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Author : Jonathan H. Hamilton
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 32 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (217 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games written by Jonathan H. Hamilton and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 56 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Information written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (12 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplete Formation written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Hans-Theo Normann
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 36 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (681 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Duopoly Model with Incomplet Informationa written by Hans-Theo Normann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (318 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Multi-stage Duopoly Games written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Luís Santos-Pinto
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 30 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets written by Luís Santos-Pinto and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Saloner's (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. We find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Author : Lin Liu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation written by Lin Liu and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 26 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (321 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Cournot Duopoly written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Miguel A. Fonseca
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (664 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Duopoly: Experimental Evidence written by Miguel A. Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly written by and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.
Author : Yuanzhu Lu
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - 'Capacity-then-Quantity' Game written by Yuanzhu Lu and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage.
Author : Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Capacity Choice written by Juan Carlos Barcena Ruiz and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed duopoly where firms first strategically choose their capacity levels and then compete at price level. In equilibrium, firms are shown to set prices simultaneously while capacities are chosen sequentially. This result is in contrast to the assumption of simultaneous order of moves for capacities choice made by Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 (2007), pp. 1-7) in a mixed duopoly. Besides, we find that there are two equilibria: in one of them the public firm is the leader in capacities and, in the other, the follower.
Author : Marco A. Marini
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Lead, Follow Or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games written by Marco A. Marini and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is affected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 23 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (341 download)
Download or read book A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly with Endogenous Timing written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Toshihiro Matsumura
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopolies with Externality written by Toshihiro Matsumura and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly with a negative externality. We find that quantity (price) competition yields a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome under a significant negative externality. These results indicate that mixed duopolies yield the same results as private duopolies under a significant negative externality, which is in sharp contrast to the results in mixed duopolies without a negative externality. Unless the negative externality is insignificant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and public leadership is more robust than the private leadership as equilibrium. If optimal environmental tax policy is introduced, however, private leadership yields the greatest welfare and this an equilibrium outcome in the endogenous timing game under quantity competition.
Author : Michael Kopel
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 16 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Endogenous Timing and Strategic Managerial Incentives in a Duopoly Game written by Michael Kopel and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It is shown that in our quantity-setting model Stackelberg-type outcomes can occur. In these outcomes the Stackelberg leader is owner-managed and the follower delegates the quantity choice to a manager, who is compensated based on profits and sales. Furthermore, the follower has a second-mover advantage, i.e. achieves a higher profit than the leader.
Author : Kangsik Choi
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book A Model of Endogenous Payoff Motives and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly written by Kangsik Choi and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.
