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The Effects Of Institutional Investor Objectives On Firm Valuation And Governance
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Book Synopsis The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation and Governance by : Paul Borochin
Download or read book The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation and Governance written by Paul Borochin and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We find that ownership by different types of institutional investors has varying implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation, in both direction and magnitude, relative to fundamentals. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. Similarly, dedicated investors are associated with better future governance characteristics, while transient investors are not. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance.
Book Synopsis Investor Engagement by : Roderick Martin
Download or read book Investor Engagement written by Roderick Martin and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2007-07-05 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The growth of shareholder value has been a major change in Western economies since the 1980s. This growth has reignited debates concerning relations between investors and managers. This book argues that investors are more than passive providers of finance, on whose behalf managers seek to maximize shareholder returns. Instead, many investors directly influence management practice, through investor engagement. The book examines the role of institutional investors and private equity firms, two types of investors with overlapping but different reasons for engagement. Questions addressed include: What are the incentives, and disincentives, for investment engagement? How is investor engagement organized? What areas of management practice are of particular concern to investors? The discussion shows in detail how private equity firms play a major role in developing new companies, beyond the provision of finance, especially in the IT, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical sectors. The discussion is primarily based on British and US research. The debate has wider international relevance, because there are strong pressures for establishing shareholder value as the international 'norm' for systems of corporate governance. Following a detailed discussion of Germany, the authors conclude that there is no inevitable trend to shareholder value: shareholder value depends upon complementary institutional arrangements in national business systems, which are far from universal. The book concludes with a critical analysis of the justifications for shareholder value and investor engagement, highlighting the weaknesses of both efficiency and equity justifications.
Book Synopsis Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors by : Reena Aggarwal
Download or read book Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors written by Reena Aggarwal and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2003 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Influence of Institutional Investors on Firm Value by : Yong Seung Lee
Download or read book The Influence of Institutional Investors on Firm Value written by Yong Seung Lee and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The impact of corporate governance on firm value has been extensively debated by academics and business practitioners. Some studies show that companies that allow minority shareholders to have more control are likely to create greater shareholder value than those firms with concentrated control, while other studies suggest that the impact of having democratic governance is either negligible or even negative. In developed countries institutional investors have a significant stake in most of the companies. Active engagement by institutional investors is expected to decrease agency costs by strengthening monitoring mechanisms of operations and performance evaluations of the management, resulting in an increase in firm value. However, some academics and business practitioners argue that such minority shareholders' active engagement could be detrimental to firm value. In this thesis, I study the influence of institutional investors' active shareholder engagement on firm value and the relationship between the characteristics of corporate governance and firm value of target companies. I review previous studies that have evaluated both the effect of corporate governance and of institutional investors' activism on firm value. I conduct empirical analyses to examine the relationship between the institutions' shareholder engagement and firm value.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investor Horizon and Firm Valuation Around the World by : Simon Döring
Download or read book Institutional Investor Horizon and Firm Valuation Around the World written by Simon Döring and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using a comprehensive dataset of firms from 34 countries, we study the effect of institutional investors' investment horizons on firm valuation around the world. We find a positive relation between institutional ownership and firm value that is driven by short-horizon institutional investors. Accounting for the interaction between investors' investment horizon and nationality, we show that foreign short-horizon institutions, which are more likely to discipline managers through the threat of exit rather than engaging in monitoring made costly by the liability of foreignness, are the investor group with the strongest effect on firm value. Reinforcing the threat of exit channel, we find that the value-enhancing effect of short-horizon investors is stronger in the presence of multiple short-horizon investors, who are more likely to engage in competitive trading. The positive valuation effect of short-horizon investors is stronger when stock liquidity is high, which makes the exit threat more credible, and in firms prone to free cash flows agency problems. Overall, our results are consistent with short-horizon institutional investors, especially foreign institutional owners, affecting firm value by disciplining managers through credible threats of exit.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance by : Theodor Baums
Download or read book Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance written by Theodor Baums and published by Walter de Gruyter. This book was released on 1994 with total page 732 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The volume contains 23 articles by international experts, both scholars and practioners dealing with the development of institutional investors (such as banks, insurances, investment companies, pension funds etc.), their investment and voting policies, the impact on managements of the companies concerned and related issues. The consequences of the international development on capital markets as well as policy implications for the respective national legislations are treated.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investor Preferences and Firm Value by : Gwinyai T. Utete
Download or read book Institutional Investor Preferences and Firm Value written by Gwinyai T. Utete and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance by : Yong Wang
Download or read book Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance written by Yong Wang and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 166 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect.
