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Three Essays On Auctions And Innovation
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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation by : Thomas Giebe
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovation written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations by : Thomas Giebe
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Innovations written by Thomas Giebe and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auction and Information Markets by : Ricardo Ungo
Download or read book Three Essays on Auction and Information Markets written by Ricardo Ungo and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Auction and Information by : Tao-yi Joseph Wang
Download or read book Three Essays in Auction and Information written by Tao-yi Joseph Wang and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Auctions and Information Acquisition by : Gabor Virag
Download or read book Three Essays in Auctions and Information Acquisition written by Gabor Virag and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions by : Jörg Nikutta
Download or read book Three Essays in the Theory of Auctions written by Jörg Nikutta and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 99 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design by : Luke Hu
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design written by Luke Hu and published by . This book was released on 2014-01-28 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining by : Yumiko Baba
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions and Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auctions by : Itzhak Rasooly
Download or read book Three Essays on Auctions written by Itzhak Rasooly and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three essays on auction, retail risk management and market share evolution by : Xiaorui Hu
Download or read book Three essays on auction, retail risk management and market share evolution written by Xiaorui Hu and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Auction Markets by : Nicholas James Shunda
Download or read book Three Essays on Auction Markets written by Nicholas James Shunda and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Empirical Auctions by : Sudip Gupta
Download or read book Three Essays in Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions by : Ilaria Cingottini
Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions written by Ilaria Cingottini and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi-object Auctions by : Veronika Grimm
Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi-object Auctions written by Veronika Grimm and published by . This book was released on 2003-01-01 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on All-pay Auctions by : Minbo Xu
Download or read book Three Essays on All-pay Auctions written by Minbo Xu and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation includes three research papers on all-pay auctions. The first paper (Chapter 1) considers an all-pay auction for a product in which there is an option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified posted price P at any time. We find the symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the first- and second-price all-pay auctions (also called war of attrition) with a buy-price option. Under these equilibria the buy-price option will affect high-value bidders' behavior, and improve their welfare. At the same time, the seller can select the optimal posted price to collect more revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds as well. The second paper (Chapter 2) conducts empirical analysis on online penny auctions, which are seen as an adaptation of the famous dollar auction and as "the evil stepchild of game theory and behavioral economics." We use the complete bid and bidder history at a website to study if penny auctions can sustain excessive profits over time. The overwhelming majority of new bidders lose money, but they quit quickly. A very small percentage of bidders are experienced and strategically sophisticated, but they earn substantial profits. Our evidence thus suggests that penny auctions cannot sustain excessive profits without attracting a revolving door of new customers who will lose money. The third paper (Chapter 3) proposes a nonparametric estimation approach to empirical analysis of the war of attrition. In order to construct a tractable model, we consider the uncertain competition and derive a structural model with a stochastic number of bidders. We admit the contamination from observables and introduce a deconvolution problem with heteroscedastic errors into the nonparametric approach. By a two-step nonparametric procedure, we can attain a consistent estimator of the distribution of bidders' private values from the observables. Finally, we apply the estimation procedure to field data from penny auctions.
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Auctions and Contests by : Jun Zhang
Download or read book Three Essays in Auctions and Contests written by Jun Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Chapter 4 analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants' private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.
Book Synopsis Three essays on auction theory and contest theory by : Yong Sui
Download or read book Three essays on auction theory and contest theory written by Yong Sui and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: