Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Download Essays On Heterogeneity In Economic Networks full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Essays On Heterogeneity In Economic Networks ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author : Malte Cherdron
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (722 download)
Download or read book Essays on Heterogeneity in Economic Networks written by Malte Cherdron and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Liza Charroin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (14 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Formation of Social and Economic Networks written by Liza Charroin and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a world where networks become a dominant form of organization, the structure of networks and the position of individuals in these networks affect individual behavior and aggregate economic outcomes. The analysis of network formation by a central planner or by individuals themselves is at the heart of this thesis on the economics of networks.Chapter 1 theoretically studies the optimal formation and protection of networks by a central planner knowing that an external agent can destroy k links. The protection of the network can be guaranteed either by densifying the links between nodes, or by protecting the links. When the cost of protection is relatively small, a minimally connected network composed of protected links guarantees the communication flow; if this cost is high, the optimal solution is to form a symmetric network where each node has at least k+1 non-protected links.Chapter 2 explores the decentralized formation of networks in the laboratory by analyzing individual linking formation decisions when one agent has a higher value than others and that the linking formation process is sequential. The results show that sequentiality facilitatesthe coordination on efficient networks but that do not correspond to the Subgame PerfectEquilibrium. The heterogeneity across agents increases the asymmetry of networks because of the polarization of links on the agent with a higher value.Chapter 3 studies the impact of the endogenous formation of networks on the importance of peer effects, applied to dishonest behavior. In order to identify the effects of social comparisons, two controlled environments are designed in the laboratory in which individuals choose or not their peers, and then observe their behavior. The results show that peer effects on dishonest behavior are significantly higher when individuals can choose their peers.
Author : Domenico Delli Gatti
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642570054
Total Pages : 302 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (425 download)
Download or read book Interaction and Market Structure written by Domenico Delli Gatti and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 302 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book is a collection of essays which examine how the properties of aggregate variables are influenced by the actions and interactions of heterogenous individuals in different economic contexts. The common denominator of the essays is a critique of the representative agent hypothesis. If this hypothesis were correct, the behaviour of the aggregate variable would simply be the reproduction of individual optimising behaviour. In the methodology of the hard sciences, one of the achievements of the quantum revolution has been the rebuttal of the notion that aggregate behaviour can be explained on the basis of the behaviour of a single unit: the elementary particle does not even exist as a single entity but as a network, a system of interacting units. In this book, new tracks in economics which parallel the developments in physics mentioned above are explored. The essays, in fact are contributions to the analysis of the economy as a complex evolving system of interacting agents.
Author : Won Hee Park
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Social Networks written by Won Hee Park and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two projects, both concerned with how social networks form and how they affect economic decisions. In the first project, entitled Identifying Influential Agents in a Social Network, I define influence centrality, a new measure of influence which combines information on node and neighbor characteristics as well as information on the network structure, by building a model of friendship formation and peer effects and calculating the change in the equilibrium behavior of the network when one node changes its behavior. I apply the model to the context of smoking among middle and high school students and show that a targeted anti-smoking intervention in which a small number of influential smoking students are treated may be more efficient than a uniform program where every student in the school receives the same anti-smoking treatment. The second project, entitled Quantifying Spillovers in Network Formation Over Time, is a joint work with Sean Chu and Shankar Kalyanaraman at Facebook. The goal of the project is to separately identify and understand the relative importance of network effects and unobserved heterogeneity in a multi-period network formation model. Here, we define network effects to be the effect of the number of mutual friends on the probability of friendship and assume that unobserved heterogeneity is time-consistent. We estimate the model on a de-identified panel data set from a small group of users on Facebook and find that both network effects and unobserved heterogeneity are statistically and economically significant predictors of friendship formation on Facebook. We further re-estimate the model first, without network effects and next, without unobserved heterogeneity. Comparing the results from these specifications, we find that network effects play a more important role than unobserved heterogeneity in network formation models on Facebook.
