Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
How Has Ceo Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards And Increasingly Uneasy Ceos
Download How Has Ceo Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards And Increasingly Uneasy Ceos full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online How Has Ceo Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards And Increasingly Uneasy Ceos ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Book Synopsis How Has CEO Turnover Changed? by : Steven N. Kaplan
Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed? written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.
Book Synopsis How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS. by : Steven N. Kaplan
Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS. written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.
Book Synopsis How Has Ceo Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy Ceos by :
Download or read book How Has Ceo Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy Ceos written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis How Has CEO Turnover Changed ? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly CEOs by : Steven N. Kaplan
Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed ? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly CEOs written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis CEO Compensation and Turnover by : Eliezer M. Fich
Download or read book CEO Compensation and Turnover written by Eliezer M. Fich and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent wave of revelations involving corporate governance problems has created significant interest in the relationships between chief executive officers (CEOs) and their boards of directors. In this paper we focus on one important but previously uninvestigated characteristic of boards: the tendency of many boards to have two (or more) directors who are also members of another company's board. We define this relationship as a mutual interlock. We explore the consequences of this phenomenon for CEO compensation and CEO turnover.Our empirical analyses - conducted for a sample of 366 large companies, in which 87% of the companies have at least one mutual interlock - show that CEO compensation tends to be higher and CEO turnover tends to be lower when the CEO's board has one or more pairs of board members who are mutually interlocked with another company's board. There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of and a contributor to CEO entrenchment, and the higher compensation and lower turnover follow from this entrenchment. The other is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of the strengthening of an important and valuable strategic alliance for the company, and the higher CEO compensation and lower turnover are the CEO's reward for arranging the alliance. We believe that the first interpretation is more accurate, for the reasons discussed in the paper.
Book Synopsis CEO Entrenchment Versus Boards of Directors by : James Markham
Download or read book CEO Entrenchment Versus Boards of Directors written by James Markham and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporations are the most important business form in the modern economy accounting for the vast preponderance of value added. Consequently, how well they function substantially determines how well the economy functions. Corporations are governed both by formal legal rules and by market pressures coming from product, labor, and capital markets, including the market for corporate control. In both legal and economic theory, shareholder interests should be foremost in corporate governance, meaning that the directors and managers of a corporation should always act in the shareholders' best interests. Economists justify this paramount consideration of shareholders' interests by citing the shareholders' status as the residual claimants to the corporation's profits. Economic theory and research also tell us that shareholders will be interested in very little other than stock returns. Thus, we would expect that, if directors of corporations make their decisions to retain or replace the corporation's CEO according to the best interests of shareholders, the performance of the corporation should be a critical factor and little else should matter. Using a sample that is larger (nearly 10,000 observations) and more recent (1999-2006) than in previously published work, I study board decisions to retain or replace CEOs ("CEO turnover"). I find such decisions are based on both accounting and stock return results and depend critically upon how the directors and the CEO respectively control company stock. Greater CEO control discourages turnover while greater control among directors other than the CEO relates directly to turnover. In addition, among poorly-performing firms in general and among poorly-performing firms with CEOs below normal retirement age, the presence on the board of employees other than the CEO, the CEO serving as chairman, and large board size all appear to entrench the CEO vis-à-vis the board. Classified boards (i.e.-those with staggered election terms among directors), board independence, independence of the nominating committee, and the presence of outside blockholders do not matter to turnover. All of these results apply even among the subset of CEOs who are below normal retirement age.
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Turnover by : Johan Maharjan
Download or read book Essays on Executive Turnover written by Johan Maharjan and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 182 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Chapter 1 deviates from the conventional practice by highlighting an alternative to forced CEO turnover. An interesting puzzle in corporate finance is the week sensitivity of disciplinary action against CEO to poor firm performance. I show that this weak relation is in part driven by an overlooked alternative to firing, which in practice takes the form of splitting the CEO-Chairman role or demoting the incumbent CEO to the executive Chairman position. I first document that such demotions are a frequently used alternative disciplinary mechanism, accounting for nearly 40% of all involuntary CEO transitions. I further show that the use of this mechanism is concentrated among firms in which the CEO is most entrenched or the cost of firing its CEO is high, i.e. CEOs with firm or industry-specific managerial skills and those with strong long-term performance and weak governance. Market reactions to CEO demotions are positive, on average. Finally, I show that classifying CEO demotions as an alternative form of involuntary turnover magnifies the sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm performance and eliminates the relation between performance and voluntary turnover. In chapter 2, we examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect to be causal. CEOs with longer pay Duration are also less likely to experience a forced turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower in firms that offer longer duration pay. Overall, our study highlights a strong link between compensation design and turnover for top executives. Finally, in chapter 3, we develop and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on the optimal course of corporate actions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms, and thus create incentives for firms to replace CEOs who investors tend to disagree with. We use this logic to develop and provide evidence for three hypotheses. First, firms with higher investor-management disagreement are more likely to fire their CEOs, and this effect is more pronounced in more-financially-constrained firms as well as those with less-entrenched CEOs and stronger shareholder governance. Second, firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if investor-management disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Third, investor-management disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Thus, the evidence sheds new light on how disagreement between management and investors shapes one important aspect of corporate governance--the replacement of CEOs.
Book Synopsis Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation by : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services
Download or read book Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis CEO Turnover in LBOs by : Francesca Cornelli
Download or read book CEO Turnover in LBOs written by Francesca Cornelli and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the CEO turnover in LBOs backed by private equity funds. When a company is taken private, we find that the CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on performance. We also find that a higher involvement of the LBO sponsors, who replace the outside directors on the board after transition to private, reduces the CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance, but improves the operating performance. These findings suggest that more inside information and effective monitoring allow private equity funds to assess CEOs' performance over a longer horizon relative to their publicly-traded counterparts.
Book Synopsis Entrenchment and Changes in Performance Following CEO Turnover by : Cristian L. Dezso
Download or read book Entrenchment and Changes in Performance Following CEO Turnover written by Cristian L. Dezso and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether CEO turnovers - forced, as well as voluntary - are accompanied by changes in firm performance, and whether governance provisions associated with managerial entrenchment affect these changes. Using data on CEO turnovers in the 800 largest U.S. companies occurring over the period 1980-2000, I present evidence that firms with entrenched CEOs exhibit significantly poorer performance in the year prior to forced turnover, and experience significantly larger performance improvements during the three years following forced turnover. More importantly, I show that these larger performance improvements are the result of improved management rather than mean reversion. This evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that entrenchment hampers firm performance by protecting inferior CEOs.
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation Best Practices by : Frederick D. Lipman
Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Book Synopsis Understanding the Growth Slowdown by : Brink Lindsey
Download or read book Understanding the Growth Slowdown written by Brink Lindsey and published by Cato Institute. This book was released on 2015-12-10 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Companies and industries rise and fall...fortunes are made and lost...jobs are created and destroyed by the millions. These are the headline-grabbing dramas of modern economic life. But, residing beneath the booms and busts is a more deeply consequential drama: the long-term growth of real gross domestic product (GDP). Often only apparent years after happening, shifts in long term growth rates are as momentous as they are subtle. This new ebook examines the gathering evidence, in the wake of the great recession of 2008, that we are in the midst of one of these profound shifts. The disappointing performance of the U.S. economy in recent years—the slowest post recession expansion since World War II—may not be just a temporary setback after a severe downturn. It could be the “new normal.”
