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On The Formation Of Coalitions To Provide Public Goods
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Book Synopsis On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods by : Astrid Dannenberg
Download or read book On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods written by Astrid Dannenberg and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the free-riding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached.
Book Synopsis The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods by : David M. McEvoy
Download or read book The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods written by David M. McEvoy and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.
Book Synopsis Voluntary public goods provision, coalition formation, and uncertainty by : Nicholas E. Burger
Download or read book Voluntary public goods provision, coalition formation, and uncertainty written by Nicholas E. Burger and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Group-Size Effect by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Group-Size Effect written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size effect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size effect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players' preferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. Moreover, a core allocation consists of connected coalitions.
Book Synopsis A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation by : Debraj Ray
Download or read book A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation written by Debraj Ray and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2007-11 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
Book Synopsis On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Goods by : Astrid Dannenberg
Download or read book On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Goods written by Astrid Dannenberg and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods by : Astrid Dannenberg
Download or read book Participation and Commitment in Voluntary Coalitions to Provide Public Goods written by Astrid Dannenberg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper reports experimental evidence on the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide a public good. Participation and commitment in a coalition are either exogenously imposed or endogenously determined by the players themselves. We find larger voluntary participation rates when commitments in the coalition are endogenously determined using a minimum contribution rule rather than exogenously determined. However, due to a trade-off between participation and commitment, coalitions with voluntary participation are less effective in facilitating cooperation compared to when all players are forced to participate. This paper therefore confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from coalition formation theories.
Book Synopsis Coalitions Improve Coordination and Provision of Public Goods by : Sheryl B. Ball
Download or read book Coalitions Improve Coordination and Provision of Public Goods written by Sheryl B. Ball and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a public goods game with heterogeneous agents who care about their own payoff as well as of the player who receives the lowest payoff. The weight on own payoff varies across players, and is private information. We first develop a theoretical model and then test the predictions of our model in a laboratory setting under different parameter conditions. In both our model and experiments, introducing a coalition formation stage prior to making a contribution decision enables sorting of players according to their preferences, resulting in higher contributions to the public good. Additionally, we find that participants in our experiment take previous period outcomes into account while making current period decisions. These results help explain successful coalitions, like international environmental agreements, that are effective in creating real world public goods like reductions in carbon emission.
Book Synopsis Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences by : Charles D. Kolstad
Download or read book Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences written by Charles D. Kolstad and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Why cooperation occurs when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's concern shifted to voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990's, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions to provide transboundary pollution abatement. The problem is that theory suggests fairly low (even zero) levels of contributions to the public good and high levels of free riding. Experiments and empirical evidence suggests higher levels of cooperation. This is a major reason for the emergence in the 1990's and more recently of the literature on other-regarding preferences (also known as social preferences). Such preferences tend to involve higher levels of cooperation (though not always). This paper contributes to the literature on coalitions, public good provision and other-regarding preferences. For standard preferences, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to investing in the public good must be greater than one for contributing to be individually rational. We find that Charness-Rabin preferences tend to reduce this threshold for individual contributions. We also find that Charness-Rabin preferences reduce the equilibrium size of a coalition of agents formed to provide the public good. In addition to theoretical results, some experimental implications of the theoretical model are provided. In contrast to much of the literature, we treat the wealth of agents as heterogeneous.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effect written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a well-defined solution that selects envy-free allocations from the core.
Book Synopsis Coalition and Communication in Public Goods Games with Punishment by : Stephan Hartl
Download or read book Coalition and Communication in Public Goods Games with Punishment written by Stephan Hartl and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Fairness has again become a topic of increased attention in today's world. In Economics, and especially in Behavioral Economics, public good games represent one of the major experimental research tools in this area. In this thesis, I look at coalition building, or lack thereof, in public goods games with punishment and different communication treatments, in order to identify the impact of coalition building on contributions in public goods games as well as formats of communication that foster or inhibit the formation of these coalitions. The experiment employs three different treatments. Firstly, a treatment that only allows punishment without any communication. This treatment is called NoChat. The other two treatments include chat based communication in addition to punishment. The CommonChat treatment uses one group chat for all members of a group. The third treatment has bilateral chats for the members of each group which allows for more secluded communication. This treatment is labeled BilateralChat. After a review of the existing literature on public goods games in general, with punishment and with communication as well as on coalition formation, I derive the hypotheses that firstly, groups with more observable coalition building will experience a positive effect on group cooperation and secondly, when using a treatment with a more secluded format of communication (BilateralChat) in the public goods experiment, more coalition building will occur than when using a more open format of communication (CommonChat). The concurrent data analysis, however, reveals that these hypotheses cannot be supported as declared. The first hypothesis has to be rejected outright, whereas the second hypothesis only holds with the restriction of being applicable to coalitions with the intent to punish a third party. From this analysis follows that despite the obvious presence of coalition formation in public goods games with communication, coalitio.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effects by : Fan-chin Kung
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Local Public Goods and Network Effects written by Fan-chin Kung and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions by : Carlo Carraro
Download or read book The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions written by Carlo Carraro and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2003-01-01 with total page 274 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.
Book Synopsis Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers by : Sang-Seung Yi
Download or read book Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers written by Sang-Seung Yi and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin 1995 , the Coalition Unanimity game of Bloch 1996 , and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra 1994.
Book Synopsis Coalition Formation with Optimal Transfers when Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse by : Marco Rogna
Download or read book Coalition Formation with Optimal Transfers when Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse written by Marco Rogna and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Obtaining significant levels of cooperation in public good and environmental games, under the assumption of players being purely selfish, is usually prevented by the problem of freeriding. Coalitions, in fact, generally fail to be internally stable and this cause a serious underprovision of the public good together with a significant welfare loss. The assumption of relational preferences, capable of better explaining economic behaviors in laboratory experiments, helps to foster cooperation, but, without opportune transfers scheme, no substantial improvements are reached. The present paper proposes an optimal transfers scheme under the assumption of players having Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility functions, whose objective is to guarantee internal stability and to maximize the sum of utilities of coalition members. The transfers scheme is tested on a public good contribution game parameterized on the data provided by the RICE model and benchmarked with other popular transfers scheme in environmental economics. The proposed scheme outperforms its benchmarking counterparts in stabilizing coalitions and sensibly increases cooperation compared to the absence of transfers. Furthermore, for high but not extreme values of the parameter governing the intensity of dis-utility from disadvantageous inequality, it manages to support very large coalitions including three quarters of all players.
Book Synopsis Strange Bedfellows by : Robin Phinney
Download or read book Strange Bedfellows written by Robin Phinney and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-06-09 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book develops a new theory of collaborative lobbying and influence to explain how antipoverty advocates gain influence in American social policymaking.
