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Author : Pekka Sääskilahti
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9789517919661
Total Pages : 163 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (196 download)
Download or read book Essays on the Economics of Networks and Social Relations written by Pekka Sääskilahti and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 163 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : James E. Rauch
Publisher : Russell Sage Foundation
ISBN 13 : 1610444663
Total Pages : 257 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (14 download)
Download or read book The Missing Links written by James E. Rauch and published by Russell Sage Foundation. This book was released on 2007-08-16 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Half of all workers are hired through personal referrals, and networks of social connections channel the flows of capital, technology, and international trade. Sociologists and economists alike recognize that economic exchange is shaped by social networks, which propagate information and facilitate trust, but each discipline brings a distinct theoretical perspective to the study of networks. Sociologists have focused on how networks shape individual behavior, economists on how individual choices shape networks. The Missing Links is a bold effort by an interdisciplinary group of scholars to synthesize sociological and economic theories of how economic networks emerge and evolve. Interweaving sophisticated theoretical models and concrete case studies, The Missing Links is both an introduction to the study of economic networks and a catalyst for further research. Economists Rachel Kranton and Deborah Minehart illustrate their field's approach to modeling network formation, showing how manufacturers form networks of suppliers in ways that maximize profits. Exemplifying the sociological approach, Ronald Burt analyzes patterns of cooperation and peer evaluations among colleagues at a financial organization. He finds that dense connections of shared acquaintances lead to more stable reputations. In the latter half of the book, contributors combine the insights of sociology and economics to explore a series of case studies. Ray Reagans, Ezra Zuckerman, and Bill McEvily investigate an R & D firm in which employees participate in overlapping collaborative teams, allowing the authors to disentangle the effects of network structure and individual human capital on team performance. Kaivan Munshi and Mark Rosenzweig examine how economic development and rising inequality in India are reshaping caste-based networks of mutual insurance and job referrals. Their study shows that people's economic decisions today are shaped both by the legacy of the caste hierarchies and by the particular incentives and constraints that each individual faces in an evolving labor market. Economic globalization is forging new connections between people in distant corners of the world, while unsettling long-standing social relations. Anyone interested in understanding the opportunities and challenges of this era of rapid change will find a highly informative guide in The Missing Links.
Author : Mariya Teteryatnikova
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 103 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (728 download)
Download or read book Essays on Applied Network Theory written by Mariya Teteryatnikova and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 103 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Akira Namatame
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3540287272
Total Pages : 345 pages
Book Rating : 4.5/5 (42 download)
Download or read book The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions written by Akira Namatame and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2006-03-09 with total page 345 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Understanding the mechanism of a socio-economic system requires more than an understanding of the individuals that comprise the system. It also requires understanding how individuals interact with each other, and how the agg- gated outcome can be more than the sum of individual behaviors. This book contains the papers fostering the formation of an active multi-disciplinary community on socio-economic systems with the exciting new ?elds of age- based modeling and econophysics. We especially intend to increase the awareness of researchers in many ?elds with sharing the common view many economic and social activities as collectives of a large-scale heterogeneous and interacting agents. Economists seek to understand not only how individuals behave but also how the interaction of many individuals leads to complex outcomes. Age- based modeling is a method for studying socio-economic systems exhibiting the following two properties: (1) the system is composed of interacting agents, and (2) the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the interactions of the agents that cannot be deduced simply by agg- gating the properties of the system’s components. When the interaction of the agents is contingent on past experience, and especially when the agents continually adapt to that experience, mathematical analysis is typically very limited in its ability to derive the outcome.
Author : Jeffrey Johnson
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3319424246
Total Pages : 236 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (194 download)
Download or read book Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy written by Jeffrey Johnson and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-01-20 with total page 236 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The overall aim of this book, an outcome of the European FP7 FET Open NESS project, is to contribute to the ongoing effort to put the quantitative social sciences on a proper footing for the 21st century. A key focus is economics, and its implications on policy making, where the still dominant traditional approach increasingly struggles to capture the economic realities we observe in the world today - with vested interests getting too often in the way of real advances. Insights into behavioral economics and modern computing techniques have made possible both the integration of larger information sets and the exploration of disequilibrium behavior. The domain-based chapters of this work illustrate how economic theory is the only branch of social sciences which still holds to its old paradigm of an equilibrium science - an assumption that has already been relaxed in all related fields of research in the light of recent advances in complex and dynamical systems theory and related data mining. The other chapters give various takes on policy and decision making in this context. Written in nontechnical style throughout, with a mix of tutorial and essay-like contributions, this book will benefit all researchers, scientists, professionals and practitioners interested in learning about the 'thinking in complexity' to understand how socio-economic systems really work.
