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Essays On The Relation Between Managers Incentives And Financial Accounting Information
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Book Synopsis Essays on the Relation Between Managers' Incentives and Financial Accounting Information by : Yanfeng Xue
Download or read book Essays on the Relation Between Managers' Incentives and Financial Accounting Information written by Yanfeng Xue and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (Cont.) around thresholds do convey information about a firm's future performance, firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry between the management and investors are more likely to use this signaling mechanism, and the capital market recognizes the information content of the earnings management activities and rationally incorporates it in setting prices.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Voluntary Disclosure and Managerial Incentive by : Ling Tuo
Download or read book Three Essays on the Voluntary Disclosure and Managerial Incentive written by Ling Tuo and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders including shareholders has been extensively debated in the business literature in the aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The key indicator of business value have shifted from accounting profits and stock market performance, formerly, to firm reputation and sustainability performance, currently. Therefore, the transparency and value-relevance of conventional financial reporting has been questioned in terms of its capability to satisfy increasing information needs of all stakeholders. Many doubt whether those traditional financial metrics derived from financial statements can appropriately capture firm & rsquo;s long-term value creation ability. In recent years, users of corporate reports are demanding more relevant financial and non-financial on key performance indicators and forward looking information above and beyond conventional financial statements. To satisfy the demands of information users and decision makers, companies are expected to not only increase their reporting transparency in conventional financial statements but also disclose more inside information to outside public through different types of voluntary disclosure. The first dissertation investigates the role of sustainability report through examining the associations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and audit fee. Recently more and more firms begin to release sustainability reports, one important channel of voluntary disclosure, to satisfy the needs of information users and increase the transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, I especially examine the effect of voluntary disclosure quality on those associations. Through Difference-in-Difference test, I find that the release of sustainability report is positively correlated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, the positive (negative) correlation between sustainability report and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less) pronounced when the voluntary disclosure quality is high. I also find that the release of sustainability report is associated with higher audit fees and thus it suggests that the sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional financial statement. My conclusions are robust through additional tests of OLS regressions. This paper has important political, academic and industry application. The second dissertation investigates how the firm & rsquo;s cost stickiness strategy is associated with the firm & rsquo;s management earnings forecast (MEF). I conjecture that the managerial incentive regarding the cost strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy are interdependent. When managers choose their cost management, they will also choose the corresponding management earnings forecast strategy to align their interests. Through the empirical tests with a sample between year 2005 and 2011, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is positively associated with the firm & rsquo;s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is associated with more good earnings news forecasted by managers. Finally, I find that the relation between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the MEF is long-horizon oriented and when the firm efficiency is high. My research builds a link between financial accounting information and managerial accounting information, and also provides new evidence to understand the managerial incentives behind each strategy chosen by managers. This third dissertation investigates how industry peer firms tend to influence the specific firm & rsquo;s voluntary disclosure strategy. Through examining the empirical example of management earnings forecast between 2005 and 2011 and implementing the 2SLS regressions, I find that the specific firm & rsquo;s disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and the disclosure of bad news are significantly influenced by its peers firms & rsquo; disclosure behaviors. Specifically, the increase in the peers & rsquo; disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news tend to encourage the specific firm to increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. Moreover, certain firms (such as firms with S & P credit rating, higher profit, larger size or higher market-to-book ratio) tend to be more sensitive to their peer firms & rsquo; voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, I find that the specific leader-follower relation doesn & rsquo;t exist in the peer effects of disclosure strategy and thus the signaling theory, litigation risk and CEO reputation are more major reasons than herding theory and free rider theory in explaining this phenomenon.
Book Synopsis Dissertation Abstracts International by :
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2009-05 with total page 582 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Incentives by : Brooke Winnifred Stanley
Download or read book Two Essays on Incentives written by Brooke Winnifred Stanley and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine two sets of incentives faced by corporate CEOs to determine how they respond to those incentives. I compare firms that restate financial statements to firms that do not restate to test the hypotheses that bank monitoring should provide incentives to deter misreporting. For relatively less (more) severe misreporting, I find the likelihood of misreporting is positively related (unrelated) to bank borrowing, and that ex ante changes in bank debt are positive (unrelated) for misreporting firms versus control firms. These results suggest that bank monitoring is insufficient to deter or detect misreporting, rather that it may provide incentives for managers to engage in relatively less severe misreporting, consistent with the "debt covenant hypothesis". I next examine the incentives that CEOs have to increase firm value that result from their compensation packages and opportunities for advancement in the managerial labor market. Traditional methods for estimating pay-performance sensitivity exclude incentives that derive from opportunities for advancement in the managerial labor market and assume a linear relation between changes in pay and changes in performance. But results in recent literature imply that advancement opportunities may be a significant source of incentives and that the relation between changes in pay and changes in performance may depend upon the level of performance. I estimate payperformance sensitivities that incorporate these results. I find that although performance may be positively related to opportunities for advancement, the contribution to a CEO's total pay-performance sensitivity is too small to be economically significant. I also find that pay-performance sensitivities vary depending on the level of performance and may be higher or lower than estimates from linear models suggest. In sum, observed CEO pay packages may not be as suboptimal as some prior studies suggest.
