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Author : Pio Baake
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 22 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs written by Pio Baake and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9783863040048
Total Pages : 29 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (4 download)
Download or read book Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 106 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Oliver D. Hart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 79 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (223 download)
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 79 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Few people would disagree with the proposition that horizontal mergers have the potential to restrict output and raise consumer prices. In contrast, there is much less agreement about the anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model showing how vertical integration changes the nature of competition in upstream and downstream markets and identifying conditions under which market foreclosure will be a consequence or even a purpose of such integration. In contrast to much of the literature, we do not restrict upstream and downstream firms to particular contractual arrangements, but instead allow firms to choose from a full set of contractual arrangements both when integrated and when not. We also allow non-integrated firms to respond optimally to the integration decisions of other firms, either by remaining nonintegrated, exiting the industry or integrating too (i.e. bandwagoning). In a final section we use our analysis to shed some light on a number of prominent vertical merger cases, involving computer reservation systems for airlines, the cement industry and the St. Louis Terminal Railroad.
Author : Alexander Schrader
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 32 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure written by Alexander Schrader and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ian Ayres
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 29 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (12 download)
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Overbuying written by Ian Ayres and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Gilles Chemla
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.X/5 (6 download)
Download or read book Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration written by Gilles Chemla and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure and Quality Investment written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Simon Loertscher
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Market Structure and the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration written by Simon Loertscher and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete à la Cournot downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure effects, and vertical integration even to full foreclosure can be procompetitive. Surprisingly, vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the industry is otherwise more concentrated. Extensions analyze incentives to integrate and differentiated Bertrand competition downstream. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should be wary of vertical integration when the integrating firm faces many competitors and should be permissive otherwise.
Author : Bibliothèque centrale (Fonds Quetelet)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 916 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Aanwinsten van de Centrale Bibliotheek (Queteletfonds) written by Bibliothèque centrale (Fonds Quetelet) and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 916 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jay Pil Choi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications written by Jay Pil Choi and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications. In this model, vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would, as an independent firm, provide a generalized input. The changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails; vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm's costs at the downstream level. The choice of a specialized input by the integrated firm serves as a natural commitment mechanism not to supply the rival downstream firms and, thus, enables us to dispense with the controversial price commitment assumption in the literature. We derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.
Author : Herman Quirmbach
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 108 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (9 download)
Download or read book Vertical Integration, Contestable Markets, and the Misfortunes of the Misshaped U written by Herman Quirmbach and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Eric S. Rosengren
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 38 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Empirical Evidence on Vertical Foreclosure written by Eric S. Rosengren and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Stephen Martin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets written by Stephen Martin and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit to restricting output to the monopoly level, as does the use of public contracts. Public contracts are not a perfect substitute for vertical integration, however: integration allows more surplus to be extracted from the unintegrated downstream firm, a bargaining effect that has been underemphasized in the recent foreclosure literature. Motivated by some observations that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory, we extend the theory to allow downstream firms to have heterogeneous (rather than purely passive or symmetric) out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Author : Pio Baake
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure Versus Downstream Competition with Capital Precommitment written by Pio Baake and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level. We allow the upstream firm to make an ex-ante capital precommitment. We show that, if integration is outlawed, the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output. We show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration.
Author : Johannes Boehm
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (118 download)
Download or read book Vertical Integration and Foreclosure written by Johannes Boehm and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lucy White
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Foreclosure with Incomplete Information written by Lucy White and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm's marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has argued that vertical integration is harmful because it allows an upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will "over-sell," producing more in equilibrium. By contrast, we find that with incomplete information, high-cost firms will often "under-sell" in equilibrium, that is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to integrate downstream, but this is socially harmful only for low-cost types. For high-cost firms vertical integration can be Pareto-improving, resulting in higher output, profits, and consumer surplus.
