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Relational Contracts With And Between Agents
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Book Synopsis Relational Contracts with and Between Agents by : Tim Baldenius
Download or read book Relational Contracts with and Between Agents written by Tim Baldenius and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a dynamic multi-agent model with a verifiable team performance measure and non-verifiable individual measures. The optimal contract can be interpreted as an explicit contract that specifies a minimum bonus pool as a function of the verifiable measure and an implicit contract that gives the principal discretion to increase the size of the pool and to allocate it among the agents. To mitigate the threat of collusion, the optimal contract often converts any exogenous productive interdependence into strategic payoff independence for the agents. Under productive complements, an unconditional bonus pool (pay without performance) can be less costly than one conditioned on the verifiable team measure.
Book Synopsis Managing Relational Contracts by : Marta Troya-Martinez
Download or read book Managing Relational Contracts written by Marta Troya-Martinez and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet in a variety of organizations relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts differ from principal-agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager's commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incentivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce effort. We also analyze the principal's delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager.
Book Synopsis Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design by : Anja Schöttner
Download or read book Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design written by Anja Schöttner and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an additional task to an agent strengthens his relational contract. Therefore, broad task assignments are optimal when the performance measure strongly distorts incentives for the two-task job. This is more likely to be the case if these two tasks are substitutes.
Book Synopsis Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities by : Alexander F. Wagner
Download or read book Relational contracts when the agent's productivity inside the relationship is correlated with outside opportunities written by Alexander F. Wagner and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Agency Coordination of Private Action by : Karen Bradshaw
Download or read book Agency Coordination of Private Action written by Karen Bradshaw and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This symposium Article explores the previously overlooked role of relational contracting in forming and maintaining public-private partnerships. Relational contracting generally describes firms using formal but legally non-binding agreements to collaborate on shared objectives. Why do parties invest in forming elaborate contracts that they do not--and cannot--enforce in court? Contract theory suggests that the very act of contracting is relationship-building; it generates commitment, trust, cooperation, a win-win philosophy, and strengthened communication. Writing down goals and intentions allows parties to clarify expectations while maintaining flexibility for unforeseen conditions. This Article demonstrates that agencies also use relational contracting--creating unenforceable written agreements to build relationships with external actors.To shed light on agencies' use of relational contracting, this Article provides a novel review of the recovery planning process required by the Endangered Species Act. A surprising finding emerges: private groups are providing cru- cial resources and logistical support to prevent the extinction of endangered species. Tribes, states, nongovernmental organizations, and sportsmen's groups are providing necessary resources to further agency action. By orches- trating private action through recovery planning documents, the agency can garner the resources necessary to undertake species translocations, which it could not unilaterally facilitate. Although the plans are not judicially enforceable, they nevertheless play a coordinating and commitment-generating role in facilitating private actors to engage in recovery efforts. This example high-lights the broader trend of relational contracting building and formalizing re-lationships between agency and non-agency actors.Environmental impact statements, forest management plans, and recovery plans for endangered species are all examples of such “relational contracts” governing inter-agency and private-public collaborations. Viewed in this light, seemingly prosaic planning documents are, in fact, a crucial component in facilitating many agency collaborations. Descriptively, this account adds institutional detail to literatures on new governance and public-private partnerships. Normatively, it raises questions about whether the benefits of contracting offsets the potential distributional inequities and mechanisms to shroud government actions created by the practice.
Book Synopsis Relational Contracts with Multitask Jobs by : Bingyong Zheng
Download or read book Relational Contracts with Multitask Jobs written by Bingyong Zheng and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes a multitask Principal-Agent model in which the performance measures of some tasks are subjective and relational contract is needed for incentive provision. We find that rewarding the Agent based on a subjective measure that aggregates performance on multiple tasks can help ease the tension between motivating the Agent by offering a bonus and the Principal's temptation to renege on bonus payment, which helps reduce the threshold discount factor for relational contract to be self-enforcing. Consequently, when some dimensions of performance can not be objectively determined, it may be optimal not to use explicit contracts for incentive provision even if other dimensions of performance can be objectively measured and there is no cost of writing explicit contracts. We therefore offer a novel explanation to "excessively incomplete contracts" observed in practice.
Book Synopsis Supervising Relational Contracts by : Marta Troya Martinez
Download or read book Supervising Relational Contracts written by Marta Troya Martinez and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Relational contracts are often studied as being between a principal and agent, such as an employer and an employee. But what happens when the relationship is managed by a supervisor, such as a manager? We develop a theory of supervised relational contracts and show that relational side payments between the supervisor and agent change the equilibrium contract in important ways. First, side payments facilitate the supervisor's commitment, potentially enabling levels of effort the principal could not achieve directly. Second, more valuable relationships may sustain more collusion, and hence produce less effort. We also analyze how the principal should bound the supervisor's discretion, and show that the principal benefits from entrusting a relationship to a supervisor when relational contracts are difficult.
Book Synopsis Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening by : Giacomo Calzolari
Download or read book Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening written by Giacomo Calzolari and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Rôle of Relational Contracts in Common Agency Games by : Pedro Hemsley
Download or read book The Rôle of Relational Contracts in Common Agency Games written by Pedro Hemsley and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Demystifying the Chinese Miracle by : Wang Yongqin
Download or read book Demystifying the Chinese Miracle written by Wang Yongqin and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2013-07-31 with total page 157 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The last three decades has witnessed miraculous economic growth of China. What has accounted for its miracle? What is the nature and future of the Chinese model? Is it unique? This book presents an analytical framework to demystify China's economic growth miracle. The book suggests that interlinked and relational contracts between the agents (in particular, between the state and the business) can compensate for flawed markets to achieve high growth. This kind of relational capitalism is significant in the investment-based stage of development, when mobilization of resources to exploit the existing technologies is key for growth. The book presents a general theory of interlinked relational contract, the workhorse model of the book. The theory highlights that effective governance is a function of market extent and market completeness. The process of economic development and modernization can be looked at fruitfully from two perspectives: the markets and the institutions and their interactions. The book stresses the critical fit between the development stage and the governance for a country's economic transition and development and thus the idea of "appropriate institutions".
