilateral forcing contracts. These contracts induce less effort per agent than the first best contract. Agents' effort distortions depends on their bibliographic coupling. I show that it is this novel measure that drives effort down for certain agents. Networks with high total bibliographic coupling have a large profit gap from first to second best forcing contracts. I compare these contracts to bilateral linear contracts, and show that linear contracts outperform the forcing contracts. Finally, I show that base and bonus contracts are profit maximizing for the principal, and implement first best. The second chapter considers a monopolist who introduces a new durable good to a base of consumers who are connected on a network of communication. Consumers are initially unaware of the product, and must learn about its existence through their neighbors. Each consumer who purchases informs a group of neighbors, and the information flows through consumers as a branching process. The monopolist commits to a dynamic price path on the infinite horizon. I find that though consumers are fully strategic, the monopolist finds it optimal to serve the entire consumer base infinitely often, which implies a sales structure. I then derive the optimal price path for a simplified model of two agents, and derive comparative statics. The third chapter considers a monopolist who sells to a consumer base that is largely unaware of the product. The monopolist spreads the information of the product to consumers by the past purchasers. I assume that the monopolist knows the exact network structure on which consumers live, and sets prices based off of consumers positions and the aware set of consumers. I consider three different pricing strategies. First, I consider a setting where the monopolist can price discriminate based on the consumers' network position. In this case I am able to find which consumers are important to the information flow. Consumers who are aware early get a discount, along with agents who are critical to the information flow. If there are consumers who can only be reached through one consumer purchasing, this consumer is offered a discounted price. I see that these ideas follow through to the single priced monopolist case, where prices fluctuate if many critical agents exist. Finally, I consider the optimal mechanism, where the monopolist can price discriminate based off of network position and price. In this case the monopolist can find the optimal flow of information and implement it.
Book Synopsis Essays on Social and Economic Networks by : Roghaiyeh Dastranj Tabrizi
Download or read book Essays on Social and Economic Networks written by Roghaiyeh Dastranj Tabrizi and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Peer pressure and social networks are powerful influences on behaviour. The focus of this thesis is studying the channels through which social networks impact individuals' choices and outcomes in three different contexts.The first paper of this thesis (Chapter 2) develops a theoretical network-based model of Twitter, formulating individual interaction as a dynamic game in which heterogenous agents choose a 'niche' to tweet in, and whom to follow. By characterizing the stable networks that the dynamic Markov process converges to, we show that information does not diffuse as widely as one might expect: although many agents are directly or indirectly connected to each other, agents strategically filter information in accordance with their niche.The second paper of this thesis (Chapter 3) presents a social network model of criminal activity, where agents' payoffs depend on the structure of their connections with each other. The Nash equilibria in crime activity are characterized, and the theoretical results are used to identify the optimal network, which maximize the sum of agents' payoffs, by searching over all possible non-isomorphic graphs of given size. In addition, the effects of different anti-crime policies on the optimal crime network structure and the overall crime level are analyzed and presented.The third paper of this thesis (Chapter 4) studies the direct and spillover effects of social interactions on fundraising and engagement activities in a network of volunteers from Engineers Without Borders, Canada. The network effects are modelled through two separate channels: a strategic interaction term which affects the marginal benefit from supplying effort and a direct spillover term affecting the level of payoff. This model is estimated using several online and offline networks via instrumental variables and system GMM. The results always present large significant levels of strategic complementarities in fundraising activities. However, in engagement activities, strategic complementarities are only significant in online networks. Additionally, engagement activities exhibit positive significant levels of direct spillovers for all networks. In contrast, in fundraising campaigns, the direct spillover effect is only significant in large offline networks.
Book Synopsis Essays in the Economics of Networks by : Arun Naresh Advani
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Networks written by Arun Naresh Advani and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in the Economics of Networks by : Edoardo Gallo
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Networks written by Edoardo Gallo and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in the Economics of Networks and Standards by : Tobias Kretschmer
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Networks and Standards written by Tobias Kretschmer and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in the Economics of Networks by : A. N. Advani
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Networks written by A. N. Advani and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Wealth of Networks by : Yochai Benkler
Download or read book The Wealth of Networks written by Yochai Benkler and published by Yale University Press. This book was released on 2006-01-01 with total page 532 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Describes how patterns of information, knowledge, and cultural production are changing. The author shows that the way information and knowledge are made available can either limit or enlarge the ways people create and express themselves. He describes the range of legal and policy choices that confront.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Networks and Public Economics by : Pier-André Bouchard St Amant
Download or read book Three Essays on Networks and Public Economics written by Pier-André Bouchard St Amant and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is a collection of three essays. The first two study how ideas spread through a network of individuals, and how it an advertiser can exploit it. In the model I develop, users choose their sources of information based on the perceived usefulness of their sources of information. This contrasts with previous literature where there is no choice made by network users and thus, the information flow is fixed. I provide a complete theoretical characterization of the solution and define a natural measure of influence based on choices of users. I also present an algorithm to solve the model in polynomial time on any network, regardless of the scale or the topology. I also discuss the properties of a network technology from a public economic standpoint. In essence, a network allows the reproduction of ideas for free for the advertiser. If there is any free-riding problem, I show that coalitions of users on the network can solve such problem. I also discuss the social value of networks, a value that cannot be captured for profit. The third essay is completely distinct from the network paradigm and instead studies funding rules for public universities. I show that a funding rule that depends solely on enrolment leads to "competition by franchise" and that such behavior is sometimes inefficient. I suggest instead an alternate funding rule that allows government to increase welfare without increasing spending in universities.
Book Synopsis Essays on Political Economy by : Frédéric Bastiat
Download or read book Essays on Political Economy written by Frédéric Bastiat and published by . This book was released on 1853 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
