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Author : Xiaoxiao Hu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 109 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (111 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information written by Xiaoxiao Hu and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 109 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Juan Escobar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 130 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Essays in Dynamic Games written by Juan Escobar and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 130 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lan Sun
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (967 download)
Download or read book Essays on Two-player Games with Asymmetric Information written by Lan Sun and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ruitian Lang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Ruitian Lang and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
Author : Di Pei (Ph. D.)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 189 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (15 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Reputations written by Di Pei (Ph. D.) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 189 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic games with incomplete information. In Chapter 1, I study reputation effects when individuals have persistent private information that matters for their opponents' payoffs. I examine a repeated game between a patient informed player and a sequence of myopic uninformed players. The informed player privately observes a persistent state, and is either a strategic type who can flexibly choose his actions or is one of the several commitment types that mechanically plays the same action in every period. Unlike the canonical models on reputation effects, the uninformed players' payoffs depend on the state. This interdependence of values introduces new challenges to reputation building, namely, the informed player could face a tradeo between establishing a reputation for commitment and signaling favorable information about the state. My results address the predictions on the informed player's payoff and behavior that apply across all Nash equilibria. When the stage game payoffs satisfy a monotone-supermodularity condition, I show that the informed long-run player can overcome the lack-of-commitment problem and secure a high payoff in every state and in every equilibrium. Under a condition on the distribution over states, he will play the same action in every period and maintain his reputation for commitment in every equilibrium. If the payoff structure is unrestricted and the probability of commitment types is small, then the informed player's return to reputation building can be low and can provide a strict incentive to abandon his reputation. In Chapter 2, I study the dynamics of an agent's reputation for competence when the labor market's information about his performance is disclosed by an intermediary who cannot commit. I show that this game admits a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). When the agent is patient, his effort is inverse U-shaped, while the rate of information disclosure is decreasing over time. I illustrate the inefficiencies of the unique MPE by comparing it with the equilibrium in the benchmark scenario where the market automatically observes all breakthroughs. I characterize a tractable subclass of non-Markov Equilibria and explain why allowing players to coordinate on payoff-irrelevant events can improve eciency on top of the unique MPE and the exogenous information benchmark. When the intermediary can commit, her optimal Markov disclosure policy has a deadline, after which no breakthrough will be disclosed. However, deadlines are not incentive compatible in the game without commitment, illustrating a time inconsistency problem faced by the intermediary. My model can be applied to professional service industries, such as law and consulting. My results provide an explanation to the observed wage and promotion patterns in Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994). In Chapter 3, I study repeated games in which a patient long-run player (e.g. a rm) wishes to win the trust of some myopic opponents (e.g. a sequence or a continuum of consumers) but has a strict incentive to betray them. Her benet from betrayal is persistent over time and is her private information. I examine the extent to which persistent private information can overcome this lack-of-commitment problem. My main result characterizes the set of payoffs a patient long-run player can attain in equilibrium. Interestingly, every type's highest equilibrium payoff only depends on her true benet from betrayal and the lowest possible benet in the support of her opponents' prior belief. When this lowest possible benet vanishes, every type can approximately attain her Stackelberg commitment payoff. My finding provides a strategic foundation for the (mixed) Stackelberg commitment types in the reputation models, both in terms of the highest attainable payoff and in terms of the commitment behaviors. Compared to the existing approaches that rely on the existence of crazy types that are either irrational or have drastically dierent preferences, there is common knowledge of rationality in my model, and moreover, players' ordinal preferences over stage game outcomes are common knowledge.