Book Synopsis An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework by : Matthias Kiefer
Download or read book An Analysis of CEO Equity Compensation in an Incomplete Contracting Framework written by Matthias Kiefer and published by Matthias Kiefer. This book was released on 2015-01-01 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntarily departing CEOs forfeit equity compensation upon departure. I follow Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) in linking CEO equity compensation to a measure of labor market competition in a sample of S&P1500 companies from 1996 to 2010. I find that the intensity of labor market competition measured by a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states affects equity grants and that the correlation is reversed in the penultimate year of forced CEO departure. This is consistent with the view that CEOs are concerned about being replaced in competitive labor markets and therefore demand more compensation that converts into severance pay. Conversely, when a dismissal is anticipated, I argue that CEOs are concerned about finding new employment and are then insured against a lack of outside opportunities. In addition, I conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between stock options, restricted stock grants and other long-term compensation between 2001 and 2006. I argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not increase managerial accountability (see for example Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2005) and that new accounting rules did not increase accounting costs of stock options (see for example Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012). Instead, I suggest that the effective prohibition of executive loans from firms and brokers made it prohibitively costly for CEOs to exercise stock options. I find that stock options began to be replaced with other long-term compensation as early as 2004. CEOs began to accumulate vested but unexercised stock options. I do not find evidence that CEOs sold vested stock to raise funds.In the final empirical chapter, I consider whether a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index across industries and states can be interpreted as a proxy for labor market competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) argue that it is product market competition that affects CEO equity grants. My results are consistent with Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) who do not find evidence that product market competition has any significant impact on equity grants. Instead, I find that labor market competition retains a significant and positive impact in our tests, and notably holds for the largest single product market. The principal limitations of the project were found to be the difficulty of collecting data of intended turnover and classifying it into forced and voluntary turnover. With respect to loans to executives, loans by brokers are usually not disclosed. This study is the first to analyze equity compensation as severance arrangement. CEO cash constraints in exercising options is an unexplored explanation for their disappearance.
Book Synopsis Research Handbook on Boards of Directors by : Jonas Gabrielsson
Download or read book Research Handbook on Boards of Directors written by Jonas Gabrielsson and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2019 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Boards of directors are complex systems, and it is imperative to understand what the contextual forces are that shape the direction and make-up of boards. This Research Handbook provides inspiration for researchers and practitioners interested in the manifold dimensions and facets of context surrounding boards of directors.
Book Synopsis CEO Turnover and Firm Diversification by : Tammy K. Berry
Download or read book CEO Turnover and Firm Diversification written by Tammy K. Berry and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We test theories of managerial entrenchment and ability matching by examining the relation between CEO turnover and the level of firm diversification. Our results indicate that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to firm performance. Additional analysis indicates that for diversified firms voluntary turnover is not sensitive to firm performance, but that forced turnover is sensitive to performance. Even when turnover is forced, however, we find little evidence of restructuring of a diversified firm following CEO succession. We also find that new CEOs in diversified firms are paid more than CEOs in focused firms, and that the compensation premium is invariant to whether the turnover was voluntary or forced. Finally, we find evidence that diversified firms are more likely to have a formal succession plan, to replace the existing CEO with an insider, and hire older more educated executives. Taken together, the findings suggest that diversified firms tend to manage the succession process more carefully because they require CEOs with greater ability. The findings are not consistent with managerial entrenchment. Our study provides new evidence on how the nature and scope of the organization affects the succession process.
Book Synopsis Corporate Governance, Board Oversight, and CEO Turnover by : Volker Laux
Download or read book Corporate Governance, Board Oversight, and CEO Turnover written by Volker Laux and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the primary roles of corporate boards is to control the processes by which top executives are assessed and if necessary replaced. CEO turnover cannot be viewed in isolation because it affects the behavior of the involved players and hence interacts with other organizational goals. This monograph seeks to synthesize recent research that analyzes these interactions. I focus on a number of recurring themes, including the implications of CEO assessment and replacement on optimal contracting, board monitoring, project selection, financial reporting, and CEO selection.
Book Synopsis CEO-board Dynamics by : John R. Graham
Download or read book CEO-board Dynamics written by John R. Graham and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller for example than the strong persistence in board structure that we document. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies document a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.
