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The Effect Of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts On Analysts Access To Management And Survival
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Book Synopsis The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival by : Bin Ke
Download or read book The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival written by Bin Ke and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 63 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard-to-predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.
Book Synopsis Does Investor Sentiment Affect Sell-Side Analysts' Forecast Bias and Forecast Accuracy by : Beverly R. Walther
Download or read book Does Investor Sentiment Affect Sell-Side Analysts' Forecast Bias and Forecast Accuracy written by Beverly R. Walther and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the association between investor expectations and its components and sell-side analysts' short-run quarterly earnings forecast bias and forecast accuracy. To measure investor expectations, we use the Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) survey and decompose it into the “fundamental” component related to underlying economic factors (FUND) and the “sentiment” component unrelated to underlying economic factors (SENT). We find that analysts are the most optimistic and the least accurate when SENT is higher. Management long-horizon earnings forecasts attenuate the effects of SENT on forecast optimism and forecast accuracy. Analysts are also the most accurate when FUND is higher. Last, the market places more weight on unexpected earnings when SENT is high. These findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment and the market reacts more strongly to unexpected earnings when analyst forecasts are the least accurate. The last result potentially explains why prior research (for example, Baker and Wurgler 2006) finds an association between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.
Book Synopsis Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent Bias and Over/Underreaction in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by : Jeffery S. Abarbanell
Download or read book Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Reported Earnings in Explaining Apparent Bias and Over/Underreaction in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts written by Jeffery S. Abarbanell and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We demonstrate the role of three empirical properties of cross-sectional distributions of analysts' forecast errors in generating evidence pertinent to three important and heretofore separately analyzed phenomena studied in the analyst earnings forecast literature: purported bias (intentional or unintentional) in analysts' earnings forecasts, forecaster over/underreaction to information in prior realizations of economic variables, and positive serial correlation in analysts' forecast errors. The empirical properties of interest include: the existence of two statistically influential asymmetries found in the tail and the middle of typical forecast error distributions, the fact that a relatively small number of observations comprise these asymmetries and, the unusual character of the reported earnings benchmark used in the calculation of the forecast errors that fall into the two asymmetries that is associated with firm recognition of unexpected accruals. We discuss competing explanations for the presence of these properties of forecast error distributions and their implications for conclusions about analyst forecast rationality that are pertinent to researchers, regulators, and investors concerned with the incentives and judgments of analysts.Previously titled quot;Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Earnings Management in Explaining Apparent Optimism and Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings Forecastsquot.
Book Synopsis Analysts' Incentives and Systematic Forecast Bias by : Senyo Y. Tse
Download or read book Analysts' Incentives and Systematic Forecast Bias written by Senyo Y. Tse and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The likelihood that earnings announcements meet or beat analyst expectations differs substantially and systematically across firms. Prior research explores managers incentives to meet analyst expectations. In this paper, we examine analysts incentives to issue systematically biased earnings forecasts and thereby influence the likelihood that firms report good earnings news. We first document that forecast biases are systematically different, as large firms and firms with low forecast dispersion - labeled high-information firms - are more likely to report positive earning surprises, while small firms and firms with large forecast dispersion - labeled low-information firms - tend to have optimistically biased forecasts that often lead to negative earnings surprises. We also show that potential financing needs induce more optimistic forecasts for low-information firms, but this effect is greatly mitigated for high-information firms. We find that career concerns help explain analysts' systematic forecast bias. An analyst's career longevity is enhanced by issuing pessimistic forecasts for high-information firms and optimistic forecasts for low-information firms. Optimistic forecast bias for high-financing-need firms has no consequence for an analyst's career longevity, but optimistic bias for low-financing-need firms hurts. Our results suggest that career concerns contribute to a systematic pattern of forecasting that aligns with managerial preferences.
Book Synopsis A Theory of Analysts Forecast Bias by : Murugappa (Murgie) Krishnan
Download or read book A Theory of Analysts Forecast Bias written by Murugappa (Murgie) Krishnan and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we provide an equilibrium explanation for the observed optimism in analysts' earnings forecasts. Our analysis provides theoretical support to the widely held notion that analysts engage in earnings optimism to gain access to management's private information. We show that a strategic analyst, who is motivated by improving the combined accuracy of his forecasts, issues a biased initial forecast to extract information from management, but issues unbiased forecasts subsequently. The management, on the other hand, provides more access because this optimistic bias reduces the proprietary costs associated with disclosure at the margin. An important element of our model is the assumption that analysts also have private information relevant to assessing firm value. Despite rational expectations about analyst bias, analysts' private information cannot be fully unravelled by other agents due to the noise introduced by the diversity in analysts' incentives.
