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Increasing Efficiency And Incentives For Performance In The Armys Selective Reenlistment Bonus Srb Program
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Book Synopsis Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program by : Beth J. Asch
Download or read book Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program written by Beth J. Asch and published by . This book was released on 2021-10-05 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best increase incentives for higher performance among enlisted members and to more efficiently achieve Army retention objectives.
Book Synopsis Army SRB Program: Estimates of Effects on Retention (Revised and Length of Reenlistment by :
Download or read book Army SRB Program: Estimates of Effects on Retention (Revised and Length of Reenlistment written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this study the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on Army reenlistments over the 1990-2000 period at Zones A, B, and C at three levels of occupational aggregation - all Army, career management field (CMF), and military occupational specialty (MOS) - were re-estimated to explicitly control for the drawdown in the mid-1990s as well as labor market conditions. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. A one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by 3 to 7 percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not quite as good as the Zone A and B results. The results provide the Army with estimates of reenlistment responsiveness to bonus changes for all three zones for all MOS. We also estimated the effect of SRBs on the reenlisting Soldier's choice of length of reenlistment. Increases in the SRB level not only increase reenlistments, but also increase the length of reenlistment. The length of reenlistment effects were incorporated into the SRB Management System to better predict program costs and the additional staff years of contracted service provided by the bonus program.
Book Synopsis Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment by : Beth J. Asch
Download or read book Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment written by Beth J. Asch and published by RAND Corporation. This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.
Book Synopsis The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses. Part 1. Background and Theoretical Issues by :
Download or read book The Effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses. Part 1. Background and Theoretical Issues written by and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In order to manage its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program effectively, the U.S. Army needs reliable information about the effects of SRBs on reenlistment rates at the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) level. Until recently, research has not addressed the reenlistment decision, bias due to population heterogeneity, and interaction between compensation policy and retention. This research examines these fundamental issues and suggests techniques for their application at the MOS level. It highlights the importance of (1) understanding institutional details of compensation policy, including the role of SRBs; (2) defining random error terms in the empirical analyses; and (3) using longitudinal research data.
Book Synopsis A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus by : Sheldon E. Haber
Download or read book A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus written by Sheldon E. Haber and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Military personnel management and oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus program needs improvement. by :
Download or read book Military personnel management and oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus program needs improvement. written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Setting Military Reenlistment Bonuses by :
Download or read book Setting Military Reenlistment Bonuses written by and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The United States military frequently has difficulty retaining enlisted personnel beyond their initial enlistment. A bonus program within each service, called a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, seeks to enhance reenlistments and thus reduce personnel shortages in critical military occupational specialties (MOSs). The amount of bonus is set by assigning "SRB multipliers" to each MOS. We develop a nonlinear integer program to select multipliers which minimize a function of deviations from desired reenlistment targets. A Lagrangian relaxation of a linearized version of the integer program is used to obtain lower bounds and feasible solutions. The best feasible solution, discovered in a coordinate search of the Lagrangian function, is heuristically improved by apportioning unexpended funds. For large problems, a heuristic variable reduction is employed to speed model solution. U.S. Army data and requirements for FY87 yield a 0-1 integer program with 12,992 binary variables and 273 constraints, which is solved within 0.00002% of optimality on an IBM 3033AP in less than 1.7 seconds. More general models with up to 463,000 binary variables are solved, on average, to within 0.009% of optimality in less than 1.8 minutes. The U.S. Marine Corps has used a simpler version of this model since 1986.
Book Synopsis Reviving Our Republic by : James Boggs
Download or read book Reviving Our Republic written by James Boggs and published by Gatekeeper Press. This book was released on 2023-04-07 with total page 174 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many political books list American societal and political problems but stop short of presenting solutions. Dr. Boggs explains the context and concepts that our Founders applied while structuring our federal system. He then applies those God-centered concepts with credible physical and online sources so the reader can conceptualize solving today’s critical problems in America. The author shows you how to evaluate statements on the internet and determine facts on current issues. Then you will be informed as you work to: increase personal morals, strengthen your family, protect your rights, meet civic responsibilities, improve local schools, assimilate legal immigrants, find and grow with a religious group, and more. You may read specific chapters which apply to problems painful to you or read the full book to greatly increase your participation in, and rewards from, the American way of life. Dr. Boggs describes step-by-step actions you can implement to improve American society while personally growing as a God-centered individual. America gives us significant values: freedom, a way of life, and opportunities for which people still risk their lives to immigrate. If these values disappear, they will be lost forever.
Book Synopsis Military Retention Incentives by : Justin Joffrion
Download or read book Military Retention Incentives written by Justin Joffrion and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Book Synopsis A Model of Reenlistment Behavior by :
Download or read book A Model of Reenlistment Behavior written by and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A logit model was applied to estimate the effect of selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) on the retention rates of Army Soldiers. The model was estimated separately by occupational group and by first (zone A), second (zone B) and third term (zone C) reenlistment decisions. An "annualized cost of leaving" (ACOL) variable was constructed to estimate the net financial returns to reenlisting in the Army compared to leaving for the civilian sector. The model was estimated using data on actual reenlistments from the period FYl99O tlirough FY2OOO. The effects of SRBs on reenlistments at Zones A, B, and C were estimated at three levels of occupational aggregation-all Army, CMF, and MOS. After out-of-sample testing, we re-specified and re-estimated the model. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. The magnitude of the effect varied by occupation, but a one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by three to seven percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not as good as the Zone A and B results. We were unable to obtain positive, statistically significant ACOL parameter estimates for a small number of occupation groups. Statistically significant effects for demographic control variables and labor market conditions were also obtained.
