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Two Essays On Agency Problems And Contracting
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Book Synopsis Two Essays on Agency Problems and Contracting by : Lei Mao
Download or read book Two Essays on Agency Problems and Contracting written by Lei Mao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Contract Design by : Walter Alberto Cont
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design written by Walter Alberto Cont and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Agency Problems and Financial Contracting by : Amir Barnea
Download or read book Agency Problems and Financial Contracting written by Amir Barnea and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 1985 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision by : Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Download or read book Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision written by Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-02-19 with total page 211 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Book Synopsis Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) by : Patrick Bolton
Download or read book Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation (Classic Reprint) written by Patrick Bolton and published by Forgotten Books. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Excerpt from Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation We conclude these introductory remarks by contrasting our paper to three related literatures. The first is the recent game-theoretic work on predation.4 This literature shares with ours the feature that predation is rational. It differs, however, in that predation is viewed as an attempt to convince rivals that it would be unprofitable to remain in the industry; predation changes rivals' beliefs about industry demand or the predator's costs. In our paper, there is common knowledge that production in each period is a positive net present value investment.5 Thus, predation does not work by changing rivals' beliefs. Rather, predation adversely affects the agency relationship between the firm and its creditors. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Book Synopsis Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation by : Patrick Bolton
Download or read book Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation written by Patrick Bolton and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Handbook of the Economics of Finance by : G. Constantinides
Download or read book Handbook of the Economics of Finance written by G. Constantinides and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2003-11-04 with total page 698 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Arbitrage, State Prices and Portfolio Theory / Philip h. Dybvig and Stephen a. Ross / - Intertemporal Asset Pricing Theory / Darrell Duffle / - Tests of Multifactor Pricing Models, Volatility Bounds and Portfolio Performance / Wayne E. Ferson / - Consumption-Based Asset Pricing / John y Campbell / - The Equity Premium in Retrospect / Rainish Mehra and Edward c. Prescott / - Anomalies and Market Efficiency / William Schwert / - Are Financial Assets Priced Locally or Globally? / G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stuli / - Microstructure and Asset Pricing / David Easley and Maureen O'hara / - A Survey of Behavioral Finance / Nicholas Barberis and Richard Thaler / - Derivatives / Robert E. Whaley / - Fixed-Income Pricing / Qiang Dai and Kenneth J. Singleton.
Book Synopsis Four Essays on Agency Problems by : Son Ku Kim
Download or read book Four Essays on Agency Problems written by Son Ku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Corporate Finance by : Sen Li
Download or read book Two Essays on Corporate Finance written by Sen Li and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts by : Gerald A. Feltham
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts written by Gerald A. Feltham and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 412 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The three coeditors knew John Butterworth for many years and had worked closely with him on a number of research projects. We respected him as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, and to the accounting profession. This volume contains twelve invited papers on the general topic of the economic theory of information and contracts. We asked leading scholars who had known John to contribute papers. The response was very gratifying. The authors provided us with new strong research papers that should make a lasting contribution to the accounting and information economics research literature, and make us all proud to have put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham's review of John Butterworth's pioneering contributions to the accounting and information economics literature. This is followed by an introduction to the papers in the volume and the papers themselves.
Book Synopsis Agency Theory by : Alexander Stremitzer
Download or read book Agency Theory written by Alexander Stremitzer and published by Peter Lang Publishing. This book was released on 2005 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues.
