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The Endogenous Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods
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Book Synopsis The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods by : David M. McEvoy
Download or read book The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods written by David M. McEvoy and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers by : Sang-Seung Yi
Download or read book Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers written by Sang-Seung Yi and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin 1995 , the Coalition Unanimity game of Bloch 1996 , and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra 1994.
Book Synopsis The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions by : Carlo Carraro
Download or read book The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions written by Carlo Carraro and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2003-01-01 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions by : Sang-Seung Yi
Download or read book Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions written by Sang-Seung Yi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper surveys the recent literature on the endogenous formation of economic coalitions, in particular, the partition function literature that allows for externalities across coalitions. Various economic coalitions are classified either as coalitions with positive externalities (output cartels, Ramp;D coalitions with spillovers, public-goods (environmental) coalitions, free-trade areas) or as coalitions with negative externalities (joint ventures with efficiency gains, customs unions). I review several games of coalition formation (the Single Coalition Formation game, the Open Membership game, the Exclusive Membership game, the Coalition Unanimity game, the Equilibrium Binding Agreements game) and examine equilibrium coalition structures in these games.
Book Synopsis A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by : Debraj Ray
Download or read book A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation written by Debraj Ray and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2007-11 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Book Synopsis On the Endogenous Formation of Coalitions by : Sergiu Hart
Download or read book On the Endogenous Formation of Coalitions written by Sergiu Hart and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Contributing Or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation by : Hideo Konishi
Download or read book Contributing Or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation written by Hideo Konishi and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effects by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effects written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Group Formation in Economics by : Gabrielle Demange
Download or read book Group Formation in Economics written by Gabrielle Demange and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2005-01-10 with total page 500 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Broad and diverse ranges of activities are conducted within and by organized groups of individuals, including political, economic and social activities. These activities have become a subject of intense interest in economics and game theory. Some of the topics investigated in this collection are models of networks of power and privilege, trade networks, co-authorship networks, buyer–seller networks with differentiated products, and networks of medical innovation and the adaptation of new information. Other topics are social norms on punctuality, clubs and the provision of club goods and public goods, research and development and collusive alliances among corporations, and international alliances and trading agreements. While relatively recent, the literature on game theoretic studies of group formation in economics is already vast. This volume provides an introduction to this important literature on game-theoretic treatments of situations with networks, clubs, and coalitions, including some applications.
Book Synopsis On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Goods by : Astrid Dannenberg
Download or read book On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Goods written by Astrid Dannenberg and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision by : Gary Charness
Download or read book Endogenous Group Formation and Public Goods Provision written by Gary Charness and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We test an assortative mechanism whereby groups are formed endogenously, through the use of voting. Once formed, groups play a public-goods game, where the social value of an incremental contribution to the group account increases with the size of the group. Societies of nine people are initially formed randomly into three groups of three people, with identification numbers, and play the game for three periods. Individuals then learn about the average contribution of each individual in one's current own group, as well as the average contribution in other groups, and can decide whether to exit the group. Remaining group members choose whether to exclude any current members from the group; the new groups then choose whether to merge with other existing groups. The exclusion/merge process takes place after every three periods; with 15 periods in one segment and another 15 periods in a second segment (with a re-start) with new identification numbers. We find a great degree of success for this mechanism. The average contribution rate to the group account (excluding the final three periods of a 15-period segment) is 90.2%. We see large and stable groups forming, promoting efficiency: Overall, after the first three periods of a segment, there is at least a 5-person group formed 96% of the time, with at least a 7-person group 66% of the time, and the nine-person grand coalition forming 27% of the time. After the re-start, these figures are even higher: at least a 6-person group formed 100% of the time, at least a 7-person group formed 79% of the time, with the nine-person grand coalition forming 43% of the time. Results from our control sessions indicate that this success is due to the voting mechanism.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Coalition Formation by : Lingling Zhang
Download or read book Endogenous Coalition Formation written by Lingling Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The aim of this dissertation is to study a class of endogenous coalition formation problems with externalities where each agent's payoff depends not only on the coalition he or she belongs to but also how others partition themselves. This dissertation contains both theoretical and application elements. At the theoretical front (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), two dynamic coalition formation games with endogenous choice of proposers are introduced. We prove that each game admits a dynamically efficient Markov perfect equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that the equilibrium payoff allocation of the game presented in Chapter 2 is unique." --
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Optimal Transfers when Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse by : Marco Rogna
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Optimal Transfers when Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse written by Marco Rogna and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Obtaining significant levels of cooperation in public good and environmental games, under the assumption of players being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of freeriding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be internally stable and this cause a serious underprovision of the public good together with a significant welfare loss. The assumption of relational preferences, capable of better explaining economic behaviors in laboratory experiments, helps to foster cooperation, but, without opportune transfers scheme, no substantial improvements are reached. The present paper proposes an optimal transfers scheme under the assumption of players having Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility functions, whose objective is to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of utilities of coalition members. The transfers scheme is tested on a public good contribution game parameterized on the data provided by the RICE model and benchmarked with other popular transfers scheme in environmental economics. The proposed scheme outperforms its benchmarking counterparts in stabilizing coalitions and sensibly increases cooperation compared to the absence of transfers. Furthermore, for high but not extreme values of the parameter governing the intensity of dis-utility from disadvantageous inequality, it manages to support very large coalitions including three quarters of all players.
Book Synopsis Economics of International Environmental Agreements by : M. Özgür Kayalıca
Download or read book Economics of International Environmental Agreements written by M. Özgür Kayalıca and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-02-17 with total page 271 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements. Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements. This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.
Book Synopsis The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict by : Michelle R. Garfinkel
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict written by Michelle R. Garfinkel and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2012-02-02 with total page 888 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Social scientists and policy makers have long been interested in the causes and consequences of peace and conflict. This Handbook brings together contributions from leading scholars who take an economic perspective to study the topic. It includes thirty-three chapters and is divided into five parts: Correlates of Peace and Conflict; Consequences and Costs of Conflict; On the Mechanics of Conflict; Conflict and Peace in Economic Context; and Pathways to Peace. Taken together, they demonstrate not only how the tools of economics can be fruitfully used to advance our understanding of conflict, but how explicitly incorporating conflict into economic analysis can add substantively to our understanding of observed economic phenomena. Some chapters are largely empirical, identifying correlates of war and peace and quantifying many of the costs of conflict. Others are more theoretical, exploring a variety of mechanisms that lead to war or are more conducive to peace.
Book Synopsis Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I by : Luis C. Corchón
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 567 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
