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Institutions Contracts And Organizations
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Book Synopsis Institutions, Contracts, and Organizations by : Claude Ménard
Download or read book Institutions, Contracts, and Organizations written by Claude Ménard and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2000 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A presentation of contributions from some of the world's leading economists, including Ronald Coase and Douglass North. It demonstrates the extent and depth of the New Institutional Economics research programme with special emphasis on the interaction between institutional factors.
Book Synopsis Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics by : W. Bentley MacLeod
Download or read book Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics written by W. Bentley MacLeod and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-04-05 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Book Synopsis The Economic Intstitutions of Capitalism by : Oliver E. Williamson
Download or read book The Economic Intstitutions of Capitalism written by Oliver E. Williamson and published by Simon and Schuster. This book was released on 1985 with total page 473 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This long-awaited sequel to the modem classic "Markets and Hierarchies" develops and extends Williamson's innovative use of transaction cost economics as an approach to studying economic organization by applying it to work and labor as well as the corporation itself. In addition, Williamson explores its growing implications for public policy, including its potential influence on antitrust and merger guidelines, labor policy, and SEC and public utility regulations.
Book Synopsis The Economics of Contracts by : Eric Brousseau
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2002-10-17 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Book Synopsis Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics by : W. Bentley MacLeod
Download or read book Advanced Microeconomics for Contract, Institutional, and Organizational Economics written by W. Bentley MacLeod and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-04-05 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Book Synopsis The Economic Institutions of Capitalism by : Oliver E. Williamson
Download or read book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism written by Oliver E. Williamson and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study is based on the belief that economic organization is shaped by transaction cost economizing decisions. It sets out the basic principles of transaction cost economics, applies the basic arguments to economic institutions, and develops public policy implications. Any issue that arises, or can be recast as a matter of contracting, is usefully examined in terms of transaction costs. Transaction cost economics maintains that governance of contractual relations is mainly achieved through institutions of private ordering instead of legal centralism. This approach is based on behavioral assumptions of bounded rationalism and opportunism, which reflect actual human nature. These assumptions underlie the problem of economic organization: to create contract and governance structures that economize on bounded rationality while safeguarding transactions against the hazards of opportunism. The book first summarizes the transaction cost economics approach to the study of economic organization. It develops the underlying behavioral assumptions and the types of transactions; alternative approaches to the world of contracts are presented. Assuming that firms are best regarded as a governance structure, a comparative institutional approach to the governance of contractual relations is set out. The evidence, theory, and policy of vertical integration are discussed, on the basis that the decision to integrate is paradigmatic to transaction cost analysis. The incentives and bureaucratic limits of internal organization are presented, including the dilemma of why a large firm can't do everything a collection of small firms can do. The economics of organization in presented in terms of transaction costs, showing that hierarchy also serves efficiency and permits a variety of predictions about the organization of work. Efficient labor organization is explored; on the assumption that an authority relation prevails between workers and managers, what governance structure supports will be made in response to various types of job attributes are discussed, and implications for union organization are developed. Considering antitrust ramifications of transaction cost economics, the book summarizes transaction cost issues that arise in the context of contracting, merger, and strategic behavior, and challenges earlier antitrust preoccupation with monopoly. (TNM).
Book Synopsis Advanced Introduction to New Institutional Economics by : Ménard, Claude
Download or read book Advanced Introduction to New Institutional Economics written by Ménard, Claude and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2022-01-14 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New institutional economics (NIE) is a powerful tool for understanding real world phenomena. This Advanced Introduction explores NIE’s answers to fundamental questions about the organization, growth and development of economies, such as why are some countries rich and others poor? Why are activities organized as firms or markets or through alternative organizational solutions? When are shared resources overexploited?
Book Synopsis Organizational Learning Contracts by : Paul S. Goodman
Download or read book Organizational Learning Contracts written by Paul S. Goodman and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2011-04-29 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book addresses a new concept, the organizational learning contract, a shared agreement among the faculty, staff, and students in an educational institution about what, how, where, and when learning should take place. Goodman, who has pioneered the concept in his work with new and traditional institutions, examines the consequences of strong and weak contracts while bridging theory with practice. In the first section, Goodman develops the concept of the organizational learning contract, builds measures, and looks at the consequences of strong versus weak contracts on student and institutional effectiveness indicators. The second section, which includes the perspectives of two leaders of start-up institutions who have created new organizational contracts, explores issues of design and change in introducing the concept into new and existing institutions.
Book Synopsis The Mechanisms of Governance by : Oliver E. Williamson
Download or read book The Mechanisms of Governance written by Oliver E. Williamson and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1996-02-29 with total page 446 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field in which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.
