Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation

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ISBN 13 : 9783758486210
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (862 download)

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Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation by : Anamarija Delic

Download or read book Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation written by Anamarija Delic and published by . This book was released on 2024 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Three Essays on Earnings Management and Executive Compensation

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9780542786945
Total Pages : 82 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (869 download)

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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Earnings Management and Executive Compensation by : Heather Katherine Guthrie

Download or read book Three Essays on Earnings Management and Executive Compensation written by Heather Katherine Guthrie and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In chapter 2, I explore the possibility that current shareholders encourage CEOs to manage earnings around equity issuances, as artificially inflated stock prices allow shareholders to obtain external financing at lower cost. My main result establishes that CEOs in well-governed firms are more likely to have large positive discretionary accruals around equity issuances than CEOs in poorly-governed firms. The finding suggests that governance is a double-edged sword: good governance may limit misreporting when it hurts current shareholders, but it may exacerbate misreporting when current shareholders stand to benefit.

Three Essays on Corporate Debt and CEO Compensation

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Publisher : ProQuest
ISBN 13 : 9780549287827
Total Pages : 334 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (878 download)

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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Corporate Debt and CEO Compensation by : Maya Waisman

Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Debt and CEO Compensation written by Maya Waisman and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2007 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Research Handbook on Executive Pay

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Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1781005109
Total Pages : 553 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (81 download)

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Book Synopsis Research Handbook on Executive Pay by : John S. Beasley

Download or read book Research Handbook on Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 553 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.

Three Essays on Top Executives – Compensation Design, Career Patterns, and Managerial Risk Taking

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ISBN 13 : 9783746743424
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (434 download)

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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Top Executives – Compensation Design, Career Patterns, and Managerial Risk Taking by : Cornelia Hojer

Download or read book Three Essays on Top Executives – Compensation Design, Career Patterns, and Managerial Risk Taking written by Cornelia Hojer and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)

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Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope by : Yuri Khoroshilov

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope written by Yuri Khoroshilov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Regulation of Executive Compensation

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Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 0857938339
Total Pages : 255 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (579 download)

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Book Synopsis The Regulation of Executive Compensation by : Kym Maree Sheehan

Download or read book The Regulation of Executive Compensation written by Kym Maree Sheehan and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2012-01-01 with total page 255 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ïBased on extensive interviews with those directly involved in the executive pay setting process _ executives themselves, remuneration committee members, remuneration consultants, and institutional investors _ this excellent study finally explains how, despite repeated regulation over the past twenty years in both the UK and Australia, limits on the amount executives get paid, and a clear relationship between pay and performance remain as elusive as ever. Dr. SheehanÍs study suggests that by targeting the pay setting process rather than pay itself, regulation may have contributed, albeit unintentionally, to the endless upward ratcheting of absolute levels of executive pay.Í _ John Roberts, University of Sydney, Australia ïFor those that believe executive remuneration in the UK and Australia is too high and poorly aligned with company performance, this book provides an excellent analytical framework and strong arguments in favor of greater shareholder oversight of remuneration practices and pay levels. It is well-written, carefully argued and persuasive in its treatment of the subject. I wholeheartedly recommend it.Í _ Randall S. Thomas, Vanderbilt University Law School, US In this timely book, Kym Sheehan examines the regulatory technique known as ïsay on payÍ _ where shareholders vote on executive compensation in an annual, advisory vote on the remuneration report. Using the model of the regulated remuneration cycle, and drawing upon evidence of its operation from interviews, voting data and remuneration reports from UK and Australian companies, the book demonstrates whether say on pay can operate successfully to both constrain executive greed and ensure accountability exists for company performance and decision-making. The Regulation of Executive Compensation is essential reading for corporate governance academics, remuneration consultants, company directors, regulators, pension and superannuation fund trustees and unions. Politicians and their policy advisers, lawyers, accountants and anyone concerned about the corporate governance of listed companies will find much to interest them in this detailed study.

Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice

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Publisher : BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN 13 : 3947095112
Total Pages : 202 pages
Book Rating : 4.9/5 (47 download)

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Book Synopsis Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice by : Tobias Oberpaul

Download or read book Complex Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Impact of Compensation Design on Firm Performance, Turnover, and Organizational Justice written by Tobias Oberpaul and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2024-01-19 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Compensation contracts have become ever more complex and individualized, particularly in the executive compensation domain, where increasingly diverse stakeholder demands and governance requirements have led to the inclusion of more and increasingly interrelated components into compensation contracts. Even the compensation of lower-level employees has become complex as firms individualize employee compensation and use many different rewards simultaneously. Research has examined elements of compensation in isolation but has attempted to avoid the complexities of compensation. This dissertation examines the consequences of compensation complexity and compensation design dispersion and contributes to a better understanding of compensation and its consequences for firms and employees. The first study examines how the complexity of executive compensation contracts affects firm performance. It finds that CEO compensation complexity negatively affects accounting, market, and ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) metrics of firm performance and explores mechanisms that help explain the relationships. The second study examines the effect of compensation design dispersion within top management teams and its impact on executive turnover. The results show that compensation design dispersion affects executive turnover, both directly and in interaction with relative pay level. The third study addresses the role of compensation design dispersion in the development of procedural justice perceptions. Using two experiments, this study shows that compensation design dispersion causes lower procedural justice perceptions, which appears to be less problematic for participants with relatively easier to understand contracts. In summary, this dissertation provides a nuanced overview of complex compensation design and compensation design dispersion. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of compensation as an incentive and sorting tool for organizations, and of the implications of compensation design for the functioning of teams.

Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets

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Publisher : Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 13 : 1782549293
Total Pages : 259 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (825 download)

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Book Synopsis Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets by : Jay Cullen

Download or read book Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets written by Jay Cullen and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2014-10-23 with total page 259 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This important book discusses the issue of executive compensation in Anglo-American financial markets following the financial crisis. The book begins by contextualizing the problem facing financial institutions in the US and the UK and argues that appr

Essays on Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (654 download)

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Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives by :

Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and Managerial Incentives written by and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Dissertation Abstracts International

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 618 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis Dissertation Abstracts International by :

Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 618 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance

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Publisher : Elsevier
ISBN 13 : 0444635408
Total Pages : 762 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (446 download)

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Book Synopsis The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance by : Benjamin Hermalin

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

Summary of the Thesis: "Essays on Financial Stability and Corporate Finance"

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Author :
Publisher : Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN 13 : 8486116813
Total Pages : 32 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (861 download)

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Book Synopsis Summary of the Thesis: "Essays on Financial Stability and Corporate Finance" by : Mónica López-Puertas Lamy

Download or read book Summary of the Thesis: "Essays on Financial Stability and Corporate Finance" written by Mónica López-Puertas Lamy and published by Ed. Universidad de Cantabria. This book was released on 2014-01-20 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: El principal objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar los efectos que la estructura de propiedad bancaria tiene sobre la toma de riesgos, a nivel microeconómico y sobre el riesgo sistémico, a nivel macroeconómico. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de competencia oligopolística y se analizan las propiedades del equilibrio de mercado en términos de beneficios, cuota de mercado y micro y macro estabilidad financiera cuando un banco comercial, maximizador de beneficios, compite contra un banco no orientado hacia los beneficios (stakeholder bank). Los resultados teóricos son validados empíricamente usando datos bancarios de 72 países durante el periodo 1997-2007. Concretamente se muestra que a) los stakeholder banks son menos arriesgados que los bancos comerciales, b) cualquier banco es más arriesgado cuando compite contra un stakeholder bank en lugar de contra un banco comercial, c) a nivel sistémico la presencia de stakeholder banks aumenta la estabilidad financiera, d) el efecto de la regulación bancaria y de la competencia en la toma de riesgos depende de la estructura de propiedad del banco, e) la concentración accionarial incrementa el riesgo bancario, f) el diseño de los incentivos gerenciales tiene un efecto muy significativo sobre la toma de riesgos bancarios.

American Doctoral Dissertations

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 776 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (91 download)

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Book Synopsis American Doctoral Dissertations by :

Download or read book American Doctoral Dissertations written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 776 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Market or State

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Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 1316513963
Total Pages : 395 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (165 download)

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Book Synopsis Market or State by : Longjie Lu

Download or read book Market or State written by Longjie Lu and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2022-09-22 with total page 395 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comparative study providing insights into the regulations and practices of bankers' remuneration in the UK and China.

Incentive Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 288 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (21 download)

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Book Synopsis Incentive Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry by :

Download or read book Incentive Regulation in the Electric Utility Industry written by and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Essays on Corporate Risk Governance

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Publisher : Stanford University
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 185 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)

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Book Synopsis Essays on Corporate Risk Governance by : Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal Sanchez

Download or read book Essays on Corporate Risk Governance written by Mr. Gaizka Ormazabal Sanchez and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2011 with total page 185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation comprises three papers on the governance of corporate risk: 1. The first paper investigates the role of organizational structures aimed at monitoring corporate risk. Proponents of risk-related governance structures, such as risk committees or Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) programs, assert that risk monitoring adds value by ensuring that corporate risks are managed. An alternative view is that such governance structures are nothing more than window-dressing created in response to regulatory or public pressure. Consistent with the former view, I find that, in the period between 2000 and 2006, firms with more observable risk oversight structures exhibit lower equity and credit risk than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. I also provide evidence that firms with more observable risk oversight structures experienced higher returns during the worst days of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and were less susceptible to market fluctuations than firms with fewer or no observable risk oversight structures. Finally, I find that firms without observable risk oversight structures experienced higher abnormal returns to recent legislative events relating to risk management than firms with observable risk oversight structures. 2. The most common empirical measure of managerial risk-taking incentives is equity portfolio vega (Vega), which is measured as the dollar change in a manager's equity portfolio for a 0.01 change in the standard deviation of stock returns. However, Vega exhibits at least three undesirable features. First, Vega is expressed as a dollar change. This implicitly assumes that managers with identical Vega have the same incentives regardless of differences in their total equity and other wealth. Second, the small change in the standard deviation of returns used to calculate Vega (i.e., 0.01) yields a very local approximation of managerial risk-taking incentives. If an executive's expected payoff is highly nonlinear over the range of potential stock price and volatility outcomes, a local measure of incentives is unlikely to provide a valid assessment of managerial incentives. Third, Vega is measured as the partial derivative of the manager's equity portfolio with respect to return volatility. This computation does not consider that this partial derivative also varies with changes in stock price. The second paper develops and tests a new measure of managerial risk-taking equity incentives that adjusts for differences in managerial wealth, considers more global changes in price and volatility, and explicitly considers the impact of stock price and volatility changes. We find that our new measure exhibits higher explanatory power and is more robust to model specification than Vegafor explaining a wide range of measures of risk-taking behavior. 3. The third paper examines the relation between shareholder monitoring and managerial risk-taking incentives. We develop a stylized model to show that shareholder monitoring mitigates the effect of contractual risk-taking incentives on the manager's actions. Consistent with the model, we find empirically that the positive association between the CEO's contractual risk-taking incentives and risk-taking behavior decreases with the level of shareholder monitoring. Furthermore, consistent with the board anticipating and optimally responding to shareholder monitoring, boards of firms exposed to more intense monitoring design compensation contracts that provide higher incentives to take risks. Overall, our results suggest that, when evaluating risk-taking incentives provided by a compensation contract, it is important to account for the firm's monitoring environment.