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Book Synopsis Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information by : Jonathan David Levin
Download or read book Relational Contracts, Incentives and Information written by Jonathan David Levin and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Relational Contracts by : Akifumi Ishihara
Download or read book Essays on Relational Contracts written by Akifumi Ishihara and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation contains three essays on self-enforcing implicit contracts in economic transactions and politics. Chapter 2 studies a repeated agency model with two tasks where the agent has private information on the first task and there is no verifiable performance signal for the second task. The equilibrium level of the first task is determined so as to guarantee the credibility of the relational contracts to provide incentives for the second task. It implies interesting economic results including non-monotonic relation between the discount factor and the total surplus, social desirability of unverifiability, and implications for organization design. Chapter 3 studies a model of political contribution of dynamic common agency where state-contingent agreements must be self-enforced. First, we investigate the punishment strategy for supporting the self-enforcing mechanism. The most severe punishment strategy on the principals takes the form of a two-phase scheme in general. Second, we characterize the payoff set of the equilibria on which the same decision is chosen by the agent through implicit agreements and examine whether it can achieve the same payoff as in the standard static menu auction model. It implies that there could be an equilibrium outcome in a static menu auction that cannot be supported in our model for any discount factor. Chapter 4 studies repeated political competition with policy-motivated citizen candidates. The dynamic relationship could cause strategic candidacy in two-candidate competition, such as in circumstances where two candidates stand for election and one of them has no chance to win. The candidate can choose her implementing policy depending on the set of the rival candidates in the election and the rival candidate actually has an incentive to stand even with no chance to win since it can induce policy compromises from the winning candidate.
Book Synopsis Engineering Societies in the Agents World V by : Marie-Pierre Gleizes
Download or read book Engineering Societies in the Agents World V written by Marie-Pierre Gleizes and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-07-08 with total page 360 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Engineering Societies in the Agents World, ESAW 2004, held in Toulouse, France, in October 2004. The 23 revised full papers presented together with an invited paper went through two rounds of reviewing and improvement and were carefully selected from 48 initial submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on roles, organizations, and institutions for agents; social issues in multi-agent systems; cooperation and collective behavior in agent societies; methodologies and platforms for agent-oriented engineering; agent-oriented simulation; and models for multi-agent systems.
Book Synopsis Teams in Relational Contracts by : Ola Kvaloy
Download or read book Teams in Relational Contracts written by Ola Kvaloy and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under different set of assumptions, and show that the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents' incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. We also show that more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's effort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.
Book Synopsis Sustaining Implicit Contracts When Agents Have Career Concerns by : Arijit Mukherjee
Download or read book Sustaining Implicit Contracts When Agents Have Career Concerns written by Arijit Mukherjee and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Firms often combine career concerns based incentives with incentives created through relational performance contracts. In this context, disclosure of worker's productivity information enhances career concerns based incentives, but may reduce the firm's ability to sustain relational contracts. The latter effect originates as upon reneging on the relational contract the firm can continue to rely on the career concerns based incentives. Thus, stronger is this incentive the larger is the punishment payoff of the firm. I consider an environment where a long-run firm faces a sequence of short-run workers, who can subsequently get raided (poached). The disclosure policy of the firm determines how much information about the worker's productivity it will share with the potential raiders. I provide a characterization of the optimal disclosure policy. When relational contracts substitutes career concern incentives, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cut-off rule where the more patient firms always opt for opaqueness. Also, the firm never combines the two forms of incentives when they are substitutes. Both of these results need not hold if the incentives are complements. I further show that in presence of firm specific matching gains, the set of discount factor that supports transparency is increasing in the size of the matching gain.
Book Synopsis Contracting in the New Economy by : David Frydlinger
Download or read book Contracting in the New Economy written by David Frydlinger and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 327 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Today’s business environment is constantly evolving, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and driven by digital transformation, globalization, and the need to creating value through innovation. These shifts demand that organizations view contracting through a different lens. Since it is impossible to predict every what-if scenario in a transactional contract, organizations in strategic and complex partnerships must shift to a mindset of shared goals and objectives built upon a strong foundation of transparency and trust, working together to mitigate risk much better than merely shifting risk to the weaker party. Contracting in the New Economy helps you to not only develop this mindset – but also offers the practical tools needed to embrace the social side of contracting, enabling your organization to harness the value creating potential of formal relational contracts. Briefly sharing the theoretical foundations that prove relational contracting works, it goes well beyond theory by providing powerful examples of relational contracting principles in practice. In addition, the authors provide a practical and proven approach for helping you to put relational contracting theory into practice for your own relationships. First by providing a framework for approaching any contracting situation and helping organizations finding the best contract model for each situation. And then by sharing five proven steps you can take to create an effective relational contract for you own strategic and complex business relationships. For anyone involved in developing contracts —lawyers, in-house counsels, contract managers, C-level managers, procurement officers, and so on — this book will empower you to create powerful cooperative alliances that will help you reach —and surpass — your business goals in today’s dynamic new environment.
