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Author : Bruno Jullien
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.X/5 (6 download)
Download or read book Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard written by Bruno Jullien and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Svetlana Danilkina
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Multitasking, Multidimensional Screening, and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents written by Svetlana Danilkina and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we consider a model where a risk-neutral principal devises a contract for a risk neutral agent who can exert effort along different dimensions. On the top of that the agent possesses multidimensional private information about her cost of effort. We show that as long as effort is exerted along different dimensions that exceed in number the available performance measures, hidden action prevents implementing the second best solution, obtained under pure adverse selection situation, even if both parties are risk neutral and private information of the agent is not correlated with the production technology. Therefore, hidden action leads to additional welfare loss. The result implies that it can be more efficient to compensate employees on the basis of a variety of performance measures rather than base their compensation on a "bottom-line" measure (e.g. their contribution to the company's profits).
Author : Rajiv D. Banker
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 58 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Screening Versus Sorting in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Rajiv D. Banker and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market. Sorting is the traditional process by which the adverse selection problem is resolved. Screening is the process we propose by which agents that are deemed to be unsuitable are rejected. Used in conjunction with sorting, we consider ex-ante screening on the basis of the measure of general ability; and ex-post screening on the basis of the private measure of ability. We find that the principal may favor an agent with high or low general ability, but always prefers an agent with superior private ability. We derive the properties of the ex-ante and ex-post screening rules as they relate to the characteristics of the principal-agent relationship. Surprisingly, a positive relationship between the private and general measures of ability tends to imply that general ability has a negative effect on the incentives and compensation of the agent, as well as the expected outcome and profit of the firm. Finally, we discuss the econometric methods by which empirical studies of executive compensation should be adjusted to take into account the fact that CEOs were selected for their positions.
Author : Bernd Theilen
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (434 download)
Download or read book Simultaneous Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection with Risk Averse Agents written by Bernd Theilen and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Amy Finkelstein
Publisher : Columbia University Press
ISBN 13 : 0231538685
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (315 download)
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author : Martin Gaynor
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 32 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (221 download)
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Partnerships written by Martin Gaynor and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Sonku Kim
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-hazard written by Sonku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Wendy Edelberg
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 62 pages
Book Rating : 4.E/5 ( download)
Download or read book Testing for Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Consumer Loan Markets written by Wendy Edelberg and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : John Eatwell
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 1349202150
Total Pages : 321 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (492 download)
Download or read book Allocation, Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author : Christina E. Bannier
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (894 download)
Download or read book Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-edged Role of Competition for Agents written by Christina E. Bannier and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firrms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable payments. Vertical differentiation between firms leads to endogenous, type-dependent exit options for agents. In contrast to screening models with perfect competition, we find that existence of equilibria does not depend on whether the least-cost separating allocation is interim efficient. Rather, vertical differentiation allows the inferior firm to offer (cross- )subsidizing fixed payments even above the interim efficient level. We further show that the efficiency of variable pay depends on the degree of competition for agents: For small degrees of competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too little effort. For large degrees of competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For intermediate degrees of competition, however, contracts are second-best despite private information.
Author : Mingyan Liu
Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 3031023811
Total Pages : 127 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (31 download)
Download or read book Embracing Risk written by Mingyan Liu and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-06-01 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides an introduction to the theory and practice of cyber insurance. Insurance as an economic instrument designed for risk management through risk spreading has existed for centuries. Cyber insurance is one of the newest sub-categories of this old instrument. It emerged in the 1990s in response to an increasing impact that information security started to have on business operations. For much of its existence, the practice of cyber insurance has been on how to obtain accurate actuarial information to inform specifics of a cyber insurance contract. As the cybersecurity threat landscape continues to bring about novel forms of attacks and losses, ransomware insurance being the latest example, the insurance practice is also evolving in terms of what types of losses are covered, what are excluded, and how cyber insurance intersects with traditional casualty and property insurance. The central focus, however, has continued to be risk management through risk transfer, the key functionality of insurance. The goal of this book is to shift the focus from this conventional view of using insurance as primarily a risk management mechanism to one of risk control and reduction by looking for ways to re-align the incentives. On this front we have encouraging results that suggest the validity of using insurance as an effective economic and incentive tool to control cyber risk. This book is intended for someone interested in obtaining a quantitative understanding of cyber insurance and how innovation is possible around this centuries-old financial instrument.
Author : Branko Urosevic
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (82 download)
Download or read book Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes[ written by Branko Urosevic and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Georges Dionne
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 1461401550
Total Pages : 1133 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (614 download)
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Author : Georges Dionne
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 0792392043
Total Pages : 748 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (923 download)
Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1992 with total page 748 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
Author :
Publisher : Newnes
ISBN 13 : 0123756790
Total Pages : 1663 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (237 download)
Download or read book Encyclopedia of Health Economics written by and published by Newnes. This book was released on 2014-02-21 with total page 1663 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Encyclopedia of Health Economics offers students, researchers and policymakers objective and detailed empirical analysis and clear reviews of current theories and polices. It helps practitioners such as health care managers and planners by providing accessible overviews into the broad field of health economics, including the economics of designing health service finance and delivery and the economics of public and population health. This encyclopedia provides an organized overview of this diverse field, providing one trusted source for up-to-date research and analysis of this highly charged and fast-moving subject area. Features research-driven articles that are objective, better-crafted, and more detailed than is currently available in journals and handbooks Combines insights and scholarship across the breadth of health economics, where theory and empirical work increasingly come from non-economists Provides overviews of key policies, theories and programs in easy-to-understand language
Author : Bernard Salanie
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262257874
Total Pages : 257 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (622 download)
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts, second edition written by Bernard Salanie and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2005-03-11 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author : Fouad Sabry
Publisher : One Billion Knowledgeable
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 579 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (661 download)
Download or read book Moral Hazard written by Fouad Sabry and published by One Billion Knowledgeable. This book was released on 2024-02-03 with total page 579 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is Moral Hazard The term "moral hazard" refers to a circumstance that occurs in the field of economics and describes a situation in which an economic actor has an incentive to expand its exposure to risk because it does not face the full costs of that risk. As an illustration, when a company is insured, it may be willing to take on additional risk since it is aware that its insurance will cover the costs connected with the risk. It is possible for a moral hazard to take place when, after a financial transaction has taken place, the actions of the party that is taking the risk change in a way that is detrimental to the party that is suffering the costs. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Moral hazard Chapter 2: Economic bubble Chapter 3: Debt Chapter 4: Contract theory Chapter 5: Adverse selection Chapter 6: Information asymmetry Chapter 7: Savings and loan crisis Chapter 8: Asset-backed security Chapter 9: Mortgage loan Chapter 10: Subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 11: Flight-to-quality Chapter 12: Subordinated debt Chapter 13: Subprime crisis impact timeline Chapter 14: Credit crunch Chapter 15: Subprime crisis background information Chapter 16: Interbank lending market Chapter 17: Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 18: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Chapter 19: Securitization Chapter 20: Financial fragility Chapter 21: 2007-2008 financial crisis (II) Answering the public top questions about moral hazard. (III) Real world examples for the usage of moral hazard in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Moral Hazard.
