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Essays On Executive Compensation
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Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Vaibhav Sharma
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Vaibhav Sharma and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation and its potential importance in aligning shareholder and management interests has been an extensively researched area within corporate finance. This thesis studys executive compensation while addressing several unresolved issues in the literature. Essay one examines CEO compensation following spin-offs. The second essay studys changes in CEO salaries and their relation to firm performance. Essay three examines managerial decision horizons for target and acquirer firms in mergers and acquisitions.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Moritz Heimes
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Moritz Heimes and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope by : Yuri Khoroshilov
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and Firm Scope written by Yuri Khoroshilov and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Brandon Neil Cline
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Brandon Neil Cline and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 278 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality by : Steffen Florian Burkert
Download or read book Executive Compensation: Empirical Essays on the Antecedents and the Consequences, and the Role of Executive Personality written by Steffen Florian Burkert and published by BoD – Books on Demand. This book was released on 2023-03-10 with total page 233 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Top managers have a significant impact on organizations because they are responsible for the formulation and implementation of corporate strategies, have the visibility and influence to shape the opinions of internal and external stakeholders, and coin the culture of their organizations, affecting employees at every level of the organization. Research has focused on the drivers and consequences of top managers' actions, with a particular focus on executive compensation, but important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the literature on top executives by examining the antecedents of executive compensation, the influence of executive compensation on executive behavior, and the interplay of executive compensation and top executive personality. The first study introduces the role of compensation benchmarking for determining executive compensation to the management literature. It finds that benchmarking leads to compensation convergence. The second study examines the impact of executive compensation complexity on firm performance. The results show that compensation complexity is negatively related to accounting-based, market-based, and ESG-based metric of firm performance. The third study explores the implications of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on the imitation behavior of firms. It finds that the introduction of RPE is positively related to the imitation of the strategic actions of peer firms. The fourth study contributes to the growing literature on the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) goals in CEO contracts. Specifically, it examines how and when CSP incentives influence the CEO's attention to corporate social responsibility topics. The final essay examines the role of CEO personality; it finds that differences in CEO personality explain differences in the level of strategic conformity. Taken together, the essays in this dissertation make a significant contribution to the scholarly discourse on the influence of top managers on their companies. The empirical evidence presented expands the current understanding of how top executives affect strategic firm behaviors, and it provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.
Book Synopsis Three Essays on Executive Compensation by : Robert R. Johnson
Download or read book Three Essays on Executive Compensation written by Robert R. Johnson and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 178 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation by : Patrick Bernard Washington
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation written by Patrick Bernard Washington and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interconnections between blockholders and CEO power, and the link between deferred compensation (inside debt) and financial performance/firm behavior. In the first chapter, I consider agency theory's prediction that a large shareholder, "blockholder," can serve as an effective governance mechanism when monitoring man- agers by reducing CEO dominance. However, not all blockholders are created equally. Inside blockholders with large equity stakes may be subject to CEO influence. Outside blockholders may not fear the same career concerns. Using a novel approach, I sepa- rate blockholders into insiders (officers & directors) and outsiders when considering their relationship to CEO power, which is proxied by the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). However, separating blockholders into outside and officer specifications reveals that director block- holders reduce CEO power. Economic theory suggests that firms with multiple classes of shares have weak governance structures. A significant difference in CEO dominance inside dual class share firms versus single class share firms has been documented. This paper expounds on previous research and shed's light on the effect of insiders' differential shareholder rights in dual class share firms. Evidence is provided that shows as insiders' percentage of voting rights increase then CEO power (CPS) decreases. Also, the results reveal that as insiders' percentage of cash flow rights increase then CEO power (CPS) increases. In the second chapter, I study recent literature's documentation that inside debt is widely used in executive compensation contracts. Prior research has only focused on the CEO's level of inside debt. However, the inner workings of the top executive team, and their importance for firm performance are difficult to observe and measure. In this essay, I aim to contribute to the subject by introducing new measures pertaining to the rela- tionship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team, as well as studying the relation between these measures and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. My novel measure is the Slice of CEO Inside Debt (SCID) -- the frac- tion of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO. The effects of total deferred compensation account balances, firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID. This research provides evidence of increased CEO tenure (entrenchment) in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, reduced spending on research and development in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, increased spend- ing on capital expenditures in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID, and a lower probability of bankruptcy in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID. Also, this paper shows that as the CEO's slice of deferred compensation from firm contributions and executive contributions increases then firm liquidity, i.e. working capital, decreases. In the final chapter, I consider prior research that has shown firms with CEOs who have less power take less risk. Thus, theory suggests that reducing CEO power through the use of deferred compensation, "inside debt," should motivate executives to become more risk averse. This essay investigates the relationship between the Slice of CEO Inside- Debt (SCID) — the fraction of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO — and CEO power (CPS--CEO Pay Slice) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The effects of firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID in relation to CPS and CSR. This research provides evidence of increased CEO power by showing that firms with CEOs who contribute more money to their deferred compensation accounts relative to the total amount deferred by the top five executives, including the CEO, have CEOs with greater power in the following year. Additionally, this essay studies firms use of inside debt and its effect on corporate social responsibility. Empirical evidence is provided that firms with CEOs who experience increased earnings on their deferred compensation accounts relative to the account earnings of top five executives are positively correlated with being more socially responsible.
