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Central Bank Independence Fiscal Responsibility And The Goals Of Macroeconomic Policy
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Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Goals of Macroeconomic Policy by : Ralph C. Bryant
Download or read book Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Goals of Macroeconomic Policy written by Ralph C. Bryant and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence by : Jan Kleineman
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Jan Kleineman and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2021-10-18 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In December 1999, prior to the forming of a Stockholm Centre for Commercial Law, an international symposium entitled Central Bank Independence was held at the Department of Law at Stockholm University in co-operation with the Swedish Central Bank (The Riksbank) and Queen Mary and Westfield College, London University. The participants were principally political, economic and legal specialists in the field, all with considerable international experience. This led to the topic being examined in detail from many different perspectives. This publication includes contributions by the participants and contains many important facts for those readers who wish to study and understand the different consequences of the yielding of control over financial policymaking by the traditional political organisations to a body of experts. For readers in some countries, who realise that the subject will revolutionise traditional Constitutional and Administrative Law, the topic and therefore this publication, cannot be ignored.
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence by : Ignacio Mas
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Ignacio Mas and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1994 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility by : Francesco Lippi
Download or read book Central Bank Independence, Targets, and Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999-01-27 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Author :Mr.Alberto Musalem Borrero Publisher :INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ISBN 13 :9781451843743 Total Pages :0 pages Book Rating :4.8/5 (437 download)
Book Synopsis On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance by : Mr.Alberto Musalem Borrero
Download or read book On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance written by Mr.Alberto Musalem Borrero and published by INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. This book was released on 2001-02-01 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints across institutions. Abstracting from long-run considerations, higher central bank independence increases fiscal discipline and results in lower inflation and growth, generating a short-run institutional Phillips curve. In the presence of sufficiently strong negative long-run externalities of inflation onto growth, higher CBI also increases fiscal discipline and generates lower inflation, however, it also yields higher growth and generates an inverted institutional Phillips curve. Strikingly, higher central bank independence is found to be frequently sub-optimal for a wide set of stylized economies. Whether these economies are empirically relevant is an open question.
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation by : Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Download or read book Central Bank Independence and Macro-Prudential Regulation written by Mr.Kenichi Ueda and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2012-04-01 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.
Book Synopsis The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions by : Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Download or read book The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions written by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
Book Synopsis Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies by : International Monetary Fund
Download or read book Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policies written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1998-03-01 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recently, monetary authorities have increasingly focused on implementing policies to ensure price stability and strengthen central bank independence. Simultaneously, in the fiscal area, market development has allowed public debt managers to focus more on cost minimization. This “divorce” of monetary and debt management functions in no way lessens the need for effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policy if overall economic performance is to be optimized and maintained in the long term. This paper analyzes these issues based on a review of the relevant literature and of country experiences from an institutional and operational perspective.
Author :Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger Publisher :International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers ISBN 13 : Total Pages :100 pages Book Rating :4.F/5 ( download)
Book Synopsis The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence by : Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Download or read book The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence written by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and published by International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers. This book was released on 1996 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency by : B. Laurens
Download or read book Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency written by B. Laurens and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-04-30 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Book Synopsis Central Banks Quasi-Fiscal Policies and Inflation by : Mr.Seok Gil Park
Download or read book Central Banks Quasi-Fiscal Policies and Inflation written by Mr.Seok Gil Park and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Although central banks have recently taken unconventional policy actions to try to shore up macroeconomic and financial stability, little theory is available to assess the consequences of such measures. This paper offers a theoretical model with which such policies can be analyzed. In particular, the paper shows that in the absence of the fiscal authorities' full backing of the central bank's balance sheet, strange things can happen. For instance, an exit from quantitative easing could be inflationary and central banks cannot successfully unwind inflated balance sheets. Therefore, the fiscal authorities' full backing of the monetary authorities' quasi-fiscal operations is a pre-condition for effective monetary policy.
Book Synopsis Central Banking, Monetary Policy and Social Responsibility by : Vallet, Guillaume
Download or read book Central Banking, Monetary Policy and Social Responsibility written by Vallet, Guillaume and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2022-08-18 with total page 243 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Part of The Elgar Series on Central Banking and Monetary Policy, this book explores the relationship between central banking, monetary policy and the economy at large. It focuses on the specific relationship between central banking, monetary policy and social responsibility as central banks wake up to new realities
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence by : International Monetary Fund
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1991-06-01 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There has been growing interest recently in the scope for promoting monetary stability through the establishment of independent central banks. This paper reviews the issues involved in central bank independence against the background of arrangements in nine countries. The analysis suggests that detailed institutional arrangements would need to be carefully designed if the potential benefits of central bank independence are to be delivered. Particularly important are the nature of arrangements to resolve various types of conflicts involving monetary policy, and arrangements to promote accountability and public monitoring of monetary policy performance.
