Read Books Online and Download eBooks, EPub, PDF, Mobi, Kindle, Text Full Free.
Download Essays On Ceo Compensation And Corporate Governance full books in PDF, epub, and Kindle. Read online Essays On Ceo Compensation And Corporate Governance ebook anywhere anytime directly on your device. Fast Download speed and no annoying ads. We cannot guarantee that every ebooks is available!
Author : Zhifang Zhang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (16 download)
Download or read book Essays on CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance written by Zhifang Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Patrick Bernard Washington
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 138 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (951 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation written by Patrick Bernard Washington and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 138 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interconnections between blockholders and CEO power, and the link between deferred compensation (inside debt) and financial performance/firm behavior. In the first chapter, I consider agency theory's prediction that a large shareholder, "blockholder," can serve as an effective governance mechanism when monitoring man- agers by reducing CEO dominance. However, not all blockholders are created equally. Inside blockholders with large equity stakes may be subject to CEO influence. Outside blockholders may not fear the same career concerns. Using a novel approach, I sepa- rate blockholders into insiders (officers & directors) and outsiders when considering their relationship to CEO power, which is proxied by the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). However, separating blockholders into outside and officer specifications reveals that director block- holders reduce CEO power. Economic theory suggests that firms with multiple classes of shares have weak governance structures. A significant difference in CEO dominance inside dual class share firms versus single class share firms has been documented. This paper expounds on previous research and shed's light on the effect of insiders' differential shareholder rights in dual class share firms. Evidence is provided that shows as insiders' percentage of voting rights increase then CEO power (CPS) decreases. Also, the results reveal that as insiders' percentage of cash flow rights increase then CEO power (CPS) increases. In the second chapter, I study recent literature's documentation that inside debt is widely used in executive compensation contracts. Prior research has only focused on the CEO's level of inside debt. However, the inner workings of the top executive team, and their importance for firm performance are difficult to observe and measure. In this essay, I aim to contribute to the subject by introducing new measures pertaining to the rela- tionship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team, as well as studying the relation between these measures and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. My novel measure is the Slice of CEO Inside Debt (SCID) -- the frac- tion of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO. The effects of total deferred compensation account balances, firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID. This research provides evidence of increased CEO tenure (entrenchment) in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, reduced spending on research and development in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, increased spend- ing on capital expenditures in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID, and a lower probability of bankruptcy in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID. Also, this paper shows that as the CEO's slice of deferred compensation from firm contributions and executive contributions increases then firm liquidity, i.e. working capital, decreases. In the final chapter, I consider prior research that has shown firms with CEOs who have less power take less risk. Thus, theory suggests that reducing CEO power through the use of deferred compensation, "inside debt," should motivate executives to become more risk averse. This essay investigates the relationship between the Slice of CEO Inside- Debt (SCID) — the fraction of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO — and CEO power (CPS--CEO Pay Slice) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The effects of firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID in relation to CPS and CSR. This research provides evidence of increased CEO power by showing that firms with CEOs who contribute more money to their deferred compensation accounts relative to the total amount deferred by the top five executives, including the CEO, have CEOs with greater power in the following year. Additionally, this essay studies firms use of inside debt and its effect on corporate social responsibility. Empirical evidence is provided that firms with CEOs who experience increased earnings on their deferred compensation accounts relative to the account earnings of top five executives are positively correlated with being more socially responsible.
Author : Minhua Yang
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 76 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (67 download)
Download or read book Two Essays on Corporate Governance written by Minhua Yang and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors' incentives with those of shareholders. In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.
Author : Susan Christine Sassalos
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 198 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (33 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control written by Susan Christine Sassalos and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 198 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Syed Walid Reza
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 142 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (855 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Syed Walid Reza and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 142 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Swarnodeep Homroy
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (876 download)
Download or read book Three Essays in Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance written by Swarnodeep Homroy and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Edward J Kim
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 130 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (128 download)
Download or read book ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE written by Edward J Kim and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page 130 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation consists of three chapters that explore various aspects of corporate finance with a focus on issues related to corporate governance. Chapter 1 investigates how CEO bargaining power affects the level of CEO compensation. Contracting theories predict that CEO power plays an essential role in the pay-setting process. I provide causal empirical evidence of how changes in the bargaining power of CEOs affect the level of CEO compensation. Using the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts as an exogenous shock to CEOs' bargaining power, I find that the recognition of the IDD results in significantly lower levels of CEO compensation. The effect is present only in subsamples of firms whose CEOs experience a substantial decline in their bargaining power. These results support the idea that bargaining power is the channel through which the IDD recognition decreases CEO compensation. Economic impact of the IDD is also substantial in the subsamples, ranging from 16.4% to 20.5% decline in total compensation. Examination of the structure of compensation reveals that changes in the bargaining power of CEOs reduce total current compensation and option awards. The recognition of the IDD also increases turnover-performance sensitivity and shareholder wealth. Chapter 2 examines the impact of corporate religious culture on CEO compensation structure. Recent studies document the effect of corporate culture on corporate behavior. This study examines how a firm's religious culture affects the structure of CEO compensation. Using county-level religiosity as a proxy for a firm's culture, I find that firms in highly religious counties use about 12.4% less performance-based compensation in their CEO compensation packages. I consider two characteristics of religious cultures that are likely to have implications on executive compensation: extrinsic motivation and locus of control. To determine which characteristic is driving the results, I examine how turnover decisions differ depending on religious culture of firms. If locus of control - the extent to which human effort can affect future outcomes - is driving the main result, less turnover-performance sensitivity is expected in highly religious firms. The results show that turnover-performance sensitivity does not vary according to county-level religiosity, suggesting that locus of control is not the driver behind the main result. These findings indicate that firms with highly religious cultures use less performance-based compensation because religious cultures' work ethic is less financially motivated. Lastly, Chapter 3 investigates how insider-dominance of corporate boards affect firm value. The agency literature posits that insider-dominated boards are likely to face severe agency problems. However, some theories on board control argue that insider-dominated boards are sometimes optimal for shareholders. I evaluate the theories using SOX-related board reforms in the early 2000s that presented an exogenous change in board control. Specifically, I analyze the heterogenous treatment effects based on firm characteristics that theoretically favor insider-dominated boards - firm size, proprietary knowledge, and information transparency. Preliminary results suggest that firms with theoretically optimal insider-dominated boards experienced a net increase in shareholder value when boards became independent. These results indicate that benefits of enhanced monitoring by independent boards outweighed any loss in value associated with insider control of the board.
