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Author : Michal Břeský
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788086286198
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (861 download)
Download or read book Equilibria in multi-unit auctions written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (246 download)
Download or read book An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David McAdams
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)
Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Author : Michal Břeský
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788073441661
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (416 download)
Download or read book Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Edward J. Anderson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (138 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.
Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 012426297X
Total Pages : 319 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (242 download)
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002-03-13 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Author : Somdeb Lahiri
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Existence of Market Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions With Emission Constraint written by Somdeb Lahiri and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We obtain a computable necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market equilibrium for multi-unit auctions with an emission constraint.
Author : Paul Milgrom
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1139449168
Total Pages : 378 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (394 download)
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction.
Author : Mete Ahunbay
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Equilibria and Efficiency of Sequential Multiunit Auctions written by Mete Ahunbay and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "We study the equilibrium and efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with complete information, both under no constraints on buyers' bidding strategies and when buyers are constrained to not bid above their valuation for an additional item in each individual auction. When buyers may not overbid we give a complete characterisation of the equilibrium of the auction when only two buyers are present and show that efficiency of an outcome allocation is at least (1-1/e) with respect to welfare. When buyers may overbid and two buyers are present we restore the (1-1/e) efficiency result of (Bae et al. 2008, 2009). We also inspect the setting when arbitrarily many buyers are present, showing conditional constant-factor efficiency results"--
Author : Gregory S. Crawford
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Bidding Asymmetries in Multi-Unit Auctions written by Gregory S. Crawford and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper introduces and tests Bid Function Equilibria (BFE) in the British spot market for electricity. BFE are Nash Equilibria of an oligopoly model of multi-unit auctions under complete information designed to reflect wholesale electricity markets. Unlike existing theories of electricity supply, BFE predict asymmetric bidding by producers: a single firm (the price-setter) bids strategically while other forms (non-price-setters) bid their costs. Using data on bid functions between 1993 and 1995, we find strong empirical support for the theory. We conclude that BFE has important implications for the design and governance of electricity markets.
Author : Andreas Hefti
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (119 download)
Download or read book Market Power and Information Effects in a Multi-unit Auction written by Andreas Hefti and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the effects of different information structures (full information, supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty) on equilibrium prices, allocative efficiency and bidding behavior in a (supply-side) uniform-price multi-unit auction, using supply function competition and a novel experimental design. Our setup integrates different types of market power and a varying level of competition. We empirically find that average prices tend to be higher under full information compared to the cases where bidders either have limited information about about the demand level or rivals' technologies or; the latter even leading to strictly lower average prices as the exertion of market power and bid shading is strongly reduced. We explain this finding with a behavioral equilibrium concept, where bidders behave as if competing against the average market situation. Further, we address the problem of multiplicity of equilibria by exploiting the equilibrium conditions to obtain an empirical selection of the average equilibrium supply function. The respective predictions of the average prices exceed those by standard OLS in all information treatments.
Author : Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 38 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (263 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainity, and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Pak-Sing Choi
Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 3030695751
Total Pages : 304 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (36 download)
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Author : Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 232 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (34 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David Joseph Wood
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 662 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (7 download)
Download or read book A Study of Multiplicative-strategy Equilibria in Second-price Multi-component Auctions written by David Joseph Wood and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 662 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 31 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (445 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit, Multi-period Auctions, Supply Uncertainty and the Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria written by Jeroen M. Swinkels and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
