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Belief Free Equilibria
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Author :Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche Publisher : ISBN 13 :9782854188455 Total Pages :31 pages Book Rating :4.1/5 (884 download)
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Book Synopsis Belief Free Equilibria by : Olivier Compte
Download or read book Belief Free Equilibria written by Olivier Compte and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by other players and must rely on noisy signals he receives about those actions. This is typically incorporated into models by defining a monitoring structure, that is, a collection of probability distributions over the signals each player receives (one distribution for each action profile players may play). Although this is simply meant to capture the fact that players don.t directly observe the actions chosen by others, constructed equilibria often depend on players precisely knowing the distributions, somewhat unrealistic in most problems of interest. This paper aims to show the fragility of belief free equilibrium constructions when one adds shocks to the monitoring structure in repeated games.
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games by : Jeffrey C. Ely
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games written by Jeffrey C. Ely and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Johannes Horner
Download or read book Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Horner and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Book Synopsis Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria by : Yuval Heller
Download or read book Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria written by Yuval Heller and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Book Synopsis Inadequate Equilibria (Draft Version) by : Eliezer Yudkowsky
Download or read book Inadequate Equilibria (Draft Version) written by Eliezer Yudkowsky and published by . This book was released on 2017-11-16 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :Charalambos D. Aliprantis Publisher :Springer Science & Business Media ISBN 13 :3662058588 Total Pages :733 pages Book Rating :4.6/5 (62 download)
Book Synopsis Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics by : Charalambos D. Aliprantis
Download or read book Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics written by Charalambos D. Aliprantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-11-11 with total page 733 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
Book Synopsis The Elgar Companion to Information Economics by : Daphne R. Raban
Download or read book The Elgar Companion to Information Economics written by Daphne R. Raban and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2024-03-14 with total page 579 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Elgar Companion to Information Economics dexterously navigates this interdisciplinary field of research which celebrates the crucial contribution of information to decision making, market dynamics, and economic well-being. Offering a wealth of conceptual analysis, this erudite Companion embarks on an intellectual journey exploring the fundamentals of information economics. This title contains one or more Open Access chapters.
Author :Econometric Society. World Congress Publisher :Cambridge University Press ISBN 13 :0521871522 Total Pages :431 pages Book Rating :4.5/5 (218 download)
Book Synopsis Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 by : Econometric Society. World Congress
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1 written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-08-14 with total page 431 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publisher description
Book Synopsis The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2 by : Roger D. Blair
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2 written by Roger D. Blair and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2014-11-03 with total page 665 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Book Synopsis PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems by : Tim Miller
Download or read book PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems written by Tim Miller and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-10-23 with total page 687 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2018, held in Tokyo, Japan, in October/November 2018. The 27 full papers presented and 31 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 103 submissions. PRIMA presents subjects in many application domains, particularly in e-commerce, and also in planning, logistics, manufacturing, robotics, decision support, transportation, entertainment, emergency relief and disaster management, and data mining and analytics.
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Johannes Hörner
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Hörner and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 79 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé en anglais.
Book Synopsis Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense by : Sushil Jajodia
Download or read book Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense written by Sushil Jajodia and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-08-30 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Today’s cyber defenses are largely static allowing adversaries to pre-plan their attacks. In response to this situation, researchers have started to investigate various methods that make networked information systems less homogeneous and less predictable by engineering systems that have homogeneous functionalities but randomized manifestations. The 10 papers included in this State-of-the Art Survey present recent advances made by a large team of researchers working on the same US Department of Defense Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) project during 2013-2019. This project has developed a new class of technologies called Adaptive Cyber Defense (ACD) by building on two active but heretofore separate research areas: Adaptation Techniques (AT) and Adversarial Reasoning (AR). AT methods introduce diversity and uncertainty into networks, applications, and hosts. AR combines machine learning, behavioral science, operations research, control theory, and game theory to address the goal of computing effective strategies in dynamic, adversarial environments.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steven N. Durlauf and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-07-14 with total page 391 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Hans Peters and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-06-04 with total page 493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games and Reputations by : George J. Mailath
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
