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Author : Marius Ionut Ochea
Publisher : Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN 13 : 905170688X
Total Pages : 217 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (517 download)
Download or read book Essay on Nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics written by Marius Ionut Ochea and published by Rozenberg Publishers. This book was released on 2010 with total page 217 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Daniel Friedman
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0199981167
Total Pages : 320 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (999 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds written by Daniel Friedman and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2016-02-01 with total page 320 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy"; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.
Author : Bikas K. Chakrabarti
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3319613529
Total Pages : 208 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (196 download)
Download or read book Econophysics of the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and Related Games written by Bikas K. Chakrabarti and published by Springer. This book was released on 2017-07-19 with total page 208 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides the first comprehensive introduction to multi-agent, multi-choice repetitive games, such as the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and the Minority Game. It explains how the tangible formulations of these games, using stochastic strategies developed by statistical physicists employing both classical and quantum physics, have led to very efficient solutions to the problems posed. Further, it includes sufficient introductory notes on information-processing strategies employing both classical statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Games of this nature, in which agents are presented with choices, from among which their goal is to make the minority choice, offer effective means of modeling herd behavior and market dynamics and are highly relevant to assessing systemic risk. Accordingly, this book will be of interest to economists, physicists, and computer scientists alike.
Author : Jun Tanimoto
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 4431549625
Total Pages : 214 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (315 download)
Download or read book Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications written by Jun Tanimoto and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-10-23 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Author : Mark Broom
Publisher : CRC Press
ISBN 13 : 1000623726
Total Pages : 746 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (6 download)
Download or read book Game-Theoretical Models in Biology written by Mark Broom and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2022-08-03 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology, Second Edition presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use Python to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behaviour, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modelling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modelling of these diverse biological phenomena. In this thoroughly revised new edition, the authors have added three new chapters on the evolution of structured populations, biological signalling games, and a topical new chapter on evolutionary models of cancer. There are also new sections on games with time constraints that convert simple games to potentially complex nonlinear ones; new models on extortion strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and on social dilemmas; and on evolutionary models of vaccination, a timely section given the current Covid pandemic. Features Presents a wide range of biological applications of game theory. Suitable for researchers and professionals in mathematical biology and the life sciences, and as a text for postgraduate courses in mathematical biology. Provides numerous examples, exercises, and Python code.
Author : William H. Sandholm
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262288613
Total Pages : 618 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (622 download)
Download or read book Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics written by William H. Sandholm and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2010-12-17 with total page 618 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory. This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the 1970s through recent advances. Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. It then studies the dynamics of behavior in these games. By introducing a general model of myopic strategy revision by individual agents, the text provides foundations for two distinct approaches to aggregate behavior dynamics: the deterministic approach, based on differential equations, and the stochastic approach, based on Markov processes. Key results on local stability, global convergence, stochastic stability, and nonconvergence are developed in detail. Ten substantial appendixes present the mathematical tools needed to work in evolutionary game theory, offering a practical introduction to the methods of dynamic modeling. Accompanying the text are more than 200 color illustrations of the mathematics and theoretical results; many were created using the Dynamo software suite, which is freely available on the author's Web site. Readers are encouraged to use Dynamo to run quick numerical experiments and to create publishable figures for their own research.
Author : Ratul Lahkar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 180 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (891 download)
Download or read book Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ratul Lahkar and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Reinhard Selten
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 3662026740
Total Pages : 338 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (62 download)
Download or read book Game Equilibrium Models I written by Reinhard Selten and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-29 with total page 338 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Author : American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher : American Mathematical Soc.
ISBN 13 : 0821853260
Total Pages : 186 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (218 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Game Dynamics written by American Mathematical Society. Short Course and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2011-10-27 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
Author : Mark Broom
Publisher : CRC Press
ISBN 13 : 1439853223
Total Pages : 516 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (398 download)
Download or read book Game-Theoretical Models in Biology written by Mark Broom and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2013-03-27 with total page 516 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use MATLAB® to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behavior, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modeling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modeling of these diverse biological phenomena.
Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262033053
Total Pages : 346 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games written by Ross Cressman and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 346 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
Author : Elias Tsakas
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 90 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)
Download or read book Essays on Epistemology and Evolutionary Game Theory written by Elias Tsakas and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Frank Thuijsman
Publisher : Birkhäuser
ISBN 13 : 3319280147
Total Pages : 319 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (192 download)
Download or read book Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games written by Frank Thuijsman and published by Birkhäuser. This book was released on 2016-04-07 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 16th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. They discuss theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, issues relating to lack of information, and applications in areas such as biological or economical competition, stability in communication networks, and maintenance decisions in an electricity market, just to name a few. Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
Author : Larry Samuelson
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262692199
Total Pages : 332 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (921 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection written by Larry Samuelson and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 162 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ross Cressman and published by Springer. This book was released on 1992-06-24 with total page 162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The book provides a thorough analysis of the theoretical properties of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS's) in four models of evolutionary biology that are all based on individual selection principles. These models range from the standard frequency-dependent evolutionary game theory model of a single species to more recent models that include density-dependent and/or two-species frequency-dependent interactions. The book is unique in that it emphasizes both static and dynamic aspects of the ESS conditions. Of particular interest to game theorists will be the correspondence between dynamic stability in the biological system and either the Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative game theory or the core solution concept of cooperative game theory. The book is the first to consider, in detail, the game-theoretic effects of contestant information and two-species interactions. Of major significance to evolutionary biologists are the dynamic consequences, on the evolutionary process, of territorial ownership or repeated interactions between the same individuals. The book is intended as a text/reference for students/re- searchers in either discipline(evolutionary biology or game theory) who have a minimum mathematical maturity of a senior undergraduate.
Author : Jun Tanimoto
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 9811327696
Total Pages : 221 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics written by Jun Tanimoto and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-11-27 with total page 221 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human–environmental–social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost.
Author : Reinhard Selten
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 9783642081088
Total Pages : 330 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (81 download)
Download or read book Game Equilibrium Models I written by Reinhard Selten and published by Springer. This book was released on 2010-12-01 with total page 330 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
