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Essays In Mechanism Design And Implementation Theory
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Book Synopsis Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory by : Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory written by Ritesh Jain (Ph. D. in economics) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 119 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In Chapter 2 titled "Symmetric Mechanism Design," (Jointly with Yaron Azrieli) we study the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. This is an exercise in mechanism design. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constraint. In many environments, extremely discriminatory social choice functions can be implemented by symmetric mechanisms, but there are also cases in which symmetry is binding. Our characterization is based on a `revelation principle' type of result, where we show that a social choice function can be symmetrically implemented if and only if a particular kind of (indirect) symmetric mechanism implements it. We illustrate the result in environments of voting with private values, voting with a common value, and assignment of indivisible goods.
Book Synopsis Essays on Mechanism Design and Implementation by : Maria Goltsman
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design and Implementation written by Maria Goltsman and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Mechanism Design by : Levent Ulku
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Levent Ulku and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays in the theory of mechanism design under incomplete information. In the first essay, we analyze an implementation problem in which monetary transfers are feasible, valuations are interdependent and the set of available choices lies in a product space of lattices. This framework is general enough to subsume many interesting examples, including allocation problems with multiple objects. We identify a class of social choice rules which can be implemented in ex post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which ex post efficient social choice rules are implementable using monotone selection theory. The key conditions are extensions of the single crossing property and supermodularity. These conditions can be replaced with more tractable conditions in multiobject allocation problems with either two objects or two agents. I also show that the payments which implement monotone social decision rules coincide with the payments of (1) the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with private values, and (2) the generalized Vickrey auction introduced by Ausubel [1999] in multiunit allocation problems. The second essay generalizes the analysis of optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design for the seller of a single object introduced by Myerson [1981]. We consider a problem in which the seller has several heterogeneous objects and buyers' valuations depend on each other's private information. We analyze two nonnested environments in which incentive constraints can be replaced with more tractable monotonicity conditions. We establish conditions under which these monotonicity conditions can be ignored, and show that several earlier analyses of the optimal mechanism design problem can be unified and generalized. In particular, problems with two complementary goods in Levin [1997] and multiunit auction problems in Maskin and Riley [1989] and Branco [1996] are special cases. The third essay considers the problem of selling internet advertising slots to advertisers. Under suitable conditions, we solve for the payments imposed by an optimal mechanism and show that it can be decentralized via prices using a linear assignment approach. At every configuration of private information, optimal mechanism can be interpreted as a menu consisting of a price for every slot.
Book Synopsis Essays on Mechanism Design, Safety, and Crime by : George Fouad Nabih Shoukry
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design, Safety, and Crime written by George Fouad Nabih Shoukry and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation uses theoretical and empirical tools to answer applied questions of design with an emphasis on issues relating to safety and crime. The first essay incorporates safety in implementation theory and studies when and how safe mechanisms can be designed to obtain socially desirable outcomes. I provide general conditions under which a social choice rule can be implemented using safe mechanisms. The second essay is an empirical study of how criminals respond to changing profitability of crime, a question that informs the policy debate on the most effective crime fighting methods. I find that the price elasticity of theft is about 1 in the short term and increases to about 1.2 over a seven-month horizon, suggesting that policies that directly affect crime profitability, such as policies that shut down black markets or those that reduce demand for illegal goods, can be relatively effective. The third essay shows that any standard implementation problem can be formulated as a question about the existence of a graph that solves a graph coloring problem, establishing a connection between implementation theory and graph theory. More generally, an implementation problem can be viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem, and I propose an algorithm to design simple mechanisms to solve arbitrary implementation problems.