Book Synopsis Managerial Behavior and the Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by : Lawrence D. Brown
Download or read book Managerial Behavior and the Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts written by Lawrence D. Brown and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
Book Synopsis Do Managers Bias Their Forecasts of Future Earnings in Response to Their Firm's Current Earnings Announcement Surprises? by : Stephen P. Baginski
Download or read book Do Managers Bias Their Forecasts of Future Earnings in Response to Their Firm's Current Earnings Announcement Surprises? written by Stephen P. Baginski and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Approximately 90 percent of managers' earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with their firm's current earnings announcement - a practice referred to as the “bundling” of earnings information. We examine whether managers bias these forecasts conditional on the news conveyed in current earnings, and offer three findings. First, managers appear to release optimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released negative current earnings news. Second, managers appear to release pessimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released large positive current earnings news. Third, these results (especially for optimistic bias when current earnings news is negative) are stronger when managers: (1) face less analyst monitoring and lower litigation risk, which constrain the ability to bias their forecasts, and (2) face greater career concerns, which create incentives to alter investor perceptions about current earnings. Additional analysis suggests that investors are unable to identify the management forecast bias, but that they unravel the bias subsequently as it is revealed. While no archival study can ascertain management intent, we provide several results that cast doubt on the idea that this management forecast bias behavior is purely unintentional. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers issue biased forecasts with the earnings announcement to influence perceptions of their firm's current earnings news.
Book Synopsis Bias in European Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by : Stan Beckers
Download or read book Bias in European Analysts' Earnings Forecasts written by Stan Beckers and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Forecasting company earnings is a difficult and hazardous task. In an efficient market where analysts learn from past mistakes, there should be no persistent and systematic biases in consensus earnings accuracy. Previous research has already established how some (single) individual-company characteristics systematically influence forecast accuracy. So far, however, the effect on consensus earnings biases of a company's sector and country affiliation combined with a range of other fundamental characteristics has remained largely unexplored. Using data for 1993-2002, this article disentangles and quantifies for a broad universe of European stocks how the number of analysts following a stock, the dispersion of their forecasts, the volatility of earnings, the sector and country classification of the covered company, and its market capitalization influence the accuracy of the consensus earnings forecast.
Book Synopsis Earnings Predictability and Bias in Analysts? Earnings Forecasts by : Somnath Das
Download or read book Earnings Predictability and Bias in Analysts? Earnings Forecasts written by Somnath Das and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines cross-sectional differences in the optimistic behavior of financial analysts. Specifically, we investigate whether the predictive accuracy of past information (e.g., time-series of earnings, past returns, etc.) is associated with the magnitude of the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. We posit that there is higher demand for non-public information for firms whose earnings are difficult to accurately predict than for firms whose earnings can be accurately forecasted using public information. Assuming that optimism facilitates access to management's non-public information, we hypothesize that analysts will issue more optimistic forecasts for low predictability firms than for high predictability firms. Our results support this hypothesis.
Book Synopsis U.S. Analyst Regulation and the Earnings Forecast Bias Around the World by : Armen Hovakimian
Download or read book U.S. Analyst Regulation and the Earnings Forecast Bias Around the World written by Armen Hovakimian and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the spillover effects of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (or Global Settlement) on analysts' earnings forecasts in 40 developed and emerging markets. Prior to the Global Settlement, analysts generally made overly optimistic forecasts, this bias tending to be higher in countries with less investor protection. This forecast bias declined significantly after passage of the Global Settlement, the spillover effect being stronger for countries with lower investor protection. The spillover effect is also stronger for countries with a more significant presence of the analysts of the 12 banks directly involved in the Global Settlement.
Book Synopsis An Empirical Investigation of Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by : Hakan Saraoglu
Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts written by Hakan Saraoglu and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 318 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Ex Post Bias in Management Earnings Forecasts by : Afshad J. Irani
Download or read book Ex Post Bias in Management Earnings Forecasts written by Afshad J. Irani and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the effect of proprietary information, disclosure-related legal liability, earnings variability, financial distress, and external financing on bias in management earnings forecasts. Bias, specifically ex post bias (as is referred to in the management forecast literature), exists if the expected value of the observed management earnings forecasts differs from actual earnings. The effect of the test variables on ex post bias is investigated by examining whether a firm's forecast error (measure of ex post bias and defined as actual earnings minus management earnings forecast) is a function of the aforementioned variables. Proprietary information, disclosure-related legal liability, and earnings variability are hypothesized to be positively associated with ex post bias, while external financing and financial distress are expected to be negatively correlated. All the independent variables are measured using public information available at the time that the financial statements are released.Using a sample of 267 management earnings forecasts released during the period 1990-95 in the first three quarters of the fiscal year, I find that these forecasts are on average optimistic. Results from the multivariate regression analysis find that three of the five factors, proprietary information, financial distress and earnings variability, are significant in explaining ex post bias. For the most part, these findings are robust across various sub-samples.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Analyst Earnings Forecast by : Wenjuan Xie
Download or read book Three Essays on Analyst Earnings Forecast written by Wenjuan Xie and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis New Determinants of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Accuracy by : Tanja Klettke
Download or read book New Determinants of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Accuracy written by Tanja Klettke and published by Springer Science & Business. This book was released on 2014-04-28 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Financial analysts provide information in their research reports and thereby help forming expectations of a firm’s future business performance. Thus, it is essential to recognize analysts who provide the most precise forecasts and the accounting literature identifies characteristics that help finding the most accurate analysts. Tanja Klettke detects new relationships and identifies two new determinants of earnings forecast accuracy. These new determinants are an analyst’s “general forecast effort” and the “number of supplementary forecasts”. Within two comprehensive empirical investigations she proves these measures’ power to explain accuracy differences. Tanja Klettke’s research helps investors and researchers to identify more accurate earnings forecasts.
