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Author : Jeffrey C. Ely
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games written by Jeffrey C. Ely and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Johannes Horner
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Horner and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Author : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9782854188455
Total Pages : 31 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (884 download)
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Author : Olivier Compte
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 12 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Belief Free Equilibria written by Olivier Compte and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by other players and must rely on noisy signals he receives about those actions. This is typically incorporated into models by defining a monitoring structure, that is, a collection of probability distributions over the signals each player receives (one distribution for each action profile players may play). Although this is simply meant to capture the fact that players don.t directly observe the actions chosen by others, constructed equilibria often depend on players precisely knowing the distributions, somewhat unrealistic in most problems of interest. This paper aims to show the fragility of belief free equilibrium constructions when one adds shocks to the monitoring structure in repeated games.
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0198041217
Total Pages : 664 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (98 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author : Robert J. Aumann
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262011471
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (114 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author : Yuval Heller
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria written by Yuval Heller and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement.
Author : Jean-François Mertens
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 110703020X
Total Pages : 597 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (7 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games written by Jean-François Mertens and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-02-09 with total page 597 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Author : Johannes Hörner
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9782854189216
Total Pages : 79 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (892 download)
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Hörner and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 79 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé en anglais.
Author : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9782854188844
Total Pages : 31 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (888 download)
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé en anglais.
Author : Jonathan A. K. Cave
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 604 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Equilibrium Behavior in Infinitely-repeated Games written by Jonathan A. K. Cave and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Daphne R. Raban
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1802203966
Total Pages : 579 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (22 download)
Download or read book The Elgar Companion to Information Economics written by Daphne R. Raban and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2024-03-14 with total page 579 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Elgar Companion to Information Economics dexterously navigates this interdisciplinary field of research which celebrates the crucial contribution of information to decision making, market dynamics, and economic well-being. Offering a wealth of conceptual analysis, this erudite Companion embarks on an intellectual journey exploring the fundamentals of information economics. This title contains one or more Open Access chapters.
Author : John H. Nachbar
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Beliefs in Repeated Games written by John H. Nachbar and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consider a two-player discounted infinitely repeated game. A player's belief is a probability distribution over the opponent's repeated game strategies. This paper shows that, for a large class of repeated games, there are no beliefs that satisfy three conditions, learnability, consistency, and a diversity condition, CS. This impossibility theorem generalizes results in Nachbar (1997).
Author : Andrés Perea
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1107008913
Total Pages : 581 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (7 download)
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author : Tim Miller
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 3030030989
Total Pages : 687 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (3 download)
Download or read book PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems written by Tim Miller and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-10-23 with total page 687 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2018, held in Tokyo, Japan, in October/November 2018. The 27 full papers presented and 31 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 103 submissions. PRIMA presents subjects in many application domains, particularly in e-commerce, and also in planning, logistics, manufacturing, robotics, decision support, transportation, entertainment, emergency relief and disaster management, and data mining and analytics.
Author : George Norman
Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1783471980
Total Pages : 341 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (834 download)
Download or read book Dictionary of Industrial Organization written by George Norman and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2014-03-28 with total page 341 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Dictionary balances concise explanation with comprehensive coverage, incorporating concepts such as the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, the development of the theory of the firm, the foundational contributions of game theory and models of s
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262061940
Total Pages : 304 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (619 download)
Download or read book The Theory of Learning in Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1998 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