Author : Roghaiyeh Dastranj Tabrizi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 121 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (112 download)
Download or read book Essays on Social and Economic Networks written by Roghaiyeh Dastranj Tabrizi and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Peer pressure and social networks are powerful influences on behaviour. The focus of this thesis is studying the channels through which social networks impact individuals' choices and outcomes in three different contexts.The first paper of this thesis (Chapter 2) develops a theoretical network-based model of Twitter, formulating individual interaction as a dynamic game in which heterogenous agents choose a 'niche' to tweet in, and whom to follow. By characterizing the stable networks that the dynamic Markov process converges to, we show that information does not diffuse as widely as one might expect: although many agents are directly or indirectly connected to each other, agents strategically filter information in accordance with their niche.The second paper of this thesis (Chapter 3) presents a social network model of criminal activity, where agents' payoffs depend on the structure of their connections with each other. The Nash equilibria in crime activity are characterized, and the theoretical results are used to identify the optimal network, which maximize the sum of agents' payoffs, by searching over all possible non-isomorphic graphs of given size. In addition, the effects of different anti-crime policies on the optimal crime network structure and the overall crime level are analyzed and presented.The third paper of this thesis (Chapter 4) studies the direct and spillover effects of social interactions on fundraising and engagement activities in a network of volunteers from Engineers Without Borders, Canada. The network effects are modelled through two separate channels: a strategic interaction term which affects the marginal benefit from supplying effort and a direct spillover term affecting the level of payoff. This model is estimated using several online and offline networks via instrumental variables and system GMM. The results always present large significant levels of strategic complementarities in fundraising activities. However, in engagement activities, strategic complementarities are only significant in online networks. Additionally, engagement activities exhibit positive significant levels of direct spillovers for all networks. In contrast, in fundraising campaigns, the direct spillover effect is only significant in large offline networks.
Author : Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
Publisher : Stanford University
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 210 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Essays on Signaling and Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 210 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.
Author : Timo Hiller
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 67 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (851 download)
Download or read book Essays on Social and Economic Networks written by Timo Hiller and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three papers in the field of social and economic networks. In the first, called Peer Effects in Endogenous Networks, I build a model of endogenous net- work formation in the presence of peer effects, which play an important role for decisions concerning educational attainment, criminal activity, labor market participation and R&D expenditures of firms. The class of payoff functions assumed induce local complementar- ities in effort levels and positive local externalities. Links are one-sided and agents move simultaneously in links and effort levels. I find that equilibrium networks display - other than the complete and the empty network - a core-periphery structure, which is commonly observed in empirical studies. Ex-ante homogenous agents may obtain very different ex-post outcomes, depending on the network that arises in equilibrium. Multiplicity of equilibria serves as an explanation for large differences in behaviour across otherwise identical groups. The second paper, titled Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks, presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric. The model also provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a long-standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of alliance formation in international relations. The third paper, A Note on Stochastically Stable States for Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks, introduces dynamics into the model of the second paper and provides a conjecture for stochastically stable states. At every time period t and with fixed probability p, each agent adjusts his strategy myopically, while with small probability E chooses his strategy at random. The configuration where all agents sustain only positive links is shown to not be stochastically stable. Stochastically stable state are thought to be such that the number of cliques is maximal, under a restriction on the relative size of groups.
Author : Livia Shkoza
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Social Networks in Economics written by Livia Shkoza and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Elfried Faton
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 132 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Labor Economics and the Economics of Networks written by Elfried Faton and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis is about the influence of social interactions and network structure on various economic outcomes. Specifically, the thesis presents new findings explaining how social interactions shape individual outcomes like their effort, performance and productivity in the workplace, as well as their beliefs on miscellaneous social matters. Specifically, Chapter 1 gives new empirical results on some variables affecting the effort, quality of healthcare provided, and performance of maternal and child health (MCH) workers from a developing country (Benin). The results are obtained in a context of fixed salaries irrespective of workers' performance. In addition, Chapter 2 complements the results in Chapter 1, by explaining some of its main results on workers' productivity, in light of their bargaining power in the workplace. As for Chapter 3, it stands in the theory of opinion formation in a network. This chapter gives new results on the convergence of individual beliefs and reaching a consensus within a network when we consider a few cognitive biases in individual's behavior. More specifically, the results of this thesis are summarized as follows. Chapter 1 uses a non-cooperative game approach to bring to light the existence of strategic substitutability in the workplace of MCH workers in Benin. Particularly, the paper suggests that, to provide collectively a certain quality of healthcare in their health facility, some workers (altruists) increase their effort to compensate for the failure of their peers in offering a good quality of care. Moreover, using some relevant information in the data, the chapter also proposes a simple probability-based method to account for some variability in the strength of interactions among colleagues. Chapter 2 on the other hand, focuses on the same MCH workers, and proposes a new theory to understand better some mechanisms behind the equilibrium expressed by the strategic substitutability obtained in Chapter 1. More specifically, the chapter presents a simple Nash bargaining approach to establish how individual characteristics mold their bargaining power and consequently their workload share. The results show that workers social characteristics like their education, experience and number of children determine their bargaining power in the workplace, and thus their productivity. Finally, Chapter 3 explores how some cognitive biases affect convergence and consensus properties known up to now in an average-based model of opinion formation. In particular, when accounting for a confirmation bias and an extremist relative superiority bias, the chapter reveals that, in an a priori strongly connected and aperiodic network, beliefs do not necessarily converge to a consensus. Furthermore, some typical features of a priori networks and vectors of initial beliefs which influence the existence of a consensus are given. Overall, the chapter proposes a new understanding of some mechanisms behind social issues like political radicalism, extreme behaviors and the non-convergence of opinions within a network.
