Corporate Ownership Structure and Audit Fees

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 186 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (957 download)

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Book Synopsis Corporate Ownership Structure and Audit Fees by : Nurul Farha binti Mohamed Rusdi

Download or read book Corporate Ownership Structure and Audit Fees written by Nurul Farha binti Mohamed Rusdi and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 186 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The increasing focus on the impact of different ownership structures is prompted by the existence of monitoring differences by shareholders on corporate affairs including the financial reporting process. The external auditors' reliance on the corporate internal control varies according to the different ownership structures with a concomitant variation in the fees charged to their clients. A number of corporate collapses worldwide have highlighted the need for strong corporate governance to strengthen the financial reporting process with an emphasis on audit quality. The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between corporate ownership structures and audit fees paid to external auditors by Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. This study focuses on the extent of the auditor's reliance on the client's internal control inasmuch as the corporate ownership structures are varied, and, ultimately, affect the audit fees. This study applies the agency theory in formulating three hypotheses that guide the results analysis. By employing a multi regression model for a sample of 345 Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, this study examines the relationship of ownership structure, namely, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership with audit fees using data for 2010. The results show a significant positive relationship between audit fees and firms with larger foreign ownership and government ownership but no significant relationship with firms with higher managerial ownership. This study contributes recent evidence concerning the relationship between corporate ownership structure and audit fees. The regulator may consider ownership structure on the standards or regulation setting in order to be practical and operationalized in line with the impact associated with different ownership structures. The practitioners may also design appropriate methodologies and procedures for the different ownership structures for high quality service and to standardize the risk mitigation process.

Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality InJapan

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 52 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (931 download)

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Book Synopsis Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality InJapan by :

Download or read book Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality InJapan written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality in Japan

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 52 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (113 download)

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Book Synopsis Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality in Japan by :

Download or read book Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, and Audit Quality in Japan written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance

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Publisher : Springer Nature
ISBN 13 : 9811924600
Total Pages : 204 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (119 download)

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Book Synopsis Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance by : Shveta Singh

Download or read book Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance written by Shveta Singh and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2022-05-12 with total page 204 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book begins by analysing the various corporate governance mechanisms explored in the extant literature and determining their effectiveness in enhancing the firm value using multivariate analysis. The findings are of global relevance as the corporate governance regulations of most countries focus on independent directors as the mainstay of good governance. The empirical evidence from the first objective of this study corroborates the claim that independent directors do not strengthen the firms’ governance quality. The book is one of the few works to have analysed the possible reasons behind the ineffectiveness of the independent directors. Also, in view of the famous concept of the bundle of governance mechanisms, it might be possible that the independent directors strengthen the firms’ governance quality indirectly by strengthening other governance mechanisms. This aspect too has little precedence. This study adopts a novel moderation and mediation approach to analyse the monitoring behaviour of independent directors in relation to other governance mechanisms. The work is a must read for corporate players as well as researchers and scholars studying this discipline.

Ownership Structure and Auditor Selection

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 27 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Ownership Structure and Auditor Selection by : Curtis M. Hall

Download or read book Ownership Structure and Auditor Selection written by Curtis M. Hall and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Purpose: This paper investigates the effect that ownership structure (public vs. private) has on the demand for high-quality auditors, specifically in the U.S. banking industry.Design/Methodology/Approach: We predict that public banks are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor than private banks and pay a higher audit fee premium for that high-quality auditor (due to higher agency costs, more demand for financial information and higher litigation risk). We analyze 2008-2014 banking data from the Federal Reserve using probit and OLS regression analysis to examine if there is a higher probability that public banks choose higher quality auditors and pay higher audit fees when they do so.Findings: Our results show that private banks are less likely to hire Big 4 auditors and industry-expert auditors than public banks. We also find that both private and public banks pay higher audit fees for Big 4 and industry-expert auditors, and that public banks pay a higher premium for Big 4 auditors and industry experts than private banks.Research Limitations/Implications: Our findings may not be full generalizable to other types of firms, as banking is a heavily regulated and complex industry. However, inferences from our study may be generalizable to other similar industries such as insurance or healthcare.Practical Implications: The results of this paper imply that public and private banks have differing priorities when hiring their financial statement auditor. This may be of interest to investors and auditing regulators.Social Implications: The findings of this paper underscore the value of hiring an industry-expert auditor in an industry that is highly complex and regulated. This may be of interest to managers and policymakers.Originality/Value: Due to data restrictions, the emphasis of prior literature on the banking industry has been on public banks. Our study is the first to analyze the differences between public and private banks' demand for audit services.

Blockholders' Ownership and Audit Fees

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 37 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis Blockholders' Ownership and Audit Fees by : Raúl Barroso

Download or read book Blockholders' Ownership and Audit Fees written by Raúl Barroso and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. Shareholder (stakeholder) countries rely heavily on public (private) information to reduce information asymmetry for outside investors in the context of high (low) litigation risk. We expect audit fees to reflect the level of agency conflicts in shareholder countries as well as the needs for information of the major blockholders in stakeholder countries. Using a sample of 7982 firm-year observations from 19 countries, we find a u-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for shareholder countries and an inverted u-shaped relation between controlling shareholding and audit fees for stakeholder countries. These results are consistent across different firm-level governance arrangements.

Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors

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Publisher : OECD Publishing
ISBN 13 : 9264116052
Total Pages : 78 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (641 download)

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Book Synopsis Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors by : OECD

Download or read book Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors written by OECD and published by OECD Publishing. This book was released on 2011-07-01 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.

Multiple Large Shareholders, Audit Committee Activity and Audit Fees

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)

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Book Synopsis Multiple Large Shareholders, Audit Committee Activity and Audit Fees by : Ismail A. Adelopo

Download or read book Multiple Large Shareholders, Audit Committee Activity and Audit Fees written by Ismail A. Adelopo and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the impact of ownership structure on audit pricing, using number of Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS), in order to understand their monitoring and oversight function. Previous studies have focused exclusively on percentage holding as a measure of ownership structure with less than convincing outcomes. We responded to the call in Edman and Manso (2009) to explore the monitoring roles of MLS. We found that majority of listed firms in the UK have multiple large shareholders. The results of our one way analysis of variance (one way-ANOVA) showed that there are statistically significant differences in the audit fees, firm size and audit committee activities of these firms when they are categorised into “widely held”, “concentrated” and “highly concentrated” firms. We found that widely held firms are bigger in size, tend to pay more in audit fees and have more active audit committees. Results from our multiple regression models confirm a significant negative relationship between audit fees and number of MLS. We also found a positive relationship between audit fees and audit committee activities. Our findings are important for policy makers and market regulators who are interested in enhancing market confidence through transparent reporting and improved audit quality. It also confirms the likely beneficial effects of more active institutional investors monitoring as proposed in the recent Walkers report in the form of a Stewardship Code for institutional investors in the UK.

Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance

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Publisher : IGI Global
ISBN 13 : 1799848531
Total Pages : 425 pages
Book Rating : 4.7/5 (998 download)

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Book Synopsis Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance by : Alqatan, Ahmad

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance written by Alqatan, Ahmad and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2020-09-25 with total page 425 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After the global financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance has been gaining momentum in accounting and finance literature since it may influence firm and bank management in many countries. Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance provides emerging research exploring the implications of a good corporate governance system after global financial crises. Corporate governance mechanisms may include board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external auditing. This book is devoted to all topics dealing with corporate governance including corporate governance characteristics, board diversity, CSR, big data governance, bitcoin governance, IT governance, and governance disclosure, and is ideally designed for executives, BODs, financial analysts, government officials, researchers, policymakers, academicians, and students.

Do Audit Committees Reduce the Agency Costs of Ownership Structure?

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ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 59 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis Do Audit Committees Reduce the Agency Costs of Ownership Structure? by : Charlie X. Cai

Download or read book Do Audit Committees Reduce the Agency Costs of Ownership Structure? written by Charlie X. Cai and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the agency costs of corporate ownership structure and the role of audit committees in mitigating their effect. Using China as a laboratory, where audit committees are voluntary, we study the demand for and value relevance of audit committees conditional on the various agency costs of corporate ownership. Audit committees are shown to complement existing internal governance systems by reducing the agency conflicts embedded in ownership structure. They are always value relevant, the magnitude of which depends upon the level and complexity of the ownership lattice. Finally, audit committees substitute for inefficient external regulatory environments, particularly where weak legal institutions predominate. Our results are robust to firm size, investment level and financial leverage.

The Relationship between Governance Structure and Audit Fees Pre-Cadbury

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)

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Book Synopsis The Relationship between Governance Structure and Audit Fees Pre-Cadbury by : Michael J. Peel

Download or read book The Relationship between Governance Structure and Audit Fees Pre-Cadbury written by Michael J. Peel and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we provide new evidence on the relationship between internal governance structures (board composition and ownership concentration) and audit fees of UK industrial quoted companies, before the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee were implemented. We also develop a new hypothesis derived from agency theory, in an attempt to explain the puzzling positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees. In common with post-Cadbury research, we find no significant evidence that board structure variables, including chairman/chief executive officer split and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, impact significantly on external audit fees. Also, while prior research has shown that the aggregated level of institutional and managerial ownership are negatively associated with audit fees, we find that only one constituent of this variable, namely directors' ownership, has a significant impact.

Industry Specialist Auditors and Audit Fees in Family Firms

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 : 9781267419200
Total Pages : 87 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (192 download)

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Book Synopsis Industry Specialist Auditors and Audit Fees in Family Firms by : Fei Kang