Book Synopsis Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by : Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag
Download or read book Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts written by Seung-Woog (Austin) Kwag and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If either economic incentives or psychological phenomena cause the bias in analysts' forecasts to persist long enough, it would be potentially discoverable and exploitable by investors. quot;Exploitationquot; in this context implies that investors, through examination of historical forecasting performance, can more or less reliably estimate the direction and extent of bias, and impute unbiased estimates for themselves, given analysts' forecasts. The absence of persistence in forecast errors would suggest that analysts' own behavior ultimately quot;self-correctsquot; within a time frame that eliminates the possibility that the patterns could be exploited by investors. We use two look-back methods that capture salient features of analysts' past forecasting behavior to form quintile portfolios that describe the range of analysts' forecasting behavior. Parametric and nonparametric tests are performed to determine whether the two portfolio formation methods provide predictive power with respect to subsequent forecast errors. The findings support a conclusion that analysts' behaviors in both optimistic and pessimistic extremes do not entirely self-correct, leaving open the possibility that investors may find historical forecast errors useful in making inferences about current forecasts.
Book Synopsis Advances in Behavioral Finance by : Richard H. Thaler
Download or read book Advances in Behavioral Finance written by Richard H. Thaler and published by Russell Sage Foundation. This book was released on 1993-08-19 with total page 628 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Modern financial markets offer the real world's best approximation to the idealized price auction market envisioned in economic theory. Nevertheless, as the increasingly exquisite and detailed financial data demonstrate, financial markets often fail to behave as they should if trading were truly dominated by the fully rational investors that populate financial theories. These markets anomalies have spawned a new approach to finance, one which as editor Richard Thaler puts it, "entertains the possibility that some agents in the economy behave less than fully rationally some of the time." Advances in Behavioral Finance collects together twenty-one recent articles that illustrate the power of this approach. These papers demonstrate how specific departures from fully rational decision making by individual market agents can provide explanations of otherwise puzzling market phenomena. To take several examples, Werner De Bondt and Thaler find an explanation for superior price performance of firms with poor recent earnings histories in the tendencies of investors to overreact to recent information. Richard Roll traces the negative effects of corporate takeovers on the stock prices of the acquiring firms to the overconfidence of managers, who fail to recognize the contributions of chance to their past successes. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny show how the difficulty of establishing a reliable reputation for correctly assessing the value of long term capital projects can lead investment analysis, and hence corporate managers, to focus myopically on short term returns. As a testing ground for assessing the empirical accuracy of behavioral theories, the successful studies in this landmark collection reach beyond the world of finance to suggest, very powerfully, the importance of pursuing behavioral approaches to other areas of economic life. Advances in Behavioral Finance is a solid beachhead for behavioral work in the financial arena and a clear promise of wider application for behavioral economics in the future.
Book Synopsis Financial Analysts and Information Processing on Financial Markets by : Jan-Philipp Matthewes
Download or read book Financial Analysts and Information Processing on Financial Markets written by Jan-Philipp Matthewes and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2015-01-28 with total page 185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Financial analysts play an ambivalent role on financial markets: On the one hand investors and the media frequently follow their advice, on the other hand they are regularly discredited when their forecasts or recommendations prove to be erroneous. This cumulative thesis explores the informational content of financial analysts’ forecasts for investors by addressing three specific topics: Consensus size as a rudimentary investment signal, the association of analysts’ target prices with business sentiment, and the consistency of analysts’ different investment signals in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, the thesis provides additional evidence that investors can profit from analysts’ forecasts and recommendations. However, it is also shown that investors need to be very selective about which signal to rely on and in which context to use these because analysts’ investment signals can also be heavily biased and erroneous. About the author: Jan-Philipp Matthewes studied ‘Economics’ at the University of Cologne, Germany, and holds a Dean’s Award from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. His research focus on financial analysts evolved while working in equity research at a leading German bank. The PhD-thesis was supervised by Prof. Dr. Martin Wallmeier, Finance and Accounting, at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. Since 2013 Jan-Philipp Matthewes is the managing director of the boutique private equity firm ‘Matthewes Capital Invest GmbH’.
