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Moral Hazard And Limited Liability
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Book Synopsis Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation by : Susanne Ohlendorf
Download or read book Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation written by Susanne Ohlendorf and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Limited Liability and Moral Hazard Implications by : Marie-Laure Djelic
Download or read book Limited Liability and Moral Hazard Implications written by Marie-Laure Djelic and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The principle of limited liability is one of the defining characteristics of modern corporate capitalism. It is also, we argue in this paper, a powerful structural source of moral hazard. Engaging in a double conceptual genealogy, we investigate how the concepts of moral hazard and limited liability were created and diffused over time. We highlight two very similar but parallel paths of emergence, moral contestation and eventual institutionalization, and outline how the two notions have become connected through time, showing clear elective affinities between both concepts and their respective evolution. Going one step further, we suggest that both concepts have come to be connected through time. In the context of contemporary capitalism, limited liability has to be understood, we argue, as a powerful structural source of moral hazard. In conclusion, we propose that this structural link between limited liability and moral hazard is an important explanatory factor of the recent financial crisis and a seemingly intractable characteristic of modern corporate capitalism.
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Market for Loans by : Anindya Banerjee
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Market for Loans written by Anindya Banerjee and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard and Limited Liability by : Rohan Pitchford
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Limited Liability written by Rohan Pitchford and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Repeated Moral Hazard Under Limited Liability by : Jürgen Bierbaum
Download or read book Repeated Moral Hazard Under Limited Liability written by Jürgen Bierbaum and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the incentives that arise in a two-period agency relationship with moral hazard when agents are subject to limited liability. Since the existence of limited liability creates rent the principal can motivate an agent by credibly threatening him to be fired. It is shown that a combination of a two-period contract, where the agent is fired after period one in case of poor performance and retained otherwise, and a one-period contract optimally implements high effort. In particular, this combination is strictly better than a two-period contract, where the agent is retained in period two for sure. Moreover, there is a combination of one-period contracts that is equivalent to the optimal combination. While the second-period contract is the same as the optimal contract in the static model, the first-period contract pays a lower bonus in case of success. In an extension of the model "learning by doing" is considered. It turns out that the ranking of contracts is reversed if the increase in revenues due to "learning by doing" is sufficiently strong. In addition, a commitment problem arises which makes short-term contracting strictly worse than long-term contracting.
Book Synopsis Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation by : Susanne Ohlendorf
Download or read book Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation written by Susanne Ohlendorf and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-agent Problem by :
Download or read book Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-agent Problem written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity by : Steven M. Matthews
Download or read book Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity written by Steven M. Matthews and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard, Limited Liability and the Corporation Tax by : Anindya Banerjee
Download or read book Moral Hazard, Limited Liability and the Corporation Tax written by Anindya Banerjee and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Moral Hazard with Limited Liability by : Wenbin Wang
Download or read book Moral Hazard with Limited Liability written by Wenbin Wang and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the optimal contract for a risk-neutral agency with limited liability. We introduce a novel formulation of the model, in which the contract design problem reduces to a problem of constructing the distribution function of a random variable. This formulation directly balances the principal's tradeoff between incentivizing the agent to exert proper effort and minimizing the cost of the agent's compensation. We show that the optimal contract may involve one or two tiers of performance-based bonuses. We obtain new sufficient conditions for the optimality of bonus contracts and provide new insights into the choice of contract parameters.
Book Synopsis The 'moral Hazard' of Limited Liability Corporate Groups and Involuntary Creditors by : Jasper Kjar-Cruttenden
Download or read book The 'moral Hazard' of Limited Liability Corporate Groups and Involuntary Creditors written by Jasper Kjar-Cruttenden and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Moral Hazard of Managers' Decisions by : Michael Teit Nielsen
Download or read book The Moral Hazard of Managers' Decisions written by Michael Teit Nielsen and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis "Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity" by : Steven A. Matthews
Download or read book "Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity" written by Steven A. Matthews and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Price of Unobservability by : Felipe Balmaceda
Download or read book The Price of Unobservability written by Felipe Balmaceda and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The paper provides insights on how costly moral hazard and limited liability could be from the social point of view.
Book Synopsis Internet and Network Economics by : Amin Saberi
Download or read book Internet and Network Economics written by Amin Saberi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2010-12-06 with total page 590 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010, held in Stanford, USA, in December 2010. The 52 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 95 submissions. The papers are organized in 33 regular papers and 19 short papers.
Book Synopsis Optimal Labor Contracts with Moral Hazard and Limited Liability by : Jeff Borland
Download or read book Optimal Labor Contracts with Moral Hazard and Limited Liability written by Jeff Borland and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Environmental Accidents Under Moral Hazard and Limited Firm Liability by : Jon Strand
Download or read book Environmental Accidents Under Moral Hazard and Limited Firm Liability written by Jon Strand and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: