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Author : Ichiro Obara
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 121 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (244 download)
Download or read book Private Information in Repeated Games written by Ichiro Obara and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Massimiliano Amarante
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 118 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (438 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Private Information written by Massimiliano Amarante and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0198041217
Total Pages : 664 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (98 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author : Juan I. Block
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (93 download)
Download or read book Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games written by Juan I. Block and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert J. Aumann
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262011471
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (114 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author : Jean-François Mertens
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 110703020X
Total Pages : 597 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (7 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games written by Jean-François Mertens and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2015-02-09 with total page 597 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 40 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Olivier Compte
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 226 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Private Observations, Communication and Coordination in Repeated Games written by Olivier Compte and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Juan Block
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 34 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)
Download or read book Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games written by Juan Block and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's code-of-conduct, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information we are able to prove a “folk-like” theorem for repeated self-referential games with private information. This theorem holds even when both sources of information are weak.
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 250 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games with Private Monitoring written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 250 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games with incomplete information where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions and the map from actions to signal distributions is itself unknown. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the intersection of the maximal half spaces in various directions; we focus on the "cross-state" directions that consider payoffs in two or more states. We develop conditions under which the maximal half spaces in these directions impose no constraints on the equilibrium set, so that equilibrium play can be as if the players have learned the state. We use these conditions to provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0195300793
Total Pages : 664 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (953 download)
Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author : David Aaron Miller
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 158 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information written by David Aaron Miller and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : George J. Mailath
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 19 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (248 download)
Download or read book Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring written by George J. Mailath and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Drew Fudenberg
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 9812818464
Total Pages : 417 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (128 download)
Download or read book A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2009 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author : George J Mailath
Publisher : World Scientific
ISBN 13 : 9813239956
Total Pages : 364 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (132 download)
Download or read book Modeling Strategic Behavior: A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by George J Mailath and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2018-12-18 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.
Author : Nicolas Jacquemet
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Using Or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Nicolas Jacquemet and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage games share the same simple structure, but differ markedly on how information should be optimally used once they are repeated. Despite the complexity of the optimal strategies, the empirical value of information coincides with the theoretical prediction in most instances. In particular, it is never negative, it decreases with the number of repetitions, and it is nicely bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game and above by the value of the one-shot game. Subjects are unable to completely ignore their information when it is optimal to do so, but the use of information in the lab reacts qualitatively well to the type and length of the game being played.
