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Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts
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Book Synopsis Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts by : Stephanie Rosenkrantz
Download or read book Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts written by Stephanie Rosenkrantz and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts by : Stephanie Rosenkranz
Download or read book Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts written by Stephanie Rosenkranz and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Prominent results of the property rights approach based on incomplete contracts as outlined by Hart (1995) say that all ownership structures lead to underinvestment and that joint ownership cannot be optimal, provided that investments are strategic complements and affect human capital only. We show that in cases where only the total amount invested matters, these conclusions are still true in the static setting, even if investments are in physical capital. However, if the parties can invest and generate a surplus twice, then joint ownership may imply first-best investments in the first stage and can well be the optimal ownership structure.
Book Synopsis Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership by : Patrick Schmitz
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership written by Patrick Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The property rights approach to the theory of the firm is the most prominent application of the incomplete contracting paradigm. A central conclusion of the standard model says that joint ownership is suboptimal. In this note, we analyze a modified version of the standard model that is tailored to the organization of R&D activities, where one of the parties is wealth-constrained and protected by limited liability. It turns out that joint ownership can be optimal, since it avoids wasteful rent-seeking activities when limited liability rents are necessary to induce high effort. Our results are in line with the fact that R&D activities are often conducted in research joint ventures.
Book Synopsis Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts by : Patrick W. Schmitz
Download or read book Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization, i.e. joint ownership, may well turn out to be the optimal property rights regime, if the trade-offs that have been emphasized in the privatization context (see Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)) are taken into account. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is often dominated, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatization can be optimal since it mitigates the disadvantages of public ownership (no incentives to improve quality if the manager invests or too strong incentives if the government invests) and of privatization (too strong incentives for the manager to reduce costs).
Book Synopsis Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives by : Patrick W. Schmitz
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of an asset. It is ex post efficient that tomorrow the party with the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments to enhance the asset's productivity. Contracts are incomplete, so today only the ownership structure can be specified, which may be renegotiated tomorrow. It turns out that shared ownership is often optimal. If the investments are embodied in the physical asset, it may be optimal that party B has a larger ownership share even when party A has a larger valuation and a better investment technology. When shared ownership is taken into account, joint ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power cannot be optimal, regardless of whether the investments are in human capital or in physical capital.
Book Synopsis Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts by : Stephanie Rosenkranz
Download or read book Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts written by Stephanie Rosenkranz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.
Book Synopsis Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives by : Patrick W. Schmitz
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of an asset. It is ex post efficient that tomorrow the party with the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments to enhance the asset's productivity. Contracts are incomplete, so today only the ownership structure can be specified, which may be renegotiated tomorrow. It turns out that shared ownership is often optimal. If the investments are embodied in the physical asset, it may be optimal that party B has a larger ownership share even when party A has a larger valuation and a better investment technology. When shared ownership is taken into account, joint ownership in the sense of bilateral veto power cannot be optimal, regardless of whether the investments are in human capital or in physical capital.
Book Synopsis An Incomplete-contracts Approach to Joint Ventures by : Zhigang Tao
Download or read book An Incomplete-contracts Approach to Joint Ventures written by Zhigang Tao and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Choice of Ownership Structure in Transition Economies by : Tatyana Yuryevna Dobryanskaya
Download or read book The Choice of Ownership Structure in Transition Economies written by Tatyana Yuryevna Dobryanskaya and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis focuses on ex post efficiency of vertically integrated enterprises under different ownership structures, given that complete contingent contracts cannot be written. Unforeseen contingencies, unverifiable terms, costs of enforcement, and a lack of common language all contribute to contracts being incomplete. These characteristics of contracts provide incentives to acquire ownership, since ownership is a source of power when contracts are in dispute and is a way of securing residual property rights. We use the incomplete contract approach to study the choice of ownership structure after privatization and we consider the transition economy of Russia as an example. The Russian economy is characterized by asset market failures and capital market imperfections, and the initial allocation of property rights can have a substantial effect on the future economic performance of enterprises. In the model we make a number of assumptions: complete contracts cannot be written, asset and capital markets are imperfect, and payoff of the firms are interdependent on the levels of the managers' investments (efforts), the firm's assets are complimentary and the relationship-specific investments may be investments in physical capital. Whether the manager produces or not he gets his share of the joint venture's profit. The ownership may change hands if managers sign the contract on creating a joint venture. In this case both managers have the incentive to invest more since they share final surplus. Given these assumptions, we show that joint ownership for vertically integrated enterprises is optimal.
Book Synopsis Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts by : Rohan Pitchford
Download or read book Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts written by Rohan Pitchford and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A model of externalities with sequential location choice is developed. The first mover decides on location before it knows the identity of the second mover. Joint location results in a negative externality. The court, having limited information, allocates property rights over the externality based on the timing of location. Sufficient conditions are presented supporting the 'coming to the nuisance' doctrine, where the first mover is given property rights. This doctrine is not always supported: greater surplus may be generated by giving property rights to the second mover. A sufficient condition guaranteeing optimality for any property-rights allocation is derived.
Book Synopsis The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics by : Philippe Aghion
Download or read book The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics written by Philippe Aghion and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard and Limited Liability by : Rohan Pitchford
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Limited Liability written by Rohan Pitchford and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Justice in Transactions by : Peter Benson
Download or read book Justice in Transactions written by Peter Benson and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2019-12-03 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Legal thinkers typically justify contract law on the basis of economics or promissory morality. But Peter Benson takes another approach. He argues that contract is best explained as a transfer of rights governed by a conception of justice. The result is a comprehensive theory of contract law congruent with Rawlsian liberalism.
Book Synopsis Foundations of Incomplete Contracts by : Oliver D. Hart
Download or read book Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
Book Synopsis Public Ends, Private Means by : Alexander S. Preker
Download or read book Public Ends, Private Means written by Alexander S. Preker and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2007-01-01 with total page 440 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Great progress has been made in recent years in securing better access and financial protection against the cost of illness through collective financing of health care. Managing scarce resources effectively and efficiently is an important part of this story. Experience has shown that, without strategic policies and focused spending, the poor are likely to get left out. The use of purchasing to enhance public sector performance is well-documented in other sectors. Extension to the health sector of lessons from this experience is now successfully implemented in many developing countries. Public.
Book Synopsis Choice, Complexity and Ignorance by : Brian J. Loasby
Download or read book Choice, Complexity and Ignorance written by Brian J. Loasby and published by CUP Archive. This book was released on 1976-04-15 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Entrepreneurship and the Firm by : Nicolai J. Foss
Download or read book Entrepreneurship and the Firm written by Nicolai J. Foss and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2002-01-01 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: While characteristically "Austrian" economic themes are clearly relevant to the business firm, Austrian economists have said little about management, organization and strategy. The 12 chapters in this work seek to advance the understanding of these issues by drawing on Austrian ideas.