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Author : Andreas Asseyer
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Essays in Contract Theory and Industrial Organization written by Andreas Asseyer and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Zhuoran Lu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 150 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (17 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory and Industrial Organization written by Zhuoran Lu and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on contract theory and industrial organization. The first chapter studies a signaling model in which a strategic player determines the cost structure of signaling. A principal chooses a price schedule for a product, and an agent with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to the market. When the market observes the price schedule, the principal charges monopoly prices, and the agent purchases less than the first-best. In contrast, when the market does not observe the price schedule, the principal charges lower prices, and the agent purchases more than in the observed case; those of the highest types purchase more than the first-best. In terms of payoffs, the principal gains lower profits, whereas the agent obtains higher utility than in the observed case. When the intensity of signaling activity is sufficiently high, the observed case yields higher social welfare than the unobserved case. The model can be applied to schools choosing tuition, retailers selling luxury goods and media companies selling advertising messages. The second chapter studies nonlinear pricing for horizontally differentiated products that provide signaling values to consumers with private information, who choose how much to purchase as a signal to the receivers. I characterize the optimal symmetric price schedules under different market structures. Under monopoly, when the receivers observe the price schedule, the market is partially covered, and quantity is downward distorted if there is little horizontal differentiation. As the degree of horizontal differentiation rises, the market coverage rises, and the downward distortion decreases. When the degree is sufficiently high, for a certain level of signaling intensity, the monopolistic allocation achieves the first-best; for higher signaling intensities, quantity is upward distorted at the low end. In contrast, when the receivers do not observe the price schedule, the market is always partially covered, and the allocation is more dispersed than that in the observed case. Specifically, higher types purchase more than in the observed case, with the highest types purchasing more than the first-best, whereas lower types purchase less than in the observed case, with more types excluded from the market. When the market structure changes from monopoly to duopoly, market competition results in a higher market coverage and larger quantities for both the observed and unobserved case. The third chapter analyzes a principal-agent model to study how the architecture of peer monitoring affects the optimal sequence for teamwork. The agents work on a joint project, each responsible for an individual task. The principal determines the sequence of executing tasks as well as the rewards upon success of the project, the probability of which depends on each agent's effort and ability, with the objective of inducing full effort with minimum rewards. Agents may observe one another's effort based on an exogenous network and the endogenous sequence. We focus on networks composed of stars, and find a simple algorithm to characterize the optimal sequence of task assignment. The optimal sequence reflects the trade-off between the magnitude and the coverage of reward reduction in incentive design. In a single star, less capable periphery agents precede their center while more capable ones succeed their center. In complex networks consisting of multiple stars, periphery agents precede their center early in the sequence but succeed their center late in the sequence. When the number of peripheries differ across stars, a "V-shape" emerges: agents in large stars are allocated towards both ends of the sequence, while those in small ones towards the middle.
Author : Gregory K. Dow
Publisher : University of Toronto Press
ISBN 13 : 0802097022
Total Pages : 313 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (2 download)
Download or read book Industrial Organization, Trade, and Social Interaction written by Gregory K. Dow and published by University of Toronto Press. This book was released on 2010-01-01 with total page 313 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: B. Curtis Eaton is one of Canada's leading microeconomists. As an applied economic theorist, Eaton has contributed greatly to industrial organization literature and has also worked in labour economics, economic geography, and organizational theory. The essays in this volume, by former students and present and former colleagues, call attention to the path-breaking work of Professor Eaton. The first two chapters provide a short overview of Eaton's research contributions and argue that his work laid the foundation for important research programs across the country. The remaining chapters, including an unpublished paper by Eaton himself, consist of original work that can be divided into the three broad categories of industrial organization and spatial competition, trade and productivity, and social interaction. Not only a collection of laudatory essays, Industrial Organization, Trade, and Social Interaction presents cutting edge research by leading scholars.
Author : Rongzhu Ke
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 203 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (65 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contract Theory and Organizational Economics written by Rongzhu Ke and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (Cont.) The main advantage of the current approach is the relaxation of the global concavity of agent utility. We show that under a set of mild conditions, the fixed point approach is applicable and the solution to the principal agent problem exists. In particular, if the log likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in output but decreasing in effort, the best response correspondence against a MK contract has and only has one unique fixed point. Our approach unifies Jewitt's (1988) and Rogerson's (1985) proofs of validity of FOA, and provides a general method to judge validity of FOA. Based on the fixed-point approach, with some additional specifications, we restore Jewitt's (1988) results to situations where the distribution is not convex and the log likelihood ratio is not bounded from below (e.g., normal distribution), or there exists a limited liability constraint. Furthermore, we generalize our results to a situation where the agent's utility is non separable. In this fairly general environment, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the FOA to be valid, which provides an important method to identify the validity of FOA and compute the solution of the original problem. Finally, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a general non-linear bi-level optimization problem to be solvable based on FOA, without a convex constrained set. Chapter 3 constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex post participation constraint.