Author : Lucas Vernet
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 117 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (11 download)
Download or read book Four Essays on Economic Networks written by Lucas Vernet and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 117 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation lies at the intersection of two fields of research in economics that have recently substantially developed: on the one hand, the modeling and study of economic networks, and on the other hand, transport theory and its applications in economics. The four chapters of this dissertation present theoretical results in relation with these two topics and put stress on their connections. The first chapter models bipartite contracts on a decentralized market as an equilibrium flow problem. We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium outcome and discuss its effciency. We interpret this equilibrium in the case of indivisible commodities. As an illustration, we build a model for the overnight interbank loan market with counterparty risk and collateralization costs. In the second one, written in collaboration with Alfred Galichon and Larry Samuelson, we prove a monotone comparative statics theorem that we then apply to several classical economic models (matching models, min-cost flow problems and hedonic models). The third chapter is a joint work with Alfred Galichon and Arthur Charpentier. It presents tools to solve for matching problems on large geographic networks before applying them to examples. Finally, the fourth chapter, written with Rakesh Vohra, shows how a monopolistic insurer can use externalities between agents - modeled as a network - to maximize his profit. We show that a monopolistic insurer decreases the welfare of all agents.
Author : Benjamin Golub
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (768 download)
Download or read book Essays on Economic Networks written by Benjamin Golub and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation theoretically analyzes how networks of relationships among decision-makers affect two kinds of economic processes: (i) investment in public goods; and (ii) repeated updating of beliefs or behaviors based on observing neighbors. The results connect these processes to the spectral properties of networks -- that is, eigenvalues and eigenvectors -- and use the connection to shed light on economic outcomes. The first essay, based on joint work with Matthew Elliott, focuses on games in which each player simultaneously exerts costly effort that provides different benefits to each other player. The goal is to find and describe effort profiles that are immune to coordinated coalitional deviations when such a game is played repeatedly. Formally, these effort profiles are the ones that can be sustained in a strong Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. We introduce a class of effort profiles that are called centrality-stable. These are characterized by a network centrality condition: agent A's contribution (defined as effort level times marginal cost) is equal to a weighted sum of the contributions of those who help A; the weight on B's contribution measures the marginal benefit B's effort provides to A. Under certain assumptions (mainly concavity of utility functions), centrality-stable profiles exist, are Pareto-efficient, and any such profile is sustainable in a coalitionally robust equilibrium of the repeated game. Centrality-stable profiles also have an alternative definition: they are those at which all agents are first-order indifferent to scaling all efforts by a factor near $1$. This single condition rules out all profitable coalitional deviations. The results are obtained without parametric assumptions, using the theory of general equilibrium and its relation to the core, along with the Perron-Frobenius spectral theory of nonnegative matrices. When agents are uncertain about each other's utility functions but can verify marginal costs and benefits at an implemented effort profile, then the centrality-stable profiles are the only ones that are immune to manipulation through misreporting of preferences. The second essay, based on joint work with Matthew O. Jackson, studies learning in a setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the true value of a variable and then communicate in a network. They naively update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent on the long-run beliefs vanishes as the society grows. We also identify obstructions to this, including the existence of prominent groups, and provide structural conditions on the network ensuring efficient learning. The third essay, also based on joint work with Matthew O. Jackson, examines how the speed of such an updating process depends on homophily: the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately with those having similar traits. When agents' beliefs or behaviors are developed by averaging what they see among their neighbors -- as in the learning model discussed above or in a myopic best-reply dynamic -- convergence to a consensus is slowed by the presence of homophily, but is not influenced by network density. This is in stark contrast to the viral spread of a belief or behavior along shortest paths -- a process whose speed is increasing in network density but does not depend on homophily. In deriving these results, we propose a new, general spectral measure of homophily based on the relative frequencies of interactions among different groups.
