Evidence on the Tradeoff Between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation: to 25; Pages:26 to 50; Pages:51 to 75; Pages:76 to 100; Pages:101 to 120

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Publisher : ProQuest
ISBN 13 : 9780549163251
Total Pages : 120 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (632 download)

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Book Synopsis Evidence on the Tradeoff Between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation: to 25; Pages:26 to 50; Pages:51 to 75; Pages:76 to 100; Pages:101 to 120 by : Amy Yunzhi Zang

Download or read book Evidence on the Tradeoff Between Real Manipulation and Accrual Manipulation: to 25; Pages:26 to 50; Pages:51 to 75; Pages:76 to 100; Pages:101 to 120 written by Amy Yunzhi Zang and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2000 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Accounting-based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (429 download)

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Book Synopsis Accounting-based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation by : Wei Yu

Download or read book Accounting-based Earnings Management and Real Activities Manipulation written by Wei Yu and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the first essay, I examine the association between auditor industry specialization and earnings management choices. Prior research suggests that industry specialist auditors constrain accounting-based earnings management. But such actions may cause client companies to seek alternative means to manage earnings. Specifically, companies that hire industry specialist auditors may alter operating decisions to meet earnings targets, referred to as real activities manipulation. This essay investigates whether clients of industry specialist auditors that have an incentive to manage earnings are constrained from managing earnings through accruals manipulation and, therefore, are more likely to engage in real activities manipulation. Further, I examine whether operating performance declines for firms suspected of real activities manipulation. My findings indicate that clients of industry specialist auditors with incentives to manage earnings have lower absolute value of accruals relative to firms with incentives to manage earnings that do not hire industry specialist auditors. These clients of industry specialist auditors are also more likely to engage in real activities manipulation, suggesting this is a possible unintended consequence of hiring an industry specialist auditor. I also document evidence that firms suspected of real activities manipulation have lower future operating performance relative to firms not suspected of real activities manipulation.