Book Synopsis Central Banking, Monetary Policies, and the Implications for Transition Economies by : Mario I. Blejer
Download or read book Central Banking, Monetary Policies, and the Implications for Transition Economies written by Mario I. Blejer and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 458 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: the adaptation of the institutional settings of monetary policy to deal with an emerging market economy had to be carried out in the midst of an unprecedented stabilization effort and, therefore, was particularly urgent and complicated. In many of the transition countries, the transformation effort implied not just changes in procedures but the establishment of a central bank from scratch, a process that involved an important effort, precisely at a time when the whole system was in serious turmoil. While the process of reforms is not yet completed in all the transition countries, an immense amount of progress has been achieved, and many of the transition countries face today monetary and central banking conditions that are close to those of Western economies. In this volume, we collect a number of important contributions that discuss the most burning aspects of the current debates on central banking and monetary policy and draw implications for the postsocialist transition economies. The various papers included in the volume deal with a broad set of related issues, which are highly relevant not just for transition economies but for other emerging markets and for advanced economies as well. The subjects covered in the book are divided into seven major categories (Sections II to VIII), some of which overlap.
Book Synopsis Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence by : Åke Lönnberg
Download or read book Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence written by Åke Lönnberg and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2008 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Conventional economic policy models focus only on selected elements of the central bank balance sheet, in particular monetary liabilities and sometimes foreign reserves. The canonical model of an "independent" central bank assumes that it chooses money (or an interest rate), unconstrained by a need to generate seignorage for itself or government. While a long line of literature has emphasized the dangers of fiscal dominance influencing the conduct of monetary policy the idea that an independent central bank could be constrained in achieving its policy objectives by its own balance sheet situation is a relatively novel idea considered in this paper. If one accepts this potential constraint as a valid concern, the financial strength of the central bank as a stand alone entity becomes highly relevant for ascertaining monetary policy credibility. We consider several strands of evidence that clearly indicate fiscal backing for central banks cannot be assumed and hence financial independence is relevant to operational independence. First we examine 135 central bank laws to illustrate the variety of legal approaches adopted with respect to central bank financial independence. Second, we examine the same data set with regard to central bank recapitalization provisions to show that even in cases where the treasury is nominally responsible for maintaining the central bank financially strong, it may do so in purely a cosmetic fashion. Third, we show that, in actual practice, treasuries have frequently not provided central banks with genuine financial support on a timely basis leaving them excessively reliant on seignorage to finance their operations and/or forcing them to abandon policy objectives.
Book Synopsis Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence by : Ake Lonnberg
Download or read book Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence written by Ake Lonnberg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Conventional economic policy models focus only on selected elements of the central bank balance sheet, in particular monetary liabilities and sometimes foreign reserves. The canonical model of an quot;independentquot; central bank assumes that it chooses money (or an interest rate), unconstrained by a need to generate seignorage for itself or government. While a long line of literature has emphasized the dangers of fiscal dominance influencing the conduct of monetary policy the idea that an independent central bank could be constrained in achieving its policy objectives by its own balance sheet situation is a relatively novel idea considered in this paper. If one accepts this potential constraint as a valid concern, the financial strength of the central bank as a stand alone entity becomes highly relevant for ascertaining monetary policy credibility. We consider several strands of evidence that clearly indicate fiscal backing for central banks cannot be assumed and hence financial independence is relevant to operational independence. First we examine 135 central bank laws to illustrate the variety of legal approaches adopted with respect to central bank financial independence. Second, we examine the same data set with regard to central bank recapitalization provisions to show that even in cases where the treasury is nominally responsible for maintaining the central bank financially strong, it may do so in purely a cosmetic fashion. Third, we show that, in actual practice, treasuries have frequently not provided central banks with genuine financial support on a timely basis leaving them excessively reliant on seignorage to finance their operations and/or forcing them to abandon policy objectives.
Book Synopsis Central Bank Independence by : Guy Debelle
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Guy Debelle and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1996 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.