Author : Ayca Kaya
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 200 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (794 download)
Download or read book Essays on Games with Asymmetric Information written by Ayca Kaya and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Daehyun Kim
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 153 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (11 download)
Download or read book Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Author : Ying Jiang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 148 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (956 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Analysis of Dynamic Games written by Ying Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation seeks to combine ideas from literature in Machine Learning and the econometric analysis of games, and contributes to the analysis of dynamic competition in the context of high dimensional covariates. Chapter 1 studies new entry and mergers in the U.S. airlines industry and explores how the incentives of legacy carriers to accommodate new entry change when they merge and whether low cost carriers are sensitive to these changes when making entry decisions. We estimate an explicitly network-wide, strategic and dynamic model of airline competition, and find evidence that Southwest was more likely to enter markets where, from Delta and Northwest's perspective, the expected value of committing aircraft capacity, relative to other markets, fell the most post-merger. Chapter 2 develops a method for deriving policy function improvements for a single agent in high dimensional Markov dynamic games. We derive a one-step improvement policy over any given benchmark policy, and the one-step improvement policy can in turn be improved upon until a suitable stopping rule is met. Chapter 3 applies the method proposed in Chapter 2 to solve for policy function improvements in a high-dimensional entry game similar to that studied by Holmes (2011). The game has a state variable vector with an average cardinality of 10^42. We find that our algorithm results in a nearly 300 percent improvement in expected profits as compared to a benchmark strategy.
Author : Esat Doruk Cetemen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 160 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (119 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games written by Esat Doruk Cetemen and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This thesis focuses on the effect of uncertainty and asymmetric information on cooperation in dynamic Bayesian games. Both chapters of the thesis build on the same underlying Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian model, but each chapter considers different information structures. Chapter 1, considers a team of agents working on a joint project with unknown true prospects. Team members receive interim feedback that is informative for effort choices and the project's prospects. We show that the presence of uncertainty alleviates inefficiencies arising from free-riding. The team members exaggerate their efforts to influence the interim feedback signal, which in turn affects their partners' beliefs about the uncertain state, consequently affecting their future effort choices. The equilibrium effort level can be approximately efficient when feedback is sufficiently responsive. Our result implies that creating uncertainty in team projects could lead to a Pareto improvement. Chapter 2, considers a two partners contribute to a common project over time. As in Chapter 1, the value of the project is determined by the aggregate effort of the partners and by a common productivity parameter. Different than Chapter 1, in this chapter each partner is privately informed about the productivity parameter. At each instant, the two partners observe a noisy public signal of total effort. An equilibrium of this game is Markov if effort choices of agents depend only on the beliefs about the value of the project and on calendar time. I characterize the unique symmetric linear Markov equilibrium as the solution to a nonlinear boundary value problem. The equilibrium features a mutual encouragement effect, as agents exaggerate their effort in order to signal their private information, which counteracts free-riding incentives. Indeed, if the project lasts sufficiently long, the diffused information structure approximates the first-best in terms of welfare. If, instead of distributed private information, one agent has all the information about the productivity parameter, the excessive signaling effect is accentuated. As a result, the centralized information structure can yield output levels above the first best."--Pages viii-ix.
Author : Chaim Fershtman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (458 download)
Download or read book Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information written by Chaim Fershtman and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Chaim Fershtman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (16 download)
Download or read book Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: a Framework for Applied Work written by Chaim Fershtman and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ziwei Wang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (136 download)
Download or read book Essays on Games with Incomplete Information written by Ziwei Wang and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The study of game theory has advanced our understanding of strategic interactions and economic behaviors. In applications, we economists often use parsimonious game-theoretic models to help us make sharp predictions. However, these models are associated with strong, sometimes unwarranted, common knowledge assumptions about players' payoffs and information. In order to make our predictions realistic and reliable, we need to embed these models into larger and more comprehensive ones, and then perform analysis that are robust to the relaxation of common knowledge assumptions. This dissertation contains three chapters that study various game-theoretic frameworks with incomplete information and investigate the implications of weakened assumptions. The first chapter proposes a new notion of stability to study matching markets with one-sided incomplete information. A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition of uninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self-consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion of stability for a given set of outcomes, and then iteratively apply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot be deemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. We prove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomes using a fixed-point characterization. We then provide two additional characterizations of our solution concept. The first characterization links the non-equilibrium approach we pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu (2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptions implicit in the iterative definition. In the second chapter, we study standard auctions and compare their minimum expected revenues across all information structures. We show that, for a given symmetric common prior of values among bidders, if the seller is uncertain about the correct model of bidders' interim beliefs and evaluates her expected revenue by the worst-case scenario, the all-pay auction performs weakly worse than does the first-price auction. Specifically, we first provide a revenue equivalence result of standard auction formats under the "worst-case" information structure constructed in Bergemann et al. (2017a), which implies that the minimum expected revenue of the all-pay auction never exceeds that of a first-price auction. We then construct an example to illustrate that the all-pay auction can generate strictly lower expected revenue in some cases. The third chapter studies predictions that are robust against higher order payoff uncertainty in dynamic games. Common knowledge among players is captured by a preference-information structure, while a type space is used as a concise model of players' initial beliefs. We formulate an interim version of extensive form rationalizability (EFR) and use this solution concept as the starting point of our robustness analysis. Employing a collection-based approach, we provide conditions that fully characterize (i) what refinements of EFR are robust, (ii) when a Structure Theorem (Weinstein and Yildiz, 2007) of EFR holds, and (iii) when the prediction of EFR is generically unique. We then apply these results to study robust refinements of EFR when there is higher order uncertainty about privacy of information or about observability of actions. These applications demonstrate the power of our results and generate interesting observations in dynamic environments.