Book Synopsis What We Owe Each Other by : Minouche Shafik
Download or read book What We Owe Each Other written by Minouche Shafik and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2022-08-23 with total page 256 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From one of the leading policy experts of our time, an urgent rethinking of how we can better support each other to thrive Whether we realize it or not, all of us participate in the social contract every day through mutual obligations among our family, community, place of work, and fellow citizens. Caring for others, paying taxes, and benefiting from public services define the social contract that supports and binds us together as a society. Today, however, our social contract has been broken by changing gender roles, technology, new models of work, aging, and the perils of climate change. Minouche Shafik takes us through stages of life we all experience—raising children, getting educated, falling ill, working, growing old—and shows how a reordering of our societies is possible. Drawing on evidence and examples from around the world, she shows how every country can provide citizens with the basics to have a decent life and be able to contribute to society. But we owe each other more than this. A more generous and inclusive society would also share more risks collectively and ask everyone to contribute for as long as they can so that everyone can fulfill their potential. What We Owe Each Other identifies the key elements of a better social contract that recognizes our interdependencies, supports and invests more in each other, and expects more of individuals in return. Powerful, hopeful, and thought-provoking, What We Owe Each Other provides practical solutions to current challenges and demonstrates how we can build a better society—together.
Book Synopsis Institutional and Organizational Analysis by : Eric Alston
Download or read book Institutional and Organizational Analysis written by Eric Alston and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-08-23 with total page 409 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why isn't the whole world developed? This toolkit for institutional analysis explains how rules affect the performance of countries, firms, and even families.
Book Synopsis Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance by : Douglass C. North
Download or read book Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance written by Douglass C. North and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1990-10-26 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
Book Synopsis Institutional Economics and Economic Organisation Theory by : L. H. G. Slangen
Download or read book Institutional Economics and Economic Organisation Theory written by L. H. G. Slangen and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 434 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This publication presents one of the first attempts to integrate two emerging bodies of economic research: institutional economics and organizational theory. It begins within the framework of neoclassical economics, and then extends the boundaries of this framework to offer answers to questions that have so far remained puzzles in neoclassical economics. The integrated approach of this publication also challenges the dominant paradigm in economics over the last 15 years that views the market as the best mechanism for carrying out transactions. The market is not the only transaction mechanism; other modes of organization are also important. However, this way of thinking does not involve a simple reintroduction of the confrontation between the ¿government¿ and the ¿market¿. On the contrary, the integrated approach tries to open the ¿blackbox¿ of the role of institutions in daily life and the diversity of modes of organization. Through this integrated approach, the book hopes to contribute to a better insight to real world problems. Dr. Louis H.G. Slangen is Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy at Wageningen University. His teaching, research and supervising MSc and PhD theses are in the field of resource economics, economics of land-use, new institutional economics and economic organisation theory. His publication record consists of about 30 articles in refereed journals, 15 chapters in books, and 10 books. He has a long and extensive experience in various types of research projects for various Dutch Ministries and the European Union. Dr. Laura A. Loucks is Senior Researcher and Lecturer in Institutional Economics and Organization Theory at Wageningen University. Her research focuses on new and emerging institutions for sustainable fisheries management. She has been a consultant to the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans as well as the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. Her research on fisheries co-management agreements has been published in several books and in Marine Policy, one of the leading journals on marine management issues. Dr. Arjen H.L. Slangen has been Assistant Professor of International Business at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, and is currently Assistant Professor of International Strategy at the University of Amsterdam. His research examines how national institutional environments influence the foreign entry strategies and performance of multinational enterprises. He has published in leading international business and management journals such as the Journal of International Business Studies and the Journal of Management Studies.
Book Synopsis The International Library of the New Institutional Economics by : Claude Ménard
Download or read book The International Library of the New Institutional Economics written by Claude Ménard and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 4280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'To those wishing to learn about the New Institutional Economics, this comprehensive collection of articles will be extremely valuable, exhibiting, as it does, the New Institutional Economics in all its variety. to those wishing to contribute to the New Institutional Economics, it will be an indispensable reference source.' - Ronald H. Coase, University of Chicago Law School, US 'These volumes disclose and develop the richness and importance of the New Institutional Economics - in conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and public policy respects. These timely volumes will be widely used by present students of the NIE and by social scientists and public policy analysts more generally.' - Oliver E. Williamson, University of California, Berkeley, US
Book Synopsis The Nature of the Firm by : Oliver E. Williamson
Download or read book The Nature of the Firm written by Oliver E. Williamson and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1993 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume features a series of essays which arose from a conference on economics, addressing the question: what is the nature of the firm in economic analysis? This paperback edition includes the Nobel Lecture of R.N. Case.
Book Synopsis Institutions and Economic Theory by : Eirik G. Furubotn
Download or read book Institutions and Economic Theory written by Eirik G. Furubotn and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 2010-10-22 with total page 150 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second edition assesses some of the major refinements, extensions, and useful applications that have developed in neoinstitutionalist thought in recent years. More attention is given to the overlap between the New Institutional Economics and developments in economic history and political science. In addition to updated references, new material includes analysis of parallel developments in the field of economic sociology and its attacks on representatives of the NIE as well as an explanation of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-game approach. Already an international best seller, Institutions and Economic Theory is essential reading for economists and students attracted to the NIE approach. Scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. A useful glossary for students is included. Eirik Furubotn is Honorary Professor of Economics, Co-Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany and Research Fellow, Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University. Rudolph Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany.
Book Synopsis Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure by : Oliver Hart
Download or read book Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure written by Oliver Hart and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
