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Author : Konrad Mierendorff
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 87 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (697 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Konrad Mierendorff and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Heng Liu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 99 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Heng Liu and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 99 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we address the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. In settings where agents' private information evolves independently, we construct the dynamic counterpart of the generalized VCG mechanism in one-dimensional environments. In Chapter 2, we study the problem of designing efficient trade agreements when countries involved in trade can use "disguised protections" in the form of domestic policies. We take a dynamic mechanism design approach to examine the interaction between trade and domestic policies. In particular, we show that allowing countries to make transfers can solve the incentive problems associated with private information. However, due to lack of commitment, these transfers may or may not be self-enforcing, depending on the persistence countries' private information. Our results indicate the possibility for WTO to improve the existing trade agreements through financial transfers.
Author : Anqi Li
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (795 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Anqi Li and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is composed of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study durable goods sales with a dynamic population of buyers. My contribution is to devise a Multi-round Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Generalized Reserve Price (MSAAGR) to implement the efficient allocation, and to contrast MSAAGR with the standard uniform price auction to highlight the implication of population dynamics on the design of trading platforms. In the second chapter, I estalibsh the possibility of sustaining long-term cooperation in infinitely repeated private monitoring games with scarce signals. My contribution is to construct a novel Budget Mechanism with Cross-Checking (BMCC) which, by linking players' action choices over time, virtually implements the efficient outcome with a vanishing incentive cost as the horizon of the game grows and the players become increasingly patient.
Author : Maher Riyad Said
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 238 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (67 download)
Download or read book Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Maher Riyad Said and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Ruitian Lang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 161 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Ruitian Lang and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The dissertation considers three topics in dynamic games and mechanism design. In both problems, asymmetric information causes inefficiency in production and allocation. The first chapter considers the inefficiency from the principal's inability to observes the agent's effort or cost of effort, and explores its implication to the principal's response to the combination of the output and the signal about the cost of effort. For example, the principal may punish the agent more harshly for low output when signals suggest that cost of effort is high when the effort is of high value for the principal. This chapter also classifies the long-run behavior of the relationship between the principal and the agent. Depending on whether the agent is strictly risk-averse and whether he is protected by limited liability, the state of the relationship may or may not converge to a stationary state and the stationary state may nor may not depend on the initial condition. The second chapter considers the re-allocation of assets among entrepreneurs with different matching qualities, which contributes to the growth of the whole economy. Due to reasons that are not explicitly modeled, assets are not automatically allocated to entrepreneurs who are best at operating them from the beginning, and this inefficiency is combined with inefficiency in the asset market and potential imperfection of labor contracting. When asset re-allocation can become a main source of economic growth, this chapter argues that imperfection in the labor contracting environment may boost the economic growth. The third chapter assumes that the agent's output is contractible but he can privately acquire more information about his cost of production prior to contracting. Compared to the optimal screening contract, the principal's contract in this case must not only induce the agent to "tell the truth", but also to give the agent the incentive to acquire appropriate amount of information. This may create distortion of allocation to the most efficient type and whether this happens is related to the marginal loss incurred by the principal from the cost of information acquisition.
Author : Daehyun Kim
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 153 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (11 download)
Download or read book Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Author : Murat Yilmaz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 222 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (729 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Mechanisms written by Murat Yilmaz and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 222 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (119 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three papers in mechanism design. Chapter 1 is based on a paper of mine entitled "Quality Disclosure and Price Discrimination". Chapter 2 is based on "Penalty, Voting, and Collusion: a Common Agency Approach to Industrial Regulation and Political Power". Chapter 3 is based on "Partitional Information Revelation under Renegotiation". A key framework in mechanism design is screening: a principal who designs the contract induces agents with private information to select certain action(s) or bundle(s). Classical results are second-best distortion and Myerson ironing, which are derived when the agency involves a single task (or tasks independent across agents), an agent's information is privately known by himself, and there is full commitment. Chapter 1 considers incentivizing tasks that are related through a resource constraint. It studies the second-degree price discrimination when the supply quality follows some exogenous distribution, or more specifically, the design of information and pricing in a monopolistic market with product quality dispersion. The main message is that optimality requires a partial disclosure, and finer results on the allocation distortion depend on the heterogeneity of the buyers' preference. When such preference over assignment, i.e., quality distribution, has a uni-dimensional sufficient statistics in the quality space, the optimal distortion resembles Myerson's ironing and the optimal disclosure takes a partitional form. For more general preference, the optimal distortion departs from Myerson's result. Chapter 2 considers eliciting signals informative of the agent's private information from multiple sources. An interesting case is by considering a voting committee as the principal, where voting aggregates welfare-relevant information but faces corruptive incentives. The key insights are that the optimal rule is a binary verdict, resembling the principle of maximum deterrence, and the corruptive incentives typically push the optimal voting rule towards unanimity. Chapter 3 considers commitment with renegotiation: the counterparties can stick to the previously signed long-term contract or revise it with mutual consent. More specifically, it studies a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a rental good) is private. In such a dynamic game, a new dimension of mechanism design, namely intertemporal type separation, arises as its induced belief-updating affects the rent extraction--efficiency tradeoff. The main message is that all PBE share the following property in the progressive screening process: at each history, the seller partitions the posterior support into countable intervals and offers a pooling contract to each of these intervals.