Book Synopsis Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski by : Rick Antle
Download or read book Essays in Accounting Theory in Honour of Joel S. Demski written by Rick Antle and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2007-02-15 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The integration of accounting and the economics of information developed by Joel S. Demski and those he inspired has revolutionized accounting thought. This volume collects papers on accounting theory in honor of Professor Demski. The book also contains an extensive review of Professor Demski’s own contributions to the theory of accounting over the past four decades.
Book Synopsis Essays on the Financial Reporting and Price Implications of Managerial Ownership and Contingent Consideration in Business Acquisitions by : Kofi Appiah Okyere
Download or read book Essays on the Financial Reporting and Price Implications of Managerial Ownership and Contingent Consideration in Business Acquisitions written by Kofi Appiah Okyere and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 156 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on the Quality of Audited Financial Statements by : Ulf Mohrmann
Download or read book Essays on the Quality of Audited Financial Statements written by Ulf Mohrmann and published by Logos Verlag Berlin GmbH. This book was released on 2016-02-15 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation consists of four essays on the quality of audited financial statements. The first analysis investigates the association between several regulations of the audit market and earnings characteristics. The second essay differentiates between different drivers of audit quality after an auditor change by comparing the effects of voluntary and mandatory auditor changes. The third study analyses the different strategies of Big4 and non-Big4 auditors in dealing with Level 3 fair values. The fourth part examines banks' valuation behavior concerning Level 3 fair values.
Book Synopsis Managerial Uses of Accounting Information by : Joel Demski
Download or read book Managerial Uses of Accounting Information written by Joel Demski and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-05-29 with total page 504 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The second edition of Dr. Demski’s book reflects his experiences teaching undergraduates, masters and doctoral students. He emphasizes economic fundamentals as the guiding foundation coupled with an artful application of those fundamentals. This applies to product costing, decision making and evaluation art. Dr. Demski has also removed a great deal of traditional minutiae, in order to keep this theme in constant focus. This thematic approach, in his experience, works in dramatic fashion, and stands in sharp contrast to more traditional presentations of this material. The book is not only for use as a textbook but also as a reference book.
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Investors' Perceptions about Management Disclosures by : Hailan Zhou
Download or read book Two Essays on Investors' Perceptions about Management Disclosures written by Hailan Zhou and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Financial Reporting Quality by : Yuequan Wang
Download or read book Essays on Financial Reporting Quality written by Yuequan Wang and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Because of the importance of financial reporting quality in capital market, I explore the determinants to financial reporting quality in my second essay, "Market power and accrual management". I examine whether a firm's competition status in product markets affects its financial reporting quality, measured as discretionary accrual. I argue that because firms with greater market power have a greater ability to set prices for their products, they have comparatively fewer incentives to manipulate earnings through accrual management. I use the Lerner index to measure product market power and asset-deflated absolute discretionary accruals to proxy the magnitude of accrual management. Using a large sample of firm-year observations from 1997 to 2007, I find that, as hypothesized, firms with greater market power tend to have lower levels of accrual management. The final essay, "Product market competition and audit fees", goes one-step further than the second. As noted in the second essay, product market competition affects a firm's financial reporting quality. However, financial reporting quality may not be the only factor auditors take into account when they decide what fees to charge a client. The last essay, therefore, empirically explores the inter- and intra- industry effect of product market competition on audit fees. Prior literature posits two contradictory predictions on the relation between product market competition and audit fees. On the one hand, firms in a competitive market are expected to face higher liquidity risk, distress risk, and liquidation risk, thus increasing auditors' assessments of a client's business risk. So, audit fees are expected to increase with industry competitiveness. On the other hand, it is often argued in prior literature that product market competition decreases information asymmetry and mitigates agency problems between shareholders and managers and increases the accuracy of financial reporting, thus decreasing auditors' assessments of a client's audit risk resulting in necessary audits. So auditors tend to charge lower fees on firms in a more competitive industry. The study, then, empirically tests the relation between product market competition and audit fees and finds that auditors charge higher fees on firms in a more competitive industry. It also finds that auditors charge lower fees on firms with greater market power within the same industry.