Book Synopsis The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism by : James P. Hawley
Download or read book The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism written by James P. Hawley and published by University of Pennsylvania Press. This book was released on 2000-10-06 with total page 268 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Traces the rise of public and private pension funds, which now control as much as 50 percent of the equity in American corporations, and argues that shareholders in those funds could use their power to make corporations more responsive to social needs.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance by : Stuart L. Gillan
Download or read book Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance written by Stuart L. Gillan and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Institutional Investment by : Nida Abdioglu
Download or read book Three Essays on Institutional Investment written by Nida Abdioglu and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 171 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis investigates the investment preferences of institutional investors in the United States (US). In the second chapter, I analyse the impact of both firm and country-level determinants of foreign institutional investment. I find that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor's (FII) home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the US market. My findings indicate that investors who come from countries with governance setups similar to that of the US invest more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that of the US. My results are consistent with both the 'flight to quality' and 'familiarity' arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory empirical evidence. At the firm level, I present unequivocal evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. FII domiciled in countries with high governance quality prefer to invest in US firms with high corporate governance quality. In the third chapter, I investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on foreign institutional investment in the United States. I find that, post-SOX, FII increase their equity holdings in US listed firms. This result is mainly driven by passive, non-monitoring FII, who have the most to gain from the SOX-led reduction in firm information asymmetry, and the consequent reduction in the value of private information. The enactment of SOX appears to have changed the firm-level investment preferences of FII towards firms that would not be their traditional investment targets based on prudent man rules, e.g., smaller and riskier firms. In contrast to the extant literature, which mostly documents a negative SOX effect for the US markets, my chapter provides evidence of a positive SOX effect, namely the increase in foreign investment. In the fourth chapter, I examine the effect of SOX on the relation between firm innovation and institutional ownership. I find that US firms investing in innovation attract more institutional capital post-SOX. Prior literature highlights two SOX effects that could cause this result: a decreased level of information asymmetry (direct effect) and increased market liquidity (indirect effect). My findings support the direct effect, as I find that the positive relation between innovation and institutional ownership is driven by passive and dedicated institutional investors. A reduction in firms' information asymmetry is beneficial for these investors while they gain less from increased market liquidity. Overall, my results indicate that SOX is an important policy that has strengthened the institutional investor's support for firm innovation.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investors and Firm Valuation by : Maria De-La-Hoz
Download or read book Institutional Investors and Firm Valuation written by Maria De-La-Hoz and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article analyses how the corporate valuation of Latin American firms is affected by the presence of an institutional blockholder investor. The study uses a data set of 562 firms from six Latin American countries for the period 1997 to 2011. As in similar studies, we found that the presence of an institutional investor has a positive effect of 8% on firm value. After dividing the sample by investor type, we found that the presence of a grey investor (pension funds and insurance companies) has a negative effect on firm valuation, while independent investors (banks, investment and mutual funds) have a positive effect on firm valuation. This is one of the first studies to evaluate the relationship between investor activism and corporate valuation in Latin American economies with the most significant capital market development.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and Firm Valuation by : Maria De-La-Hoz
Download or read book Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and Firm Valuation written by Maria De-La-Hoz and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article analyses how the corporate valuation of Latin American firms is affected by the presence of a blockholder institutional investor. The study uses a data set of 562 firms from six Latin American countries for the 1997-2011 period. We found that the presence of an institutional investor has a positive effect of 8% on firm value, which increases to 21% for the cases where there is blockholder coalition with an institutional investor. After dividing the sample by investor type, we found that independent institutional ownership implies a positive premium on firms' Tobin's Q, while the presence of a grey investor has a negative effect on firm valuation.
Book Synopsis Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance by : Carolyn Kay Brancato
Download or read book Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance written by Carolyn Kay Brancato and published by Irwin Professional Publishing. This book was released on 1997 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume describes in detail the best practices being used to measure and enhance firm value while observing the rights of shareholders and managing the risks of dealing with them for long-term benefit of both companies and investors.
Book Synopsis Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors by : OECD
Download or read book Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors written by OECD and published by OECD Publishing. This book was released on 2011-07-01 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.