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Asset Pricing and Asset Choice by : James Eric Gunderson
Download or read book Two Essays on Asset Pricing and Asset Choice written by James Eric Gunderson and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Dynamic Contracting by : Ilia Krasikov
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Contracting written by Ilia Krasikov and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The thesis focuses on understanding the dynamic nature of contracts used in various economic context, specifically financial economics and industrial organization. The first chapter "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints'' draws on a large empirical literature documenting that small businesses are financially constrained, and operate at an inefficient level. In the paper, we build a theoretical model where financial constraints arise endogenously as a product of interaction between persistent agency frictions and agent's inability to raise external capital.The paper makes two general points. First, efficiency is a certainty in the long run, and it is achieved through monotone slacking of financial constraints. Second, persistence makes the path towards efficiency much more constrained in comparison to the model with the iid technology. In particular, we show that dynamic agency models with persistence predict a larger cross section of firms in the economy to be financially constrained.At a technical level, we invoke the recursive approach of \citet{aps}, using a two-dimensional vector of promised utilities as a state variable. We show that the optimal contract always stays in a strict subset of the recursive domain termed the shell, and the optimal contract is monotone within this set. We also verify that the results continue to hold in continuous time.The second chapter "Dynamic Contracts with Unequal Discounting'' looks at dynamic screening with soft financial constraints. In contrast to the first paper, the agent can raise money but at a different rate than the principal.We solve for the optimal contract and show that efficiency is not attainable with soft financial constraints. Therefore, the predictions of dynamic models of mechanism design are not robust to the assumption of equal discounting. For the large set of parameters, the optimal contract has the restart property- dynamic distortions are a function of the number of consecutive bad shocks, and once the good shock arrives the process repeats again. We also show that restricting attention to contracts which have the restart property is in general approximately optimal. The endogenous resetting aspect of restart contracts shares features of various contracts used in practice.In the third chapter "On Dynamic Pricing'', we explore dynamic price discrimination, extending a canonical model of monopolistic screening to repeated sales, where a seller uses timing of purchases as a screening instrument. The importance of time as an instrument for price discrimination has been understood since Varian [1989].In the paper, we are aiming to provide a formal analysis of pricing strategies to discriminate amongst consumers based on the timing of information arrival and/or the timing of purchase.A seller repeatedly trades with a buyer. Buyer's valuations for the trade follow a renewal process; that is, they change infrequently at random dates. For the model with two periods, We show that selling the first period good for a spot price and selling the second period good by optioning a sequence of forwards is the optimal pricing strategy. Specifically, at the outset, the seller offers an American option which can be exercised in each of the two periods. Exercising the option grants the buyer with a forward- an obligation to purchase the second period good for a specific price, and a strike price- a right to buy (or not) the good in the second period after learning his value. The buyer with a high valuation exercises the option in the first period, whereas one with a low valuation waits until the second period and then takes a call.We extend the analysis to the general continuous time renewal processes and assess the performance of price discrimination based on American options on forwards:i.optioning forwards is shown to be the deterministic optimum for the sequential screening problem- when the seller makes a sale in a single fixed period;ii.optioning forwards is shown to be the exact optimum for the repeated sales problem in the restricted class of strongly monotone contracts- when allocative distortions are monotone in a whole vector of buyer's valuations;iii.the optimum for the repeated sales problem in the unrestricted class of contracts is shown to be backloaded and a theoretical bound is provided for the fraction of optimal revenue that can be extracted by optioning forwards.Finally, the construction of dynamic pricing mechanism and bounds is ported to study repeated auctions.
Book Synopsis Dissertation Abstracts International by :
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 570 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice by : Tobias Oberpaul
Download or read book Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice written by Tobias Oberpaul and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2024-01-19 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compensation contracts have become ever more complex and individualized, particularly in the executive compensation domain, where increasingly diverse stakeholder demands and governance requirements have led to the inclusion of more and increasingly interrelated components into compensation contracts. Even the compensation of lower-level employees has become complex as firms individualize employee compensation and use many different rewards simultaneously. Research has examined elements of compensation in isolation but has attempted to avoid the complexities of compensation. This dissertation examines the consequences of compensation complexity and compensation design dispersion and contributes to a better understanding of compensation and its consequences for firms and employees. The first study examines how the complexity of executive compensation contracts affects firm performance. It finds that CEO compensation complexity negatively affects accounting, market, and ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) metrics of firm performance and explores mechanisms that help explain the relationships. The second study examines the effect of compensation design dispersion within top management teams and its impact on executive turnover. The results show that compensation design dispersion affects executive turnover, both directly and in interaction with relative pay level. The third study addresses the role of compensation design dispersion in the development of procedural justice perceptions. Using two experiments, this study shows that compensation design dispersion causes lower procedural justice perceptions, which appears to be less problematic for participants with relatively easier to understand contracts. In summary, this dissertation provides a nuanced overview of complex compensation design and compensation design dispersion. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of compensation as an incentive and sorting tool for organizations, and of the implications of compensation design for the functioning of teams.
Book Synopsis Historical Foundations of Entrepreneurial Research by : Hans Landström
Download or read book Historical Foundations of Entrepreneurial Research written by Hans Landström and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2010-01-01 with total page 449 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors present an historical perspective on the development of empirical research into entrepreneurship.
Book Synopsis Essays in Economic Theory, Growth, and Labour Markets by : George Bitros
Download or read book Essays in Economic Theory, Growth, and Labour Markets written by George Bitros and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2002-01-01 with total page 328 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The distinguished contributors in this volume provide a variety of essays, which are written in honor of Emmanuel Drandakis. These essays fall into four uniform areas of economics: economic growth, general equilibrium, labor economics and game theory and applications. The editors focus on a select set of issues that stand high on the agenda of academic research. They provide fresh insights and approaches to the analysis of these issues, and thus open up wider avenues for our understanding of the dilemmas posed for theory and policy. Readers are offered new empirical evidence on such thorny social problems as, for example, unemployment, the intergenerational transmission of human capital and the response of wages to price and endowment changes.