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Author : Brett E. Katzman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (249 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Incomplete Information written by Brett E. Katzman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Edward J. Anderson
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (138 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.
Author : Vijay Krishna
Publisher : Academic Press
ISBN 13 : 012426297X
Total Pages : 319 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (242 download)
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002-03-13 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Author : Dirk Engelmann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Bidding Behavior in Multi-unit Auctions written by Dirk Engelmann and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (246 download)
Download or read book An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David McAdams
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (531 download)
Download or read book Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) nondecreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private. Keywords: Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Author : Markus Konrad Brunnermeier
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN 13 : 9780198296980
Total Pages : 264 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (969 download)
Download or read book Asset Pricing Under Asymmetric Information written by Markus Konrad Brunnermeier and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2001 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The role of information is central to the academic debate on finance. This book provides a detailed, current survey of theoretical research into the effect on stock prices of the distribution of information, comparing and contrasting major models. It examines theoretical models that explain bubbles, technical analysis, and herding behavior. It also provides rational explanations for stock market crashes. Analyzing the implications of asymmetries in information is crucial in this area. This book provides a useful survey for graduate students.
Author : Sander Onderstal
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book The Chopstick Auction written by Sander Onderstal and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We analyze the chopstick auction with incomplete information both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick auction is slightly less efficient but yields far more revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction.
Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (535 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions in which Almost Every Bid Wins written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Arupratan Daripa
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 260 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (328 download)
Download or read book Multiple Unit Auctions written by Arupratan Daripa and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Yasar N. Barut
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete Information written by Yasar N. Barut and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article examines the properties of independent-private-value all-pay and winner-pay auctions when there are multiple units sold. We study bidding behavior, efficiency, and revenue in a set of 23 experimental sessions. Our data show that the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auction are empirically revenue equivalent, though both yield higher revenue than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. Our evidence also suggests that the winner-pay auction is more likely to lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation than the all-pay auction.
Author : Michal Břeský
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788086288154
Total Pages : 48 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (881 download)
Download or read book Equilibria in multi-unit auctions written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 232 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (34 download)
Download or read book Multi-unit Auctions with Complementarities written by Wedad Jasmine Elmaghraby and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 232 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Michal Břeský
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9788073431778
Total Pages : 44 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (317 download)
Download or read book Pure Equilibrium Strategies in Multi-unit Auctions with Private Value Bidders written by Michal Břeský and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Robert Nau
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN 13 : 940171360X
Total Pages : 269 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (17 download)
Download or read book Economic and Environmental Risk and Uncertainty written by Robert Nau and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-04-17 with total page 269 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1980s and 1990s have been a period of exciting new developments in the modelling of decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Extensions of the theory of expected utility and alternative theories of `non-expected utility' have been devised to explain many puzzles and paradoxes of individual and collective choice behaviour. This volume presents some of the best recent work on the modelling of risk and uncertainty, with applications to problems in environmental policy, public health, economics and finance. Eighteen papers by distinguished economists, management scientists, and statisticians shed new light on phenomena such as the Allais and St. Petersburg paradoxes, the equity premium puzzle, the demand for insurance, the valuation of public health and safety, and environmental goods. Audience: This work will be of interest to economists, management scientists, risk and policy analysts, and others who study risky decision-making in economic and environmental contexts.
Author : R. Mark Isaac
Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9781559386074
Total Pages : 310 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (86 download)
Download or read book Research in Experimental Economics written by R. Mark Isaac and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 310 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Lawrence Marc Ausubel
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (377 download)
Download or read book Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-unit Auctions written by Lawrence Marc Ausubel and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