Book Synopsis The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance by : Petra Nix
Download or read book The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance written by Petra Nix and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance has emerged as a decisive business issue. Less corporate governance research is undertaken in civil law countries like Germany. In this thesis, the role of institutional investors in Germany is studied with the aim of providing an answer to the following research question: What role do independent institutional investors play in the corporate governance of listed German companies? This study follows an inductive qualitative research approach. The research model is based on six variables - board oversight, board nomination, identifying weaknesses, making recommendations, introducing changes in corporate strategy and exercising institutional power - to determine the role of institutional investors and to provide answers. Overall, the results show that the participants of the research study experience the role and responsibilities of institutional investors in the German two-tier corporate governance system as weak to medium across all six variables. The handling of recommendations from institutional investors to companies is not structured or executed in a systematic way by the study participants. The results indicate that the interviewees are convinced that institutional investors could be valuable partners in strengthening and improving corporate governance. They can play a role in corporate governance and can add value because they have a good understanding about the strategy and business model of the companies, expertise in research & analysis as well as a good sector expertise. However, the type of institutional investor matters in corporate governance. The strongest players are private equity and hedge funds. The weakest players are endowments and insurances. The most common company situations when institutional investors prompt change are underperformance, special companysituationsicrisis, corporate finance issues and management remuneration. The majority of the study participants expect a higher shareholder engagement in the future. Most of them have a positive point of view about the future role of institutional investors in corporate governance. III R The managerial implications of this study are that the investor relations function is well established and the programmes are sufficiently executed in German companies. Communication is the most appropriate measure. However, other typical and presumably more powerful measures like use of voting rights, engagement in the AGM, regular contact to the members of the supervisory board, taking a seat in the supervisory board, owning a meaningful company stake and collaboration with other shareholders seem to play a minor role. There is still potential for institutional investors to improve their role in corporate governance in German companies. In order to improve their influence in corporate governance institutional investors need to be prepared to pursue an escalation strategy. This encompasses for example to increase their stake to a meaningful and powerful level and/or they need to collaborate effectively and systematically with other shareholders to increase their acceptance vis-a-vis the company and to .ask for a seat in the supervisory board. However, such an approach also needs a strong long-term commitment and investment perspective as well as an attitude that also considers the long-term interests of the company. It can be concluded that institutional investors with a high level of expertise can contribute to the widely discussed improvement of the competence and independence of German supervisory boards. Important prerequisites of institutional investors to play a role in corporate governance are no conflict of interest and a sufficient sector expertise. Therefore, disadvantages like conflict of interest and lack of expertise have to be addressed properly. The results from this research can be used to draw lessons for (1) members of supervisory boards, members of the management board (in particular CEOs, and CFOs), as well as investor relations officers of listed companies, who want to improve governance and the relationship with their institutional shareholders; (2) institutional investors who want to enhance their engagement in their portfolio companies; and (3) standard setters like institutions and commissions that want to improve corporate governance.
Book Synopsis The Interaction Between Institutional and Activist Investors and Its Impact on Corporate Governance by : William Michael Billik
Download or read book The Interaction Between Institutional and Activist Investors and Its Impact on Corporate Governance written by William Michael Billik and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 173 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Institutional investors own a significant percentage of publicly traded firms, but appear to exert little control over management. Activist investors own relatively small percentages of firms, but appear to exert an over-weighted level of control. This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and activist ownership and the impact the relationship has on corporate governance. Building from the models of governance by exit (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009)) and on the threat of exit (Edmans and Manso (2010)) this study incorporates a model of activists leveraging the under-valuing of shareholder voting by institutions in exchange for a monitoring role (Gilson and Gordon (2013)) to develop a framework to test whether activist "voice" in firm governance is backed by institutional "exit" powers. A four-step structure is proposed: 1) examine the impact of activist investment on institutional investment, 2) examine the impact of activist investment on firm governance, 3) examine the impact of institutional investment on firm governance, and 4) examine the impact of firm governance in conjunction with activist investment on institutional investment. If all four steps find a significant relationship, then empirical evidence of institutional investor support for the efforts of activists in changing firm governance can be demonstrated.Identifying activist investors through SEC 13d filings and institutional investors through SEC 13f filings, and using E-Index, total board share ownership, median board share ownership, and return on assets as measures of corporate governance, hypothesis testing is performed with an emphasis on firm fixed effects, with year effects methodology, and Blundell-Bond dynamic panel model methodology with year effects. The results fail to support the framework of institutional "exit" backing activist "voice" to affect a change in corporate governance. The results of the study do lead to the conclusions that 1) institutional investors increase shareholdings as activist investors increase shareholdings, 2) institutional investors "exiting" impacts managerial entrenchment in firms, and 3) increased activist ownership contemporaneously corresponds to increased managerial entrenchment.