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation by : Timothy C. Carpenter
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Timothy C. Carpenter and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 77 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation examines the effects resultant from compensation committees' decisions on the structure and magnitude of executive compensation packages. Executive compensation has long been a contentious topic, both in the U.S. and abroad. Specifically, equity-based pay (eg. options and stock grants) has been increasing in popularity and met with mixed reactions. This form of remuneration aims to properly align the goals of executives with those of their shareholders; however, the use of equity based-pay tends to result in larger pay packages. Thus, the potential reasons for its recent popularity range from a forthright belief in its optimality to more Machiavellian motives. Moreover, incentive compensation has a number of secondary effects which must be accounted for, including effects on executive retention and accounting quality among many others. This line of research aims to improve our understanding of executive pay so compensation committees can better serve their shareholders by crafting more appropriate pay packages and better understanding the potential benefits and consequences therefrom. In Chapter One, I analyze the effect of cumulative wealth and unvested equity compensation on voluntary CEO turnover. I find that wealthier CEOs are less likely to retire or resign. This suggests that the CEO vetting process is able to sort out those individuals who would substitute high wealth for additional leisure. Consistent with Balsam and Miharjo (2007), CEOs with more unvested equity are significantly less likely to leave their position. However, I find that unvested equity is less effective as a retention device if the CEO has high existing wealth. In contrast to prior results, my results show no significant relation between existing CEO wealth and incentive compensation. In Chapter Two, I analyze the structure of compensation packages awarded in the United Kingdom compared to their U.S. counterparts. I consider the asymmetric relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the U.S. and test for similar relations in the U.K. My findings confirm that asymmetry exists in the U.S. in that pay is more strongly associated with upside risk than downside risk. In contrast, U.K. CEO pay is more symmetrically associated with risk. Therefore, while U.S. CEOs face greater risk as a result of compensation with more equity-based pay, their pay to performance is asymmetrical. This suggests an additional component that risk-based arguments must consider before concluding that higher pay in the U.S. is structural and, thus, rational. Finally, in Chapter Three, I examine the effect of executive wealth on accounting quality. Results indicate that firms with wealthier CEOs are significantly more likely to restate earnings. To some extent this effect may be mitigated by compensation committees through the use of unvested compensation components, but this reduction is minimal. Firms with wealthier CEOs also exhibit greater levels of earnings management. Consistent with SEC auditors being aware of this, firms with wealthier CEOs are more likely to face an enforcement action, suggesting that these firms are both targeted and, ultimately, found in violation of accounting requirements. Chief Financial Officers' wealth shows a similar (and even stronger) relationship, increasing the likelihood of an earnings restatement as well as the magnitude of earnings management, but SEC enforcement actions do not reflect this relationship. My results suggest that SEC auditors may be able to improve governance by targeting firms that employ wealthy CFOs, and particularly those with recent large gains.
Book Synopsis Essays in Executive Compensation by : Dan Zhang
Download or read book Essays in Executive Compensation written by Dan Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 145 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation and the Firm Performance by : Scott D. Tracy
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation and the Firm Performance written by Scott D. Tracy and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation by : Minjie Huang
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Minjie Huang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays in Executive Compensation by : Randy Beavers
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation written by Randy Beavers and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 167 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In essay one, we examine overconfident CEO-directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more active in nominating committees, and have more independent directorships. Attendance is higher when multiple overconfident directors are present on the board. When an overconfident board selects a new CEO after a CEO turnover, they are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO. Overconfident boards are also more likely to select an overconfident CEO. We also find overconfident boards exacerbate the restrained use of debt when an overconfident CEO is present, and we find evidence that the association between CEO-directors and greater CEO pay is driven solely by overconfident CEO-directors on the board. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO-directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO. In essay two, I analyze the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form of deferred equity compensation in the context of M & A decisions. CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in an M & A. When firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater portion of stock. The evidence indicates that inside debt incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders. In essay three, I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate compensation incentives of risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage. These types of firms use a higher percentage of term loans and other debt but a lower percentage of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation by : Fei Xie
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Fei Xie and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 111 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation by : Anamarija Delic
Download or read book Three Essays on the Regulation of Executive Compensation written by Anamarija Delic and published by . This book was released on 2024 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation by : Xiaolin Xue
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation written by Xiaolin Xue and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Essays on Executive Compensation Research by : 潘虹華
Download or read book Essays on Executive Compensation Research written by 潘虹華 and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Two Essays on Executive Compensation and External Financing Decisions by : Eric Brisker
Download or read book Two Essays on Executive Compensation and External Financing Decisions written by Eric Brisker and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ABSTRACT: My dissertation examines the impact that executive compensation has on external financing decisions. In my first essay I examine the long-run stock and operating performance of firms following seasoned equity offerings based on the level of equity-based compensation the top five managers receive. I find that firms paying high levels of equity-based compensation experience lower abnormal stock returns and less favorable changes in operating performance in the three-year period following the issue than firms paying low, or no, equity-based compensation. Moreover, in calendar-time regressions, post-issue stock returns of issuers who pay high equity-based compensation do not load significantly on an investment factor, suggesting that these issuers have non-investment motives. Overall the findings support the premise that managers receiving high equity-based compensation act in the interest of current shareholders by issuing equity when they believe their stock is overvalued, while managers receiving low equity-based compensation do not. My second essay examines to what extent executive stock options received by the top five executives affects capital structure decisions and the debt-equity choice, and whether these effects are strengthened when a firm is near, or has recently received, a credit rating change. I hypothesize that executives receiving higher levels of stock options, especially stock options held that are in-the-money, as a percentage of their overall compensation are more risk averse due to greater sensitivity of their personal wealth portfolios to firm stock performance. As a result, they reduce the riskiness of the firm by reducing the amount of debt in the capital structure of the firm and issuing equity rather than debt when raising external financing. I also expect that the risk reduction is more pronounced when the firm is near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade, or has recently received a credit rating downgrade.