Download or read book Essays in Industrial Organization written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation addresses some interesting questions related to exclusionary contracts and advertising choice. The first paper develops a model of long-term contracts as barriers to entry with differentiated products. It shows that if an incumbent firm can hold the consumer surplus in the pre-entry period hostage, he can sign the buyer up for a long-term exclusive contract regardless of the degree of product differentiation. Even though entry by an equally efficient firm is blocked, the contract still increases welfare if the incumbent's and the entrant's products are close substitutes. The model is further extended to include more periods, uncertainty, discounting, and no commitment power. When the incumbent is not able to credibly commit to refuse supply, entry may nevertheless still be blocked by the long-term contract. The objective of the second paper is to examine a monopoly firm's decision on price and advertising in a market where exclusivity matters. Two types of advertising are analyzed: (a) informative advertising, by which the firm provides information about the product's existence, features and quality, and (b) image advertising, by which the firm communicates an appealing image for the product with which buyers can associate themselves through their consumption of the good. In equilibrium only a fraction of consumers buy the image good. The effects of income dispersion, product nature, and existence of a strategic competitor on the equilibrium outcome and welfare are analyzed. It is found that monopoly advertises and serves more consumers than duopoly, generating higher total surplus. The third paper, which is joint with Tirtha Dhar, investigates the key macroeconomic drivers of deceptive advertising. We use a unique data set on advertising complaints in the United States, and combine it with macroeconomic indicators to show that deceptive advertising is counter-cyclical. When we analyze the data taking into account product durability, we find that t.
Author : Peter Benson
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 0521640385
Total Pages : 365 pages
Book Rating : 4.5/5 (216 download)
Download or read book The Theory of Contract Law written by Peter Benson and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2001-02-05 with total page 365 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essays addressing a variety of issues in the theory and practice of contract law.
Author : Stephen Leider
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 374 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (477 download)
Download or read book Essays on Experimental Economics and Behavioral Contract Theory written by Stephen Leider and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 374 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays using experiments and theory to apply behavioral insights to questions of contract theory and organizational economics. The first essay (co-authored with Judd Kessler) argues that an important aspect of incomplete contracts is their role in establishing a norm for the transaction or relationship, which increases the efficiency of agents' actions. We demonstrate experimentally that unenforceable handshake agreements within a contract can substantially increase the efficiency of subjects' actions, particularly in games with strategic complements. When there is a handshake agreement, adding an additional enforceable clause to the contract often does not further increase efficiency in our experiment. The second essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) analyzes a principal-agent setting where the agent has reciprocity preferences (the intrinsic desire to repay generosity). We identify the optimal contract, which typically includes both monetary performance-pay incentives as well as excess rents to induce gift exchange incentives. We then identify several organizational characteristics that can enhance or diminish the efficacy of reciprocity-based incentives. In the third essay (co-authored with Florian Englmaier) we test experimentally a key prediction of our general theory: the value to the principal of the agent's output (relative to the effort cost) should influence the agent's willingness to reciprocate generous wage contracts. Our results confirm this prediction, as well as providing additional evidence that agent's effort decisions are motivated by reciprocity.
Author : Ekkehart Schlicht
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3642469884
Total Pages : 306 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (424 download)
Download or read book Firms, Markets, and Contracts written by Ekkehart Schlicht and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 306 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Modern institutional economics witnesses a merging of formal and informal strands of theorizing. This development has offered new and vigorous perspectives which avoid both arbitrariness and theoretical sterility. The essays on contract theory gathered here exemplify this development. They propone new results on central issues in contractual theorizing. The theory of the firm in its variegated aspects forms, naturally, the core of the present set of contributions. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finan ce are analyzed. Some contributions use the theoretical approach of contract theory to explore other issues, like medical care, public good problems, the economics of crime, environmental economics, and international trade. The contributors are leading young economists. They have participated in one or se veral classes of the 'International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics' which has been organized by Rudolf Richter in the years 1988 through 1994 and is now continued by Urs Schweizer. The theoretical style of these contributions has been influ enced by this experience. This collection of essays is intended to express the thanks of the contributors to Rudolf Richter. His initiatives for scholarly instruction and for inter national exchange of ideas have helped to create and to diffuse the understanding of and the engagement for the new institutional economics in Europe.
Author : Linda Gratz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 115 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (82 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Industrial Organization written by Linda Gratz and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 115 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : José María Hernández García
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 146 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (851 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization written by José María Hernández García and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Chunto Tso
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 188 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (333 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on the Theory of Contracts written by Chunto Tso and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Three Essays on Contract Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Bernard Caillaud
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 432 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (2 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Contract Theory written by Bernard Caillaud and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 432 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3658241330
Total Pages : 211 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (582 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Author : Hsin-Yu Tseng
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 262 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (72 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Empirical Applications of Contract Theory written by Hsin-Yu Tseng and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Four Essays in Contracts and Industrial Organizations written by and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: HKUST Call Number: Thesis ECON 2005 Liu.
Author : Zenan Wu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 252 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays on Contracts written by Zenan Wu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays on contract theory. I investigate contracts under different economics contexts. In the first chapter, I consider a two-period model in which the success of the firm depends on the effort of a first-period manager (the incumbent) and the ability of a second-period manager. At the end of the first period, the board receives a noisy signal of the incumbent manager's ability and decides whether to retain or replace the incumbent manager. I show that the information technology the board has to assess the incumbent manager's ability is an important determinant of the optimal contract and replacement policy. The contract must balance providing incentives for the incumbent manager to exert effort and ensuring that the second-period manager is of high ability. I show that severance pay in the contract serves as a costly commitment device to induce effort. Unlike existing models, I identify conditions on the information structure under which both entrenchment and anti-entrenchment emerge in the optimal contract. In the second chapter, I use a dynamic model of life insurance with one-sided commitment and bequest-driven lapsation, as in Daily, Hendel and Lizzeri (2008) and Fang and Kung (2010), but with policyholders who may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motive, to analyze how the life settlement market--the secondary market for life insurance--may affect consumer welfare in equilibrium. I show that life settlement may increase consumer welfare in equilibrium when (i) policyholders are sufficiently overconfident; and (ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) of policyholders is greater than one.
