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Author : Zibo Xu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 53 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (875 download)
Download or read book The Instability of Backward Induction in Evolutionary Dynamics written by Zibo Xu and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Tomer Wexler
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 20 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (68 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria written by Tomer Wexler and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Sergiu Hart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (427 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction written by Sergiu Hart and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262033053
Total Pages : 346 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games written by Ross Cressman and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
Author : Larry Samuelson
Publisher : MIT Press (MA)
ISBN 13 : 9780262193825
Total Pages : 309 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (938 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection written by Larry Samuelson and published by MIT Press (MA). This book was released on 1997 with total page 309 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions." -- Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author : American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher : American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN 13 : 0821853260
Total Pages : 186 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (218 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by American Mathematical Society. Short Course and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2011-10-27 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author : William H. Sandholm
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262288613
Total Pages : 618 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (622 download)
Download or read book Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics written by William H. Sandholm and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2010-12-17 with total page 618 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory. This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the 1970s through recent advances. Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. It then studies the dynamics of behavior in these games. By introducing a general model of myopic strategy revision by individual agents, the text provides foundations for two distinct approaches to aggregate behavior dynamics: the deterministic approach, based on differential equations, and the stochastic approach, based on Markov processes. Key results on local stability, global convergence, stochastic stability, and nonconvergence are developed in detail. Ten substantial appendixes present the mathematical tools needed to work in evolutionary game theory, offering a practical introduction to the methods of dynamic modeling. Accompanying the text are more than 200 color illustrations of the mathematics and theoretical results; many were created using the Dynamo software suite, which is freely available on the author's Web site. Readers are encouraged to use Dynamo to run quick numerical experiments and to create publishable figures for their own research.
Author : Tomer Wexler
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 19 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (234 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induciton Equilibria written by Tomer Wexler and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Petyon Young
Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 0444537678
Total Pages : 1025 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (445 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2014-10-01 with total page 1025 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author :
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 9780387758886
Total Pages : 10398 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (588 download)
Download or read book Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2009-06-26 with total page 10398 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This encyclopedia provides an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the concepts of complexity theory together with the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems in all fields of science and engineering. It links fundamental concepts of mathematics and computational sciences to applications in the physical sciences, engineering, biomedicine, economics and the social sciences.
Author : Kristian Lindgren
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma - The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play written by Kristian Lindgren and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behavior often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning based on backward induction eliminates strategies step by step until defection from the first round is the only remaining choice, reflecting the Nash equilibrium of the game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies in an evolutionary context, using replicator-mutation dynamics. The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently on the first round action: The 'Convincer' strategies insist with two rounds of initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the "Follower" strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to respond to an invite in the first round. For both of these strategy sets, iterated elimination of strategies shows that the only Nash equilibria are given by defection from the first round. We show that the evolutionary dynamics of the first set is always characterized by a stable fixed point, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, if the mutation rate is sufficiently small (but still positive). The second strategy set is numerically investigated, and we find that there are regions of parameter space where fixed points become unstable and the dynamics exhibits cycles of different strategy compositions. The results indicate that, even in the limit of very small mutation rate, the replicator-mutation dynamics does not necessarily bring the system with Convincers and Followers to the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the game. We also perform a detailed analysis of how the evolutionary behavior depends on payoffs, game length, and mutation rate.
Author : Robert Axelrod
Publisher : Basic Books
ISBN 13 : 0786734884
Total Pages : 258 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (867 download)
Download or read book The Evolution of Cooperation written by Robert Axelrod and published by Basic Books. This book was released on 2009-04-29 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Author :
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 1349588024
Total Pages : 7493 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (495 download)
Download or read book The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 7493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games written by Ross Cressman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Dynamic stability under the replicator dynamic of evolutionary game theory is investigated for certain symmetric extensive form games whose subgame structure exhibits a high degree of decomposability. It is shown that a pervasive equilibrium strategy is locally asymptotically stable (l.a.s.) if and only if it is given by backwards induction applied to the l.a.s. pervasive equilibria of the subgames and their corresponding truncations. That is, this dynamic backwards induction procedure provides a rational basis on which to predict the evolutionary outcome of the replicator dynamic for these symmetric games.
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262061940
Total Pages : 304 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (619 download)
Download or read book The Theory of Learning in Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1998 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author : Eric Smith
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9780750311373
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games written by Eric Smith and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory has the potential to provide an integrated framework to model many aspects of evolution, development, and ecology. The reliable use of game models, however, requires an understanding of their behaviour when the number of players becomes very large, resulting in the emergence of thermodynamic limits. This behaviour is controlled by the symmetries that characterize the game, and the approach to the thermodynamic limit is governed by collective fluctuations in the actions of the players. In this book, the authors present methods to derive large-deviations limits for population processes, and apply these to game models illustrating the many roles of symmetry and collective fluctuations in evolutionary dynamics.
Author : Larry Samuelson
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262692199
Total Pages : 332 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (921 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection written by Larry Samuelson and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