Author : Laurent E. Calvet
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 800 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (79 download)
Download or read book Essays in the Economics of Heterogeneity written by Laurent E. Calvet and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 800 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Pedram Heydari
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Essays on Decision Theory and Economic Networks written by Pedram Heydari and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three chapters, the first two of which are on decision theory and the last of which is on social and economic networks. In the first chapter, I model a decision maker who is able to evaluate the available options in multiple subjective dimensions or attributes, but is not generally able to aggregate the values of these attributes through a single utility function to rank the available options. This inability arises whenever there are multiple attributes that lead to conflicting ranking over the options. The model that I propose is able to account for a number of violations of standard utility maximization models such as stochastic choice and context dependence, in particular the attraction effect and the compromise effect. I provide an axiomatic characterization of my model. An important feature of this model is that attributes are identified through the observed choices. The second chapter extends the random utility framework to the realm of choices over menus of alternatives. More specifically, I assume that as modelers we can only observe the aggregate choices of a heterogenous population of decision makers over menus (e.g. restaurants). Furthermore, I assume that each member of the population behaves according to the standard model of choice over menus. Specifically, each decision maker has a well-defined strict preference ordering over individual alternatives (e.g. meals) and chooses an available restaurant that offers the best meal among all the available restaurants. The potential heterogeneity of the population makes the aggregate choices over menus appear stochastic. In the main result of the paper, I provide a characterization of all stochastic choice data over menus that are consistent with a population of standard decision makers. The third chapter is on social and economic networks and studies the integration of two communities that face a barrier to communicate with one another. We assume that nodes benefit from both direct and indirect connections, but direct connections come also with a cost. We capture the barrier of communication between the two communities by assuming that inter-community links are more costly than intra-community links. In this context, we characterize all integrated structures that are efficient. Next, we determine which of these efficient structures can be also stable. A notable feature of our work is a new class of multi core and periphery structures that we introduce in this paper as parallel hyperstars.
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (889 download)
Download or read book Essays on Economics and Networks written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the first essay, motivated by the seminal work of Robert Fogel on U.S. railroads, I reformulate Fogel's original counterfactual history question on 19th century U.S. economic growth without railroads by treating the transport network as an endogenous equilibrium object. I quantify the effect of the railroad on U.S. growth from its introduction in 1830 to 1861. Specifically, I estimate the output loss in a counterfactual world without the technology to build railroads, but retaining the ability to construct the next-best alternative of canals. My main contribution is to endogenize the counterfactual canal network through a decentralized network formation game played by profit-maximizing transport firms. I perform a similar exercise in a world without canals. I find that railroads and canals are strategic complements, not strategic substitutes. Therefore, the output loss can be quite acute when one or the other is missing from the economy. In the set of Nash stable networks, relative to the factual world, the median value of output is 45% lower in the canals only counterfactual and 49% lower in the railroads only counterfactual. Such a stark output loss is due to two main mechanisms: inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium due to network externalities and complementarities due to spatial heterogeneity in costs across the two transport modes. In the second essay, the historical dynamics of entry and exit in the financial exchange industry are analyzed for a panel of 741 exchanges in 52 countries from 1855 through 2012. We focus on economic, technological, and regulatory factors. Using novel panel data evidence, we empirically test whether these factors are consistent with existing financial theories. We find that US exchanges are 4.6% more likely to exit per year after the passage of the Securities Exchange Act. The telephone, literacy, and regulation are robust predictors of financial exchange dynamics. The upward trend in literacy is an important driver of exchange entry.
Author : Nils-Holger Gudat
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (19 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Heterogeneity written by Nils-Holger Gudat and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Yiqing Xing
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays in Microeconomic Theory and the Economics of Networks written by Yiqing Xing and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays in microeconomic theory and the economics of networks. Chapter 1 establishes a model in which agents first form risk-sharing pairs, and then repeatedly share income risks under limited commitment. Agents of different occupations differ in income autocorrelations, i.e. how their current incomes correlate with past ones. I show that agents with high autocorrelation are hard to share risks with. With endogenous matching, two equilibrium outcomes can occur: either 1) agents match positive assortatively, or 2) agents from different occupations do match together, but in order to sustain such matches, agents share risks unevenly favoring the relatively less autocorrelated. Either equilibrium features substantial inequality across occupations and low total welfare, compared to what would happen if a social planner could impose an optimal matching to agents. The interplay between matching and risk sharing can change our views on policies. For instance, uniform increases in everyone's low income levels (minimal wages) may hurt some agents. Increases in occupation-specific common income shocks could improve overall risk sharing and reduce inequality. My results are also robust to forms of heterogeneity other than income autocorrelations, such as heterogeneous opportunities to rematch or migrate. This model is among the first attempts to consider both partnership formation and subsequent interactions. I highlight the point that how a pair of agents interact (share risks in this case) does not only depend on the two of them, but also on their potential links to others, and how others interact. Such a framework has important policy implications because a policy can change how agents interact as well as whom they interact with. Without considering these effects, out policy evaluations could be inadequate. Chapter 2 (coauthored with Matt Jackson) is an online experiment to justify homophily, the tendency of people to interact with others that are similar to themselves, by the ease of coordination among agents with a similar cultural background. In particular, we examine whether people are better at predicting how others with similar cultural backgrounds will behave, compared to others with different cultural backgrounds. We also explore whether this translates into better coordination. The more than a thousand participants in our experiment mainly reside in two countries: India and the United States. Participants are paired to act in a simple coordination environment with multiple coordination outcomes. Participants from India are much more likely than participants from the U.S. to choose actions that lead to very unequal payoffs across the two subjects. We also find that, although participants residing in different countries tend to choose different actions, they do not seem to adjust their actions according to their opponents' place of residence. One explanation for this pattern is that participants have no idea about what their opponents would do when the opponents are from a different cultural background from them, and wrongly believe that their opponents will behave similarly to themselves. This explanation is consistent with the data when we explicitly elicit participants' beliefs about the opponents' behaviors. In sum, due to the accuracy of predicting each others' behaviors, interactions between people who share a similar cultural background leads to a larger likelihood of coordination, and a higher payoff on average. Chapter 3 (coauthored with Matt Jackson and Hugo Sonnenschein) models negotiations that determine not only an agreement's price, but also its content, which typically has many aspects. We model such negotiations and provide conditions under which negotiation leads to efficient outcomes, even in the face of substantial asymmetric information regarding the value of each aspect. With sufficient information about the overall potential surplus, if the set of offers that agents can make when negotiating is sufficiently rich, then negotiation leads the agents to efficient agreements in all equilibria. Furthermore, the same negotiation game works regardless of the statistical structure of information - in this sense, no omniscient "planner" or "mechanism designer" is required. The theory and examples explore the anatomy of negotiation and may shed light on why many situations with significant asymmetric information exhibit little inefficiency. This chapter is within my research agenda of better understanding the social costs of asymmetric information without an omniscient and empowered "mechanism designer". Such a designer plays a key role in the mechanism design literature, but frequently is absent in applications. This chapter asks the question that whether two agents come about on their own, negotiating in "free-forms", can achieve (near) efficiency. Another paper of mine, "Intermediated Implementation", (with Anqi Li) is along the same line of research. There we ask the question whether a social planner can implement target allocations through market intermediaries (e.g., firms in the labor market) with simple policies such as per unit fee, labor income tax, or quota system.
Author : Alexander Graupner
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 110 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (116 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Networks written by Alexander Graupner and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three chapters on how economic networks affect various market situations. Broadly, they cover contracting and monopoly pricing in the presence of economic networks. The first chapter considers a principal, many agents contracting problem. Agents sit on a network of complementarities. That is, the effort of one agent affects the value of effort for those with whom he connects. Given this structure on effort, I characterize the first best contract. This contract induces efforts that reflect the agents Bonacich centrality in the symmetrized network. I then consider a variety of bilateral contracts, and compare their values for the principal. First, I consider bilateral forcing contracts. These contracts induce less effort per agent than the first best contract. Agents' effort distortions depends on their bibliographic coupling. I show that it is this novel measure that drives effort down for certain agents. Networks with high total bibliographic coupling have a large profit gap from first to second best forcing contracts. I compare these contracts to bilateral linear contracts, and show that linear contracts outperform the forcing contracts. Finally, I show that base and bonus contracts are profit maximizing for the principal, and implement first best. The second chapter considers a monopolist who introduces a new durable good to a base of consumers who are connected on a network of communication. Consumers are initially unaware of the product, and must learn about its existence through their neighbors. Each consumer who purchases informs a group of neighbors, and the information flows through consumers as a branching process. The monopolist commits to a dynamic price path on the infinite horizon. I find that though consumers are fully strategic, the monopolist finds it optimal to serve the entire consumer base infinitely often, which implies a sales structure. I then derive the optimal price path for a simplified model of two agents, and derive comparative statics. The third chapter considers a monopolist who sells to a consumer base that is largely unaware of the product. The monopolist spreads the information of the product to consumers by the past purchasers. I assume that the monopolist knows the exact network structure on which consumers live, and sets prices based off of consumers positions and the aware set of consumers. I consider three different pricing strategies. First, I consider a setting where the monopolist can price discriminate based on the consumers' network position. In this case I am able to find which consumers are important to the information flow. Consumers who are aware early get a discount, along with agents who are critical to the information flow. If there are consumers who can only be reached through one consumer purchasing, this consumer is offered a discounted price. I see that these ideas follow through to the single priced monopolist case, where prices fluctuate if many critical agents exist. Finally, I consider the optimal mechanism, where the monopolist can price discriminate based off of network position and price. In this case the monopolist can find the optimal flow of information and implement it.