Author : Sofia Joana Moroni Ulloa
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 418 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (953 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information written by Sofia Joana Moroni Ulloa and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 418 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Elham Nikram
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (16 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Game Theory and Computation written by Elham Nikram and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Shigeki Isogai
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (1 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction written by Shigeki Isogai and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this essay, I study how forward-induction reasoning affect plausibility/stability of agreements in which players in a dynamic interaction enforces cooperation with the threat of mutually destructive punishment. While the traditional theory using equilibrium concept shows that such strategy profile is self-enforcing, under a modification of the model, such strategy profile fails to be consistent with players' rationality.In the first chapter I provide the simplest setting under which this non-rationalizability result of deterrence can be shown. The game is a two-player three-stage game: in the first stage, the players choose whether to enter the strategic interaction by paying some cost; in the second stage, the players play a prisoners' dilemma game; and in the third stage, the players play a coordination game. Each move is simultaneous and the players' past actions are perfectly monitored. While there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players can cooperate with the threat of punishment provided the punishment is strong enough, I show that the strategy profile does not consists of rationalizable strategies under a certain parameter values. This occurs because choosing to enter, unilaterally defect, and then punish the opponent is strictly dominated by a mixture of the two strategies ``do not enter'' and ``enter, defect, but do not punish.'' This result shows that a simple modification of the game and forward-induction consideration encoded in rationalizability might cast doubt on the idea of deterring defection by the threat of mutual punishment.The other two chapters study to what extent the result in the fist chapter does or does not apply in different settings. The second chapter considers the infinite-horizon extension of the model in the first chapter. In the first period (denoted as period 0), the players choose whether to enter the game. After the players choose to enter, the continuation game is the infinite repetition of the stage game which consists of two phases: in the first phase players play prisoners' dilemma game, after which players simultaneously choose to continue the game, exit from the game without punishing the opponent, or punish the opponent and exit from the game. I show that with a similar condition as in the result in the first chapter, strategy which entails defection and punishment in the first stage is not rationalizable. Moreover, since the exit-without-punishment option works as an outside option in later stages of the game, we also obtain a result which provides conditions under which punishment after defection is excluded by rationalizability.The third chapter extends the model in the first chapter toward an incomplete-information model in that it considers a model of random number of players, who are sequentially matched and play the game as in the first chapter. I assume that while the past actions in the stage games are not observable, occurrences of punishment is publicly observable to all the players (the typical example is the formation of cartels and the occurrence of leniency applications). I explore how this observable punishment works as a signaling device and how this model gives rise to a rationalizable use of punishment. I first show that a simple repetition of games does not give rise to a rationalizable punishment because of the assumption that the players cannot distinguish the non-occurrence of deviation and failure to punishment. I then discuss possible modifications to recover the punishment being an equilibrium action; i.e., that a small perturbation in payoffs can recover the possibility of punishment.
Author : Ilwoo Hwang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (887 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information written by Ilwoo Hwang and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jin-Soo Yoo
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 198 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Dynamic Games in Industrial Organization written by Jin-Soo Yoo and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