Book Synopsis Internal Controls Over Army Selective Reenlistment Bonuses by :
Download or read book Internal Controls Over Army Selective Reenlistment Bonuses written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Reenlistment, Extension, Reclassification, and Reserve Component Transition System (RETAIN) is the Army's computerized retention system for enlisted personnel. It contains all the reenlistment data required to document the retention of Army Service members, including tracking selective reenlistment bonuses (SRBs) paid and data required to transition active Army Service members to the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves. DFAS and the Army activated an adjustment to the SRB portion of the interface between RETAIN and the Defense Joint Military Pay System (DJMS) in April 2007. This interface reduced the requirement for reenlistment data to be manually fed from RETAIN into the DJMS. RETAIN provides the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate with a list of both processed SRBs and those rejected for career counselors to review and correct. An SRB is paid to encourage Army Service members to reenlist in critical military occupational skills to ensure adequate retention levels. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether internal controls were in place and effective for payments to Army Service members for reenlistment bonuses. Funding was not made available to maintain the DJMS to allow the Army to pay the amount due to Service members for SRBs. As a result, 1,336 SRBs worth $15.6 million were not paid as of August 31, 2007. The authors recommend that DFAS improve the DJMS so that it will pay Army Service members the amount owed, and that the Army HRC develop internal controls to include posting the information concerning SRB payments to the bonus report in the RETAIN system for Army career counselor access. They identified DFAS management control weaknesses related to the processing of Army reenlistment bonuses. Although those weaknesses were not material in relation to the Army reenlistment bonus program taken as a whole, the weaknesses should be resolved because reenlistment bonuses affect Army Service members' pay.
Book Synopsis Retention Bonuses: More Direction and Oversight Needed by :
Download or read book Retention Bonuses: More Direction and Oversight Needed written by and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This review was conducted to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is effectively managing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program. The specific objectives were to (1) ascertain whether reenlistment bonuses were being paid to enlisted servicemembers in skill categories that were not experiencing significant personnel shortages or skills that were also receiving separation incentives and (2) assess the oversight of the program by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OsD). The SRB program is one means DOD is using to achieve its force manning objectives as the services downsize. The General Accounting Office has previously reported that the services have been successful in maintaining high aggregate personnel levels throughout the drawdown. This report looks below aggregate personnel levels and focuses on personnel levels within occupational specialties. The SRB program is authorized by 37 U.S.C. 308 to help maintain an adequate level of experienced and qualified enlisted personnel. The program authorizes bonuses of up to $45,000 to personnel in critical skills who have between 21 months and 14 years of active duty service and who reenlist or extend their reenlistments for at least 3 years. The intent of the program, according to DOD, is to focus reenlistment incentives on critical skills that are in short supply and have high training costs. (KAR) p. 2.
Book Synopsis Military Retention Incentives by : Justin L. Joffrion
Download or read book Military Retention Incentives written by Justin L. Joffrion and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.
Book Synopsis A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus by :
Download or read book A New Approach to Managing the Army Selective Reenlistment Bonus written by and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The authors develop a theoretical model of profit maximization in which the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is treated as a wage premium payable to servicemen who are more productive, more costly to recruit and train, and less likely to continue in the Army in the absence of the SRB. Empirical estimation of the model is based on measuring a serviceman's productivity (in terms of his civilian counterpart's occupational wage), recruitment and training costs, and separation rates. Multiple regression equations are used to estimate civilian wages (a proxy for productivity) as a function of civilian occupation, education, and age of the worker. The empirical model groups Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) into three categories--Combat Arms, Technical, and Support Services. The results for servicemen in grade E-4 reveal that the average SRB calculated by the model ($5,247) should be about the same as the actual payments ($5,297) for servicemen in Combat Arms, but should be higher ($7,308) compared to the actual ($5,312) for Technical occupations, and lower ($1,942) compared to the actual ($3,757) payments in the Support Services. The research shows that retention rates in Technical MOS can be raised by increasing the SRB. The required increase in SRB expenditures can be funded by reducing SRB payments in the Support Services. Keywords: Economics; Retention; Military pay; Recruitment cost; Human capital; Training cost; Civilian pay; Economic analysis; Military essentiality code.
Book Synopsis Military Personnel Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement by :
Download or read book Military Personnel Management and Oversight of Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Setting Military Compensation to Support Recruitment, Retention, and Performance by : Beth J. Asch
Download or read book Setting Military Compensation to Support Recruitment, Retention, and Performance written by Beth J. Asch and published by . This book was released on 2020-02-15 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing on a large body of research, this RAND Arroyo report, part of a series, provides an examination of the role of military compensation as a strategic human resource tool, how well it fulfills that role, and how it could be improved.
Book Synopsis Optimizing the U.S. Marine Corps' Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program for Career Force Retention by :
Download or read book Optimizing the U.S. Marine Corps' Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program for Career Force Retention written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Marine Corps uses its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program to influence Marines to reenlist for a designated term into certain Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) to reach planned manpower goals. The bonus amount is determined by selecting an "SRB multiplier" for each combination of MOS and Zone (MOSZ), where "Zone" corresponds to length of service. A higher multiplier means a larger bonus and leads to a higher percentage of Marines reenlisting. That percentage, predicted by an existing forecasting model, is assumed exact here. The "SRB multiplier model" assigns multipliers to minimize a sum of weighted squared deviations from MOSZ targets subject to a budget constraint. This model is implemented as a generalized assignment problem, and it is solved approximately on a personal computer using Lagrangian relaxation and a secondary heuristic. (The algorithm is programmed in Visual Basic for Applications and has an Excel interface.) Data for FY04 shows 491 bonus-eligible MOSZs. With up to 11 possible multiplier values, this yields a model with 5,401 0-1 variables and 491 constraints. A solution within 0.0018% of optimality is reached in 1.4 seconds on a 1.58 GHz personal computer. Standard integer-programming software verifies the correctness of the solution.
