Author :
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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 13 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (61 download)
Book Synopsis Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I. by :
Download or read book Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I. written by and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 13 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: War, like Gaul, is divided into three parts. The 1982 edition of PM 100-5 introduced this three-part formulation to the Army, and the 1986 version builds upon the structure by defining strategy, operational art, and tactics as the "broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war." This separation is not, as it was in Caesar's case, merely for organizational convenience. It is, rather, a recognition that war is a complex business requiring coordination from the highest levels of policymaking to the basic levels of execution. Without such a division, as General Glenn K. Otis has pointed out, "We will talk by each other even as professionals." The intermediate or operational level is at the pivotal location in this structure. Simply put, the commander's basic mission at this level is to determine the sequence of actions most likely to produce the military conditions that will achieve the strategic goals (as shown in the diagram on the next page). The operational commander, in other words, must be constantly interacting with the strategic level even as he gauges his adversary and determines how to use tactical forces to accomplish that sequence of actions. It is this interaction that makes strategy the key to the operational level of war. The commanders and staff at this level must recognize, as Marcus Tullius Cicero did two millennia ago, that an "army is of little value in the field unless there are wise councils at home. On a more modern note, Germany's operational and tactical brilliance in World War II is often positively cited concerning the operational level of war. What is not so frequently noted is that this brilliance was no substitute for a sound and coherent strategy and that, in fact, Germany was defeated primarily because Hitler's strategic objectives far exceeded his military capabilities.