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Simple Contracts With Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard
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Book Synopsis Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard by : Daniel Gottlieb
Download or read book Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Daniel Gottlieb and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We obtain conditions under which the optimal mechanism offers a single contract to all types. These conditions are always satisfied, for example, if output is binary or if the distribution of outputs is multiplicatively separable and ordered by FOSD (if it is not ordered, the optimal mechanism offers at most two contracts). If, in addition, the marginal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, this single contract is a debt contract. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard, where offering flexible menus of contracts provides gaming opportunities to the agent.
Book Synopsis Simple Efficient Rank-order Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection by : Jungyoll Yun
Download or read book Simple Efficient Rank-order Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Jungyoll Yun and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Allocation, Information and Markets by : John Eatwell
Download or read book Allocation, Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Book Synopsis The Economics of Contracts by : Bernard Salanié
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Bernard Salanié and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition.
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Book Synopsis Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski by : Rick Antle
Download or read book Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski written by Rick Antle and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-02-15 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The integration of accounting and the economics of information developed by Joel S. Demski and those he inspired has revolutionized accounting thought. This volume collects papers on accounting theory in honor of Professor Demski. The book also contains an extensive review of Professor Demski’s own contributions to the theory of accounting over the past four decades.
Book Synopsis Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-hazard by : Sonku Kim
Download or read book Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-hazard written by Sonku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by : Amy Finkelstein
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Book Synopsis The Theory of Incentives by : Jean-Jacques Laffont
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Book Synopsis Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk-neutral Agent by :
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk-neutral Agent written by and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Handbook of Insurance by : Georges Dionne
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 980 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the 1970's, the research agenda in insurance was dominated by optimal insurance coverage, security design, and equilibrium under conditions of imperfect information. The 1980's saw a growth of theoretical developments including non-expected utility, price volatility, retention capacity, the pricing and design of insurance contracts in the presence of multiple risks, and the liability insurance crisis. The empirical study of information problems, financial derivatives, and large losses due to catastrophic events dominated the research agenda in the 1990's. The Handbook of Insurance provides a single reference source on insurance for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants, and practitioners, that reviews the research developments in insurance and its related fields that have occurred over the last thirty years. The book starts with the history and foundations of insurance theory and moves on to review asymmetric information, risk management and insurance pricing, and the industrial organization of insurance markets. The book ends with life insurance, pensions, and economic security. Each chapter has been written by a leading authority in insurance, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Book Synopsis Efficient Contracting in a Make-to-Order Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information and Hidden Action by : Wenqiang Xiao
Download or read book Efficient Contracting in a Make-to-Order Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information and Hidden Action written by Wenqiang Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a make-to-order supply chain where a retailer sells a product for a manufacturer. There is a single selling season, during which the retailer receives customer orders and then sends the orders to the manufacturer for fulfillment. The manufacturer privately exerts effort to install production capacity prior to the season. Further, the manufacturer has superior information about the product potential than the retailer. Our focus is on the retailer's optimal design of incentive contracts facing the combination of adverse selection (due to the manufacturer's superior information about the demand) and moral hazard (due to the manufacturer's private effort decision). A contract is efficient if it renders the retailer the first-best profit (i.e., the integrated system's maximum profit). It is often true that the first-best profit can not be achieved even in settings with pure adverse selection. Indeed, we show that contracting based on sales is inefficient and illustrate the causes of inefficiency by studying a menu of revenue sharing contracts. However, we propose two simple mechanisms and show both are efficient: in the first, contracting is based on demand; in the second, contracting is based on the conjunction of sales and the binary information of whether or not demand exceeds the capacity. The insight obtained from these two mechanisms could offer useful guidelines for efficient contract design in more general principal-agent settings with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
Book Synopsis Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts by : Gerald A. Feltham
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts written by Gerald A. Feltham and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 412 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The three coeditors knew John Butterworth for many years and had worked closely with him on a number of research projects. We respected him as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, and to the accounting profession. This volume contains twelve invited papers on the general topic of the economic theory of information and contracts. We asked leading scholars who had known John to contribute papers. The response was very gratifying. The authors provided us with new strong research papers that should make a lasting contribution to the accounting and information economics research literature, and make us all proud to have put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham's review of John Butterworth's pioneering contributions to the accounting and information economics literature. This is followed by an introduction to the papers in the volume and the papers themselves.
Book Synopsis Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk-neutral Agent by : Roger Guesnerie
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk-neutral Agent written by Roger Guesnerie and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. Agriculture by : Richard E. Just
Download or read book A Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. Agriculture written by Richard E. Just and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 580 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After all the research on agricultural risk to date, the treatment of risk in agricultural research is far from harmonious. Many competing risk models have been proposed. Some new methodologies are largely untested. Some of the leading empirical methodologies in agricultural economic research are poorly suited for problems with aggregate data where risk averse behavior is less likely to be important. This book is intended to (i) define the current state of the literature on agricultural risk research, (ii) provide a critical evaluation of economic risk research on agriculture to date and (iii) set a research agenda that will meet future needs and prospects. This type of research promises to become of increasing importance because agricultural policy in the United States and elsewhere has decidedly shifted from explicit income support objectives to risk-related motivations of helping farmers deal with risk. Beginning with the 1996 Farm Bill, the primary set of policy instruments from U.S. agriculture has shifted from target prices and set aside acreage to agricultural crop insurance. Because this book is intended to have specific implications for U.S. agricultural policy, it has a decidedly domestic scope, but clearly many of the issues have application abroad. For each of the papers and topics included in this volume, individuals have been selected to give the strongest and broadest possible treatment of each facet of the problem. The result is this comprehensive reference book on the economics of agricultural risk.
Book Synopsis Adverse Selection and Non-exclusive Contracts by : Laurence Ales
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Non-exclusive Contracts written by Laurence Ales and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed by : Régis Barnichon
Download or read book A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed written by Régis Barnichon and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Unemployment insurance (UI) programs traditionally take the form of a single insurance contract offered to job seekers. In this work, we show that offering a menu of contracts can be welfare improving in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. When insurance contracts are composed of (i) a UI payment and (ii) a severance payment paid at the onset of unemployment, offering contracts with different ratios of UI benefits to severance payment is optimal under the equivalent of a single-crossing condition: job seekers in higher need of unemployment insurance should be less prone to moral hazard. In that setting, a menu allows the planner to attract job seekers with a high need for insurance in a contract with generous UI benefits, and to attract job seekers most prone to moral hazard in a separate contract with a large severance payment but little unemployment insurance. We propose a simple sufficient statistics approach to test the single-crossing condition in the data.