Author : Cristian Emerson Melo Sanchez
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 228 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (857 download)
Download or read book Essays on Economic Networks written by Cristian Emerson Melo Sanchez and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest. In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium. We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the "global" structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more "local". Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets. As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions. Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.
Author : Brandon Charles Lehr
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 133 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (71 download)
Download or read book Essays on Economies with Heterogeneous Labor written by Brandon Charles Lehr and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, I study two different economies that consist of heterogeneous labor. By allowing for differences among individuals where previous analyses restricted attention to homogeneous labor, I am able to understand the impact of such a consideration on issues of optimal policy and potential equilibria. The first chapter, Optimal Social Insurance with Individual Private Insurance and Moral Hazard, characterizes optimal social insurance in an economy where competitive firms also provide insurance to workers facing uncertain outcomes. An ex-ante heterogeneous population of workers exerts effort to increase the likelihood of high outcome events. This chapter is novel in its joint consideration of two sources of heterogeneity, two potential sources of insurance, and an endogenous ex-post distribution of outcomes. The introduction of ex-ante heterogeneity in the presence of optimal private insurance changes the optimal prescription for social insurance away from zero. Moreover, the relative source of the variation in outcomes due to ex-ante heterogeneity and ex-post shocks plays a significant role in the welfare loss associated with setting optimal social insurance without recognizing the presence of private insurance. The second chapter, Efficiency Wages with Heterogeneous Agents, builds a model of efficiency wages with heterogeneous workers in the economy who differ with respect to their disutility of labor effort. In such an economy, two types of pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria in firm wage offers can exist: a no-shirking equilibrium in which all workers exert effort while employed and a shirking equilibrium in which within each firm some workers exert effort while others shirk. The type of equilibrium that prevails in the economy depends crucially on the extent of heterogeneity among the workers. In addition, it is shown that the characterization of the economy is independent of allowing for variable labor hours and the subsequent adverse selection problem it introduces, as there does not exist a pure strategy symmetric separating Nash equilibrium. Finally, in the third chapter I correct the proof of the main proposition in the analysis of an efficiency wage model with a continuum of heterogeneous agents constructed by Albrecht and Vroman (1998).
Author : Robert Jump
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (16 download)
Download or read book Essays on Heterogeneous Agent Economics written by Robert Jump and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Roberta Distante
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 133 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (828 download)
Download or read book Heterogeneity and Relative Concerns written by Roberta Distante and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lutz Schimansky-Geier
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 9783540628934
Total Pages : 386 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (289 download)
Download or read book Stochastic Dynamics written by Lutz Schimansky-Geier and published by Springer. This book was released on 1997-05-20 with total page 386 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Stochastic Dynamics, born almost 100 years ago with the early explanations of Brownian motion by physicists, is nowadays a quickly expanding field of research within nonequilibrium statistical physics. The present volume provides a survey on the influence of fluctuations in nonlinear dynamics. It addresses specialists, although the intention of this book is to provide teachers and students with a reliable resource for seminar work. In particular, the reader will find many examples illustrating the theory as well as a host of recent findings.