Author : Rudolf Richter
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3319141546
Total Pages : 217 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (191 download)
Download or read book Essays on New Institutional Economics written by Rudolf Richter and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-04-29 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays comprises some of Rudolf Richter’s important contributions to research on New Institutional Economics (NIE). It deals with the central idea, principles, and methodology of New Institutional Economics and explores its relation to sociology and law. Other chapters examine applications of NIE to various microeconomic and macroeconomic issues in the face of uncertainty, from entrepreneurship to the euro crisis.
Author : John Lepper
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9780958357609
Total Pages : 124 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (576 download)
Download or read book Systems of Economic Relationships written by John Lepper and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Rhizoids or technical/social/economic networks"--Pref.
Author : Matthew O. Jackson
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 140083399X
Total Pages : 519 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (8 download)
Download or read book Social and Economic Networks written by Matthew O. Jackson and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-11-01 with total page 519 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Networks of relationships help determine the careers that people choose, the jobs they obtain, the products they buy, and how they vote. The many aspects of our lives that are governed by social networks make it critical to understand how they impact behavior, which network structures are likely to emerge in a society, and why we organize ourselves as we do. In Social and Economic Networks, Matthew Jackson offers a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics. He provides empirical background on networks and the regularities that they exhibit, and discusses random graph-based models and strategic models of network formation. He helps readers to understand behavior in networked societies, with a detailed analysis of learning and diffusion in networks, decision making by individuals who are influenced by their social neighbors, game theory and markets on networks, and a host of related subjects. Jackson also describes the varied statistical and modeling techniques used to analyze social networks. Each chapter includes exercises to aid students in their analysis of how networks function. This book is an indispensable resource for students and researchers in economics, mathematics, physics, sociology, and business.
Author : Nazmun Nahar Ratna
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 202 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (515 download)
Download or read book Rethinking the Role of Social Networks in Knowledge Diffusion written by Nazmun Nahar Ratna and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (913 download)
Download or read book Essays in Social Networks and Development Economics written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is a collection of three essays on social networks and development economics. The first chapter examines the effect of peer networks on self-control problems. I construct a theoretical model to describe the way in which peer networks influence consumption behaviors through social norms, which guide individuals to conform to their friends' behavior. Using comprehensive data from a monthly survey conducted in 16 villages in Thailand from 1999 through 2004, I empirically examine peer effects on temptation consumption patterns, and test the mechanism underlying this relationship. Detailed social network information in the dataset allows the identification of impacts using a friend of a friend (excluded network) as the instrument. The empirical results provide evidence that peer decisions significantly impact individuals' temptation consumption such as alcohol and gambling, as well as savings. These peer effects are driven primarily by social norms, rather than by risk sharing. In the second chapter, co-authored with professor Laura Schechter, we first conduct an extensive review of the disparate literature studying the stability of preferences measured in experiments. Then, we test the stability of individuals' choices in panel data from rural Paraguay, including both experimental and survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences collected over almost a decade. Answers to survey questions are quite stable, while experimental measures are less so. If choices made in experiments are not stable, it may be because these choices are influenced by shocks, or because they include high levels of noise. We find no evidence that real-world shocks influence play in games. We suggest that in a developing country context, researchers may want to design simpler experiments or make more use of survey questions to measure preferences. The third chapter explores the impact of weather shocks on farmers' income diversification strategies. I combine historical weather data with household data in India to explore whether farmers employ different responses toward weather shocks in regions with different levels of historical variation. I find that weather shocks can negatively affect agricultural income, but this effect decreases in a riskier place where people have, over time, diversified their income into off-farm employment. I also find evidence that caste-networks can potentially determine people's income diversification strategies. Households who are within a different caste from the majority of their village peers will be more likely to seek for off-farm jobs, while households who are in a similar caste to the majority of the people within the village will seek agricultural wage jobs from others in the village.
Author : Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (745 download)
Download or read book Essays on Signaling and Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.
Author : Alexander Fischer
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Ranks, Peers & Networks written by Alexander Fischer and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
