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Money Back Contracts With Double Moral Hazard
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Book Synopsis Money-back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard by : Duncan P. Mann
Download or read book Money-back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard written by Duncan P. Mann and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Double Moral Hazard, Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts by : Pradeep Agrawal
Download or read book Double Moral Hazard, Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts written by Pradeep Agrawal and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-hazard by : Sonku Kim
Download or read book Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-hazard written by Sonku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard by : Son-Ku Kim
Download or read book Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard written by Son-Ku Kim and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is risk-averse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-neutral. We find that the agent's optimal incentive scheme in this case is unique and non-linear, but less sensitive to output than would be designed under a single moral-hazard. We also find that the linear contract is not robust in the sense that the above unique and non-linear contract does not approach the linear contract as the agent's risk-aversion approaches zero.
Book Synopsis Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements by : Joel S. Demski
Download or read book Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements written by Joel S. Demski and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 13 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts by : Sugato Bhattacharyya
Download or read book Double-sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts written by Sugato Bhattacharyya and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Optimal Financial Contracts in Leveraged Buy Out by : Ouidad Yousfi
Download or read book Optimal Financial Contracts in Leveraged Buy Out written by Ouidad Yousfi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a double moral hazard model with three agents: the entrepreneur, the LBO fund and the bank. The entrepreneur and the LBO fund have to exert efforts in order to improve the productivity of their project; efforts are not observable. We show that the bank's payments decrease with the outcome of the project. When the project is not very risky, the entrepreneur and the LBO fund exert first best efforts and they get equal shares of the project's outcome. When it is highly risky, debt gives high powered incentives to the two agents to provide efforts but it still not sufficient to induce them to provide the first best efforts. However, these efforts are more efficient than those that could be provided if the entrepreneur asks the LBO fund for advice and money. Moreover, when the entrepreneur asks for advice from a consultant and for money from a bank, they get equal shares whether the project is very risky or not. When the project is lowly risky, the identity of the advisor (consultant/ LBO fund) is irrelevant. When it is highly risky, the optimal financial structure of capital depends on the impact of their efforts on the performance of the project.
Book Synopsis Contract Law and Economics by : Gerrit de Geest
Download or read book Contract Law and Economics written by Gerrit de Geest and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2010-10 with total page 497 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique and timely book offers an up-to-date, clear and comprehensive review of the economic literature on contract law. The topical chapters written by leading international scholars include: precontractual liability, misrepresentation, duress, gratuitous promises, gifts, standard form contracts, interpretation, contract remedies, penalty clauses, impracticability and foreseeability. Option contracts, warranties, long-term contracts, marriage contracts, franchise contracts, quasi-contracts, behavioral approaches, and civil contract law are also discussed. This excellent resource on contract law and economics will be particularly suited to contract law scholars, law teachers, policy makers, and judges. For experts in and practitioners of contract law this will be a key book to buy.
Book Synopsis Double Moral Hazard and Relational Contract by : Cosmos Adjei
Download or read book Double Moral Hazard and Relational Contract written by Cosmos Adjei and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing by : Scott Dacko
Download or read book The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing written by Scott Dacko and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2008 with total page 660 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced dictionary of marketing focuses on leading-edge terminology for use by people who are serious about the theory and practice of marketing. With over 1,000 entries ranging in length and depth, it is the ideal reference guide for researchers, directors, managers, and anyone studying marketing for a professional or academic qualification.
Book Synopsis Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation by : Hiroshi Osano
Download or read book Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation written by Hiroshi Osano and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium leads to an allocation that is superior to the second-best allocation of the standard double moral hazard model without renegotiation. The result of this paper gives some reasons for the existence of intermediary organizations such as holding companies, law houses, consulting firms, investment banks or venture capital. The result can also provide the rationalization for a fund set up by a group of firms of the industry in which their product is legally required to be recyclable.
Book Synopsis Price and "money Back Guarantees" as Signals of Product Quality by : Shiou Shieh
Download or read book Price and "money Back Guarantees" as Signals of Product Quality written by Shiou Shieh and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Organization Theory and its Applications by : Susheng Wang
Download or read book Organization Theory and its Applications written by Susheng Wang and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2012-12-20 with total page 220 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Organization theory is a fast developing field of microeconomics. Organizational approaches are now used in a wide range of topics in business studies. They are based on information economics, contract theory and mechanism design. This book introduces such organizational approaches and how to adopt them as business applications. The book presents the theory in the first two chapters and proceeds to cover the applications of the theory in the later three chapters. The theory lays the foundation and the applications illustrate how the theory can be used in a wide range of business problems. The book covers many concepts and ideas in organization theory, including complete contracts, incomplete contracts, allocation of control rights, option contracts, convertibles, and joint ventures concisely. It will be of use to third year undergraduates and above, Master’s and Ph.D levels for students in business schools.
Book Synopsis Optimal Share Contracts with Moral Hazard on Effort and in Output Reporting by : Alain de Janvry
Download or read book Optimal Share Contracts with Moral Hazard on Effort and in Output Reporting written by Alain de Janvry and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We explore in this paper the design of optimal share contracts when there is a double moral hazard, one on inputs exclusively provided by the agent (such as effort) and the other in reporting the level of output to be shared with the principal, and when there is a social efficiency cost to under-reporting. The optimal contract is second best in that it allows for residual moral hazard in both effort and output reporting. The model predicts that contract terms will vary with the value to the tenant of unreported output as well as with any capacity of the principal to directly supervise the agent. The model is written for a landlord-tenant share contract but applies as well for tax collection and franchising.
Book Synopsis Preference for Short-term Contracts with the Incentive to Learn by : Zhigang Tao
Download or read book Preference for Short-term Contracts with the Incentive to Learn written by Zhigang Tao and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Product Warranty Handbook by : Wallace Blischke
Download or read book Product Warranty Handbook written by Wallace Blischke and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 1995-11-03 with total page 958 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Covering product warranties, this work offers comprehensive examinations of fundamental concepts and furnishes detailed, immediately applicable results. It sets out to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and integrates the research of various disciplines that study warranty, illustrating all basic consumer warranty options.
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-22 with total page 699 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.