Author : Levent Ulku
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 71 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (53 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Levent Ulku and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Author : Luigi Balletta
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (775 download)
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Taxation and Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Luigi Balletta and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Luigi Balletta
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 170 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (775 download)
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Taxation and Dynamic Mechanism Design written by Luigi Balletta and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 170 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Min Ho Shin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 294 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Min Ho Shin and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 294 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Gregory Pavlov
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 151 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (663 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Gregory Pavlov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.
Author : Yuzhe Zhang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 248 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (319 download)
Download or read book Essays on Dynamic Economics written by Yuzhe Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Renkun Yang (Ph. D. in economics)
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 172 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (131 download)
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism and Information Design written by Renkun Yang (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 172 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three chapters bringing together my work in dynamic mechanism design and information design in markets. In Chapter 1 titled "The Termination Clause as a Sequential Screening Device", I investigate the role of termination fees in go-shop provisions in the mergers and acquisition markets. In an environment wherein the buyers' value uncertainty is resolved over time, I find that the seller can screen this private signal by offering a menu of termination contracts. Such a contract resembles the insight of sequential screening: the initial buyer with an optimistic estimate accepts a contract with a high floor price and high termination fee to mitigate future competition; a pessimistic early buyer, in contrast, chooses to stay flexible by accepting a low contract. Moreover, the seller collects more revenue than running a public auction until all bidders are present when the initial signal is sufficiently noisy. Chapter 2 titled "Dynamic Assignment with Limited Commitment" (joint with OSub Kwon) studies a dynamic allocation problem in which transfers are not feasible and the principal cannot commit in the long run. Specifically, an efficiency-maximizing principal (she) decides in each period whether to allocate a good at a fixed cost to the agent (he), whose private value evolves over time. The optimal mechanism in the two-period model has two main features. First, the principal elicits truthful reports in the first period by promising the low type one unit in the second period. Second, to fulfill this promise the principal strategically garbles (without observing) the agent's report. As the time horizon expands, the efficiency loss is backloaded and vanishes in the infinite horizon limit. Chapter 3 titled "Information Design in Vertical Oligopolies" studies a vertical oligopoly model in which two firms compete in quality revelation in the form of Bayesian persuasion before competing in price. I find that in the benchmark model of the covered market, both firms reveal all information in a dominant strategy equilibrium to enlarge (perceived) product differentiation and soften price competition. When a minimum quality standard (MQS) is imposed, the firms pool around the MQS to increase the pass rate and reveal all other states to soften competition in the unique symmetric equilibrium. When extending the model to the uncovered case, the endogenous market share effect renders full revelation non-dominant even without policy intervention. I characterize sufficient conditions for a full information equilibrium and show that competition in general leads to excessive information compared to the social- and consumer-optimal level.
Author : Biung-Ghi Ju
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (483 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Biung-Ghi Ju and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Mingjun Xiao
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design with Semi-exclusive Information and Wrong Beliefs written by Mingjun Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design theories have established basic framework in studying economic problems where agents have private information and behave in their own interests. This framework provides a workhorse for exploring how to implement social choice rules in general. One typical issue is to analyze the decision-making by a social planner or a designer who aims to achieve efficient outcomes that maximize the joint welfare of all agents. Not surprisingly, efficiency essentially requires that the designer know the agents' private information and then choose the corresponding socially optimal outcome. However, the difficulty of mechanism design problem is to characterize these incentive constraints where agents find it optimal to reveal their private information truthfully. Specifically, sufficiently rich private information could entail non-implementability of efficient social choice rules. To overcome this difficulty, this dissertation considers a class of semi-exclusive information structures where agents may observe signals about payoff signals, and a class of problems where agents may have wrong beliefs or the mechanism designer is not informed about the agents' valuation functions, and proposes mechanisms that implement efficient allocations.