Book Synopsis Essays in Mechanism Design with Semi-exclusive Information and Wrong Beliefs by : Mingjun Xiao
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design with Semi-exclusive Information and Wrong Beliefs written by Mingjun Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mechanism design theories have established basic framework in studying economic problems where agents have private information and behave in their own interests. This framework provides a workhorse for exploring how to implement social choice rules in general. One typical issue is to analyze the decision-making by a social planner or a designer who aims to achieve efficient outcomes that maximize the joint welfare of all agents. Not surprisingly, efficiency essentially requires that the designer know the agents' private information and then choose the corresponding socially optimal outcome. However, the difficulty of mechanism design problem is to characterize these incentive constraints where agents find it optimal to reveal their private information truthfully. Specifically, sufficiently rich private information could entail non-implementability of efficient social choice rules. To overcome this difficulty, this dissertation considers a class of semi-exclusive information structures where agents may observe signals about payoff signals, and a class of problems where agents may have wrong beliefs or the mechanism designer is not informed about the agents' valuation functions, and proposes mechanisms that implement efficient allocations.
Book Synopsis Essays on Mechanism Design by : Gregory Pavlov
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design written by Gregory Pavlov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 151 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation we address several open problems in the theory of mechanism design: (i) optimal mechanism design when agents collude; (ii) multidimensional mechanism design problem of the multiproduct monopolist; (iii) robust predictions of the relative revenue loss from the bidders' collusion in the optimal auctions.
Book Synopsis Essays in Mechanism Design by : Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory)
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Weixin Chen (Researcher in microeconomic theory) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three papers in mechanism design. Chapter 1 is based on a paper of mine entitled "Quality Disclosure and Price Discrimination". Chapter 2 is based on "Penalty, Voting, and Collusion: a Common Agency Approach to Industrial Regulation and Political Power". Chapter 3 is based on "Partitional Information Revelation under Renegotiation". A key framework in mechanism design is screening: a principal who designs the contract induces agents with private information to select certain action(s) or bundle(s). Classical results are second-best distortion and Myerson ironing, which are derived when the agency involves a single task (or tasks independent across agents), an agent's information is privately known by himself, and there is full commitment. Chapter 1 considers incentivizing tasks that are related through a resource constraint. It studies the second-degree price discrimination when the supply quality follows some exogenous distribution, or more specifically, the design of information and pricing in a monopolistic market with product quality dispersion. The main message is that optimality requires a partial disclosure, and finer results on the allocation distortion depend on the heterogeneity of the buyers' preference. When such preference over assignment, i.e., quality distribution, has a uni-dimensional sufficient statistics in the quality space, the optimal distortion resembles Myerson's ironing and the optimal disclosure takes a partitional form. For more general preference, the optimal distortion departs from Myerson's result. Chapter 2 considers eliciting signals informative of the agent's private information from multiple sources. An interesting case is by considering a voting committee as the principal, where voting aggregates welfare-relevant information but faces corruptive incentives. The key insights are that the optimal rule is a binary verdict, resembling the principle of maximum deterrence, and the corruptive incentives typically push the optimal voting rule towards unanimity. Chapter 3 considers commitment with renegotiation: the counterparties can stick to the previously signed long-term contract or revise it with mutual consent. More specifically, it studies a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation (for a per-period service or a rental good) is private. In such a dynamic game, a new dimension of mechanism design, namely intertemporal type separation, arises as its induced belief-updating affects the rent extraction--efficiency tradeoff. The main message is that all PBE share the following property in the progressive screening process: at each history, the seller partitions the posterior support into countable intervals and offers a pooling contract to each of these intervals.
Book Synopsis Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design: The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012-03-22 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Book Synopsis Essays on Matching/implementation Theory by : Kim-Sau Chung
Download or read book Essays on Matching/implementation Theory written by Kim-Sau Chung and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 286 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Social Design written by Walter Trockel and published by Springer. This book was released on 2019-05-30 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.
Book Synopsis Four Essays on Implementation Theory by :
Download or read book Four Essays on Implementation Theory written by and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays in Mechanism Design by : Yunan Li
Download or read book Essays in Mechanism Design written by Yunan Li and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 594 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this thesis, I study mechanism design problems in environments where the information necessary to make decisions is affected by the actions of principal or agents.The first chapter considers the problem of a principal who must allocate a good among a finite number of agents, each of whom values the good. Each agent has private information about the principal's payoff if he receives the good. There are no monetary transfers. The principal can inspect agents' reports at a cost and punish them, but punishments are limited because verification is imperfect or information arrives only after the good has been allocated for a while. I characterize an optimal mechanism featuring two thresholds. Agents whose values are below the lower threshold and above the upper threshold are pooled, respectively. If the number of agents is small, then the pooling area at the top of value distribution disappears. If the number of agents is large, then the two pooling areas meet and the optimal mechanism can be implemented via a shortlisting procedure. The fact that the optimal mechanism depends on the number of agents implies that small and large organizations should behave differently. The second chapter considers the problem of a principal who wishes to distribute an indivisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents. Both valuation and budget are an agent's private information. The principal can inspect an agent's budget through a costly verification process and punish an agent who makes a false statement. I characterize the direct surplus-maximizing mechanism. This direct mechanism can be implemented by a two-stage mechanism in which agents only report their budgets. Specifically, all agents report their budgets in the first stage. The principal then provides budget-dependent cash subsidies to agents and assigns the goods randomly (with uniform probability) at budget-dependent prices. In the second stage, a resale market opens, but is regulated with budget-dependent sales taxes. Agents who report low budgets receive more subsidies in their initial purchases (the first stage), face higher taxes in the resale market (the second stage) and are inspected randomly. This implementation exhibits some of the features of some welfare programs, such as Singapore's housing and development board.The third chapter studies the design of ex-ante efficient mechanisms in situations where a single item is for sale, and agents have positively interdependent values and can covertly acquire information at a cost before participating in a mechanism. I find that when interdependency is low or the number of agents is large, the ex-post efficient mechanism is also ex-ante efficient. In cases of high interdependency or a small number of agents, ex-ante efficient mechanisms discourage agents from acquiring excessive information by introducing randomization to the ex-post efficient allocation rule in areas where the information's precision increases most rapidly.
Book Synopsis Essays on Information and Mechanism Design by : Ina Angelova Taneva
Download or read book Essays on Information and Mechanism Design written by Ina Angelova Taneva and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation studies the optimal design of institutions and information structures for different objectives of a designer or a social planner. The questions addressed are interesting both from a theoretical point of view, and in terms of their real-life applications. The first chapter of the dissertation focuses on supermodular mechanism design in environments with arbitrary finite type spaces and interdependent valuations. In these environments, the designer may have to use Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, because ex post implementation may not be possible. We propose direct Bayesian mechanisms that are robust to certain forms of bounded rationality while controlling for equilibrium multiplicity. In quasi-linear environments with informational and allocative externalities, we show that any Bayesian mechanism that implements a social choice function can be converted into a supermodular mechanism that also implements the original decision rule. The proposed supermodular mechanism can be chosen in a way that minimizes the size of the equilibrium set, and we provide two sets of sufficient conditions to this effect: for general decision rules and for decision rules that satisfy a certain requirement. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementation in unique equilibrium. The second chapter looks at the incentives of a revenue-maximizing seller (designer) who discloses information to a number of interacting bidders (agents). In particular, the designer chooses the level of precision with which agents can infer the quality of a common-value object from their privately observed signals. We restrict attention to the second-price sealed-bid auction format. If the seller has perfect commitment power and can choose the precision level before observing the quality of the object, in the presence of any small cost to precision it is ex ante optimal for her to choose completely uninformative signals. For the case when the seller chooses the precision level after observing the quality of the object, we characterize pooling, partial pooling, and separating equilibria. We show that in this setting the cost associated with precision can be viewed as a form of commitment device: if costs are too low, the best pooling equilibrium ceases to exist as the high type seller is too tempted to separate. Thus, the seller ends up with a lower ex ante expected payoff than in the case when cost parameters are above a certain threshold. The third chapter of this dissertation studies the optimal choice of information structure from the perspective of a designer maximizing a certain objective function. Generally speaking, there are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations, update their beliefs, and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure --- the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure. It is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals. The optimal information structure may be a public signal, or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.
Book Synopsis Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making by : Walter P. Heller
Download or read book Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making written by Walter P. Heller and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1986-09-26 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first of three volumes of essays in honour of the distinguished economic theorist Professor Kenneth J. Arrow.
Book Synopsis Essays on Mechanism Design Under Non-Bayesian Frameworks by : Huiyi Guo
Download or read book Essays on Mechanism Design Under Non-Bayesian Frameworks written by Huiyi Guo and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions for robustly implementing a social choice function as an equilibrium that is immune to all coalitional deviations. As there are social choice functions that are only implementable with coalitional structures, this chapter provides insights on when agents should be allowed to communicate. As an extension, when the mechanism designer has no information on which coalitions can be formed, this chapter also provides conditions for robust implementation under all coalition patterns. Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others' private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others' information, they make decisions based on the worst-case belief. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice goal is implementable under such a behavioral assumption. As there are social choice goals that are only implementable under ambiguous assessments, this chapter provides insights on what information structure is desirable to the mechanism designer.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making by : Shuguang Zhu
Download or read book Three Essays on Mechanism Design, Information Design and Collective Decision-making written by Shuguang Zhu and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis investigates several topics in Microeconomic Theory, with a focus on incorporating information control into mechanism design, checking the robustness of mechanisms, and providing a foundation for inconsistent collective decision-making. This work helps to optimize information transmission and acquisition in organizational communications, advertisement and policy design. It also sheds light on how inconsistent group decisions derive from heterogeneity in group members, and proposes ways to restore efficiency. The thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is self-contained and can be read separately. The first chapter studies a mechanism design environment where the principal has control over the agents' information about a payoff-relevant state. The principal commits to an information disclosure policy where each agent observes a private signal, while the principal directly observes neither the true state nor the signal profile. Examples include (1) assessing whether a new product matches consumers' preferences through their feedback on sample product trials, and (2) gathering intelligence by authorizing investigators to collect various aspects of information. I establish optimality of individually uninformative and aggregately revealing disclosure policy, where (i) each agent obtains no new information about the state after observing any realization of his own signal, but (ii) the principal can nevertheless infer the true state from the agents' reports about their signals. Furthermore, this optimal disclosure policy admits simple and intuitive implementation (such as certain types of blinded experiments, or restrictions on access to certain information) under additional assumptions. If attention is restricted to linear settings, I characterize a class of environments (including those satisfying the standard regularity conditions in mechanism design) where an equivalence result holds between private disclosure and public disclosure.The second chapter, co-authored with Takuro Yamashita, is motivated by Chung and Ely (2007), who establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms in private-value auction environments. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments, then in general, ex post mechanisms do not have foundation. That is, there exists a non-ex-post mechanism that achieves strictly higher expected revenue than the optimal ex post mechanism, regardless of the agents' high-order beliefs. The third chapter shows that dynamic inconsistency in collective decision-making can derive from heterogeneity in group members' outside options (i.e. opportunity costs that individuals have to pay in order to join the group), even if individuals share the same exponentially discounting time preference. This model of endogenous dynamic inconsistency facilitatesthe analysis of welfare consequences, since time-consistent individual preferences allow for a well-defined measurement of social welfare. We further characterize the optimal Bayesian persuasion information disclosure policy, which takes the form of upper revealing rules, to alleviate the welfare distortion caused by inconsistent collective decisions. Our framework proves to be highly adaptable to various contexts, including provision of public facilities and assignment on team work.
Book Synopsis Two Essays in Mechanism Design by : Nicolás Andrés Figueroa González
Download or read book Two Essays in Mechanism Design written by Nicolás Andrés Figueroa González and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 146 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