Author : Ozge Uygur
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (858 download)
Download or read book CEO POLITICAL DONATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE written by Ozge Uygur and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Business Administration/Finance
Author : Houston Shawn Mobbs
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 356 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (741 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance written by Houston Shawn Mobbs and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Fang Lin
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 386 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (93 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation written by Fang Lin and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 386 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Gary Todd Moskowitz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 132 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (244 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on the Agency Problem written by Gary Todd Moskowitz and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 132 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : David De Angelis
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 192 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (826 download)
Download or read book Essays in Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance written by David De Angelis and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contains three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance. The first essay studies the effect of information frictions across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions, using the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal controls to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies. I find that after SOX, the capital allocation decision in conglomerates is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The effects are most pronounced when conglomerates are prone to information problems within the organization and least pronounced when they still suffer from internal control weaknesses after SOX. Moreover, conglomerates' productivity and market value relative to stand-alone firms increase after SOX. These results support the argument that inefficiencies in the capital allocation process are partly due to information frictions. My findings also shed light on some unintended effects of SOX on large and complex firms. The second essay is co-authored with Yaniv Grinstein and investigates how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We take advantage of new compensation disclosure requirements issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006. Firms vary in their choice of performance measures and horizons, and in their reliance on pre-specified goals. Consistent with optimal contracting theories, we find that firms choose performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions, and rely less on pre-specified goals when it is more costly to contract on CEO actions. The third essay investigates the design of division managers (DMs) incentive contracts again taking advantage of the disclosure requirements. I find that firms do not use relative performance evaluation across divisions and that in general most of DM compensation incentives are associated with firm performance instead of division performance. Furthermore, division performance-based incentives tend to be smaller in complex firms, when within-organization conflicts are potentially more severe. I also find that when the probability of promotion to CEO is lower, DM ownership requirements are more stringent and DM compensation incentives are greater. These results support notions that influence costs as well as promotion-based incentives are important considerations in designing DMs contracts.
Author : Qian Xie
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 226 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (73 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance and Delaware Incorporation written by Qian Xie and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of three essays on director compensation, CEO compensation, executive dismissal, and Delaware incorporation. Delaware incorporation is popular among publicly traded firms. However, the question of whether Delaware incorporation favors shareholders is an on-going debate.
Author : Klaus J. Hopt
Publisher : Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN 13 : 3110905043
Total Pages : 372 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (19 download)
Download or read book Comparative Corporate Governance written by Klaus J. Hopt and published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. This book was released on 2015-02-06 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance has become an important issue in all industrial economies. This text has grown out of a conference entitled Comparative Corporate Governance, An International Conference, United States - Japan - Western Europe which considered the subject.
Author : Frederick D. Lipman
Publisher : John Wiley & Sons
ISBN 13 : 9780470283035
Total Pages : 336 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (83 download)
Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.
Author : Jerry Yuekang Sun
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 330 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (174 download)
Download or read book Essays on Corporate Governance Quality of Compensation Committees written by Jerry Yuekang Sun and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 330 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Tarek El Masri
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 171 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (113 download)
Download or read book Three Essays on Corporate Governance of Family Firms written by Tarek El Masri and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 171 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation is comprised of three essays on issues related to the corporate governance of family firms. The first essay explores how owners-managers of family firms conceptualize and define their firms. Understanding the essence of a family firm helps us better understand their governance and behaviour. This essay contributes to the family business literature by presenting the seven most important criteria in identifying a family business (Handler 1989; Shanker & Astrachan 1996), namely: family ownership, control, involvement, succession, long-term vision, founders' legacy, and extended family of employees. The essay also contributes a familiness measurement tool that can be used in future research aiming at better understanding the family firm. The second essay investigates how management control technologies are calibrated in accordance with the sometimes conflicting economic and noneconomic goals resulting from the dual identities of family firms. The results show that family firms calibrate pervasive management control technologies, such as calculative, family-centric or procedural controls to strengthen the business identity and reduce the family identity of their family business. In comparison, the minimal use, or perceived absence, of management control technologies suggest that it accentuates and fosters family identity. Hence, reverting to management control technologies becomes related in a unilateral way to the business identity of the firm, despite the dual control ambition of family firms. The third essay analyzes CEO and TMT compensation practices to identify patterns that can explain the gap between family firms and the pool of external highly qualified executives. The data analysis highlights a connection between the degree of family ownership, the composition of the BOD, and the identity of the CEO. The results also show that family firms rely more heavily on cash-based awards than on equity-based awards as a form of CEO and TMT compensation. Family firms are reluctant to use option-based rewards and the use of share-based awards is also kept at a minimum. Other evidence point towards a role that institutional ownership plays in restructuring the compensation packages of the TMTs at family firms. Keywords: Family Firms, Definition of Family Firms, Family Firm Identity, Management Control Technologies, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation.