Book Synopsis Essays in Accounting Information and External Finance by : John Bannon Donovan
Download or read book Essays in Accounting Information and External Finance written by John Bannon Donovan and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 137 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine the use of accounting information in external finance. In Chapter 1, I study the use of accounting disclosure in equity crowdfunding to understand how accounting and financial reporting facilitates start-up financing. I find no relation between historical accounting disclosure and start-up capital obtained from crowdfunding investors, on average. However, I find a positive relation between capital raised and the entrepreneurs long-term forecasts of expected future performance. In Chapter 2, I examine the use of financial covenants in private debt contracts when borrowers have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firms investments. I find that debt contracts to borrowers with greater risk-taking incentives prior to contract inception are more likely to include a debt-to-earnings covenant. In Chapter 3, in co-authored work with Peter Demerjian and Jared Jennings, I examine whether the borrowers management earnings forecast accuracy is useful information in screening by providing an observable signal of the borrowers ability to anticipate future economic conditions. We find that borrowers with more accurate forecasts prior to contract inception receive a lower interest rate.
Book Synopsis Essays on the Economic Consequences of Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the world by : Ulf Brüggemann
Download or read book Essays on the Economic Consequences of Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the world written by Ulf Brüggemann and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2011-08-31 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ulf Brüggemann discusses and empirically investigates the economic consequences of mandatory switch to IFRS. He provides evidence that cross-border investments by individual investors increased following the introduction of IFRS.
Book Synopsis Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts by : Gerald A. Feltham
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Information and Contracts written by Gerald A. Feltham and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 412 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The three coeditors knew John Butterworth for many years and had worked closely with him on a number of research projects. We respected him as a valuable colleague and friend. We were greatly saddened by his untimely death. This book is an attempt to remember him. We dedicate the volume to John with thanks for the contributions he made to our research, to the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at the University of British Columbia, and to the accounting profession. This volume contains twelve invited papers on the general topic of the economic theory of information and contracts. We asked leading scholars who had known John to contribute papers. The response was very gratifying. The authors provided us with new strong research papers that should make a lasting contribution to the accounting and information economics research literature, and make us all proud to have put this volume together. The research papers in the volume are in three sections: information evaluation in multi person conte)l:ts; contracting in agencies under moral hazard; and contracting in agencies with private information. We begin part I with Jerry Feltham's review of John Butterworth's pioneering contributions to the accounting and information economics literature. This is followed by an introduction to the papers in the volume and the papers themselves.
Book Synopsis Essays on the Determinants and Effects of Financial Reporting Quality by : Ting Luo
Download or read book Essays on the Determinants and Effects of Financial Reporting Quality written by Ting Luo and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 140 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Managerial Risk-seeking Activities and Compensation Contracts by : Chang Mo Kang
Download or read book Two Essays on Managerial Risk-seeking Activities and Compensation Contracts written by Chang Mo Kang and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 322 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines how the structures of compensation for executives and directors are affected by the possibility that managers can influence the risk of a firm's cash flows. In chapter 1, I consider a moral hazard model which shows that a strong pay-for-performance sensitivity in managerial compensation may deteriorate shareholder value when shareholders cannot monitor managerial risk-seeking activities. Intuitively, while high-powered managerial compensation provides the manager with incentives to increase the firm's value by exerting effort, it also creates managerial incentive to engage in (unproductive) risk-seeking activities. To test this prediction, I consider a regulatory change that makes it more difficult for managers to conceal information about the (speculative) use of derivative instruments. Specifically, I examine how the structures of compensation for executives and managers are affected by the adoption of a new accounting standard, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FAS 133) which mandates the fair value accounting for derivative holdings. Consistent with the model prediction, I find that relative to other firms, derivative users (firms that traded derivatives before adopting FAS 133) increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO/CFO compensation. In Chapter 2, I extend the model by incorporating the realistic features that shareholders delegate to the (self-interested) board the tasks of monitoring managers and of setting their compensation contracts. My analysis shows that while high-powered board compensation induces the board to monitor the firm and to properly design managerial compensation, it also provides the board with incentives to misreport managerial risk-seeking activities and to engage in collusive behavior with the manager at the expense of shareholders. From these trade-offs, I develop a number of testable hypotheses and take them to the data. Consistent with the model predictions, I find that firms in which (i) managerial risk-seeking activities are more likely to occur (e.g., high R&D firms or banks) and (ii) board monitoring costs are likely to be lower (e.g., firms that have non-officer blockholders on the board) show weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity of board compensation and stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.
Book Synopsis Essays on Management Accounting and Incentive Contracts for Some New Production and Selling Strategies by : Seok-Young Lee
Download or read book Essays on Management Accounting and Incentive Contracts for Some New Production and Selling Strategies written by Seok-Young Lee and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 282 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance by : David De Angelis
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance written by David De Angelis and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.