Download or read book Industry Specialist Auditors and Audit Fees in Family Firms written by Fei Kang and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 87 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I examine whether and how family firms' unique ownership structure and agency problems affect their choice of industry-specialist auditors and the level of audit fees. Following prior literature, I define family firms as those in which members of the founding family continue to hold positions in top management, sit on the board, or are blockholders. Compared to non-family firms, family firms are subject to less severe Type I agency problems due to family owners' long-term horizon and close monitoring of managers, but face more severe Type II agency conflicts due to the concentrated ownership and excess of control rights over cash flow rights held by family owners. Using data from the S & P 1500 firms, I find that family firms are more likely to appoint industry-specialist auditors and incur lower audit fees than non-family firms. The results suggest that family firms have strong incentives to hire industry specialists to signal the quality of their financial reporting due to the Type II agency problems, and that they have lower assessed audit risk and less demand for external audit services due to the mitigated Type I agency problems. My additional analysis shows that, compared to family firms without dual-class shares, family firms with dual-class shares have higher demand for industry-specialist auditors to signal firms' disclosure quality. Furthermore, my results indicate that, when family members serve as CEOs, firms have a stronger tendency to hire industry specialists and to pay lower audit fees. In addition, although family firms have a higher likelihood of hiring industry-specialist auditors than non-family firms, I find no evidence that family firms purchase more non-audit services from their incumbent auditors.

The Impact of Ownership Structure and External Audit on Accruals and Real Activities Earnings Management in Jordan

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (89 download)

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Book Synopsis The Impact of Ownership Structure and External Audit on Accruals and Real Activities Earnings Management in Jordan by : Mohammed Ibrahim Idris Idris

Download or read book The Impact of Ownership Structure and External Audit on Accruals and Real Activities Earnings Management in Jordan written by Mohammed Ibrahim Idris Idris and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency theory predicts that ownership structure monitoring mechanisms can effectively align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. In additions, it views external audit as a function that lends credibility to the information disclosed in financial reports. Prior research sustains these predictions in developed markets such as in the US. However, institutional settings such as ownership structure and regulatory oversight bodies differ around the world and accordingly, the sustain ability of agency theory predictions might also differ. Further, little research differentiates between accruals and real activities earnings management in contexts such as the Jordanian where ownership is concentrated, investors' protection is weak and capital market is still evolving. Therefore, this study addresses these issues and investigates the validity of agency theory predictions concerning the effectiveness of ownership structure and external audit monitoring mechanisms in mitigating both accruals and real activities earnings management in Jordan. In this study, four measures of earnings management are estimated through the models of Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006): Magnitudes of abnormal accruals are obtained from the former model and magnitudes of abnormal cash flow from operating activities, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses are obtained from the latter model. As a result, four empirical models are constructed in which the estimated earnings management measures represent the dependent variables. Independent variables in each empirical model are the same and are classified into three categories: first, ownership structure variables include ownership concentration, controlling shareholders, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. The second category includes external audit quality measured by auditor size. Third, a set of control variables include board size, leverage, growth and firm size. These models are tested using the population of all manufacturing firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange over the period 2005 - 2008. The results reveal that controlling shareholders appear effective in constraining accruals manipulations, sales manipulations and production costs manipulations. As for manipulations in discretionary expenses, the results show that . only high levels of institutional ownership can effectively deter abnormal discretionary expenses. Moreover, contrary to the popular convention, the results suggest that non-big 5 auditors in Jordan who in fact mitigate abnormal accruals not big 5 auditors. Finally, no evidence is found supportive of the substitutive effect. That is, firms that are prevented from managing their earnings through accruals due to the enhanced scrutiny of non-big 5 auditors, do not resort to sales manipulations, production costs manipulations or discretionary expenses manipulations as substitutes to achieve desired levels of reported earnings. Given these findings, the present study provides understanding and extension for agency theory literature that focuses on earnings management in general and in emerging markets in particular. It highlights challenges to applicability of agency theory in emerging markets where corporate governance mechanisms are supposed to mitigate the practice of earnings management. As such, these fading's could be helpful to investors and other stakeholders in making rational contractual decisions, especially when such decisions involve non-owner- controlled firms. Finally, Amman Stock Exchange could impose the corporate governance codes that actively promote internal corporate governance mechanisms to restrain accruals and real activities earnings management.

International Convoluted Ownership Structure in Accounting and Finance

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 25 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (13 download)

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Book Synopsis International Convoluted Ownership Structure in Accounting and Finance by : Chi Keung Man

Download or read book International Convoluted Ownership Structure in Accounting and Finance written by Chi Keung Man and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance can be old cliché as internal and external types. Internal corporate governance is the mechanism by which firms' governing managers align their activities with stakeholder interests through the composition of the board, audit committees, and compensation committees as well as the ownership structure. External corporate governance occurs overweightingly and dominantly through mechanisms, such as legal protections and takeovers imposed by the capital market, that are external to the firm that protects stakeholder interests. Since the scope of corporate governance is too broad to address here, this article examines only its ownership structure dimension and its impact on firm performance, cost of capital, dividend policy, disclosure, and conservatism. Researchers have been investigating these issues for decades, with gobsmacking inconclusive results. Recent papers have provided new insights by which we may examine the issues in more detail. For instance, Chen et al. (2012) suggest that family CEOs in family firms produce less turnover and lower share returns than do non-family CEOs in family firms, leading to the temeritous question of whether the chairperson and CEO governance functions should be separated and pointing to future research into whether family firms with family CEOs generate lower or higher earnings. Haw et al. (2012), concerning conservatism, investigates whether the second largest shareholders in firms with multiple shareholdings and a cash flow right dispersion can shape conservatism in financial statements. They argue that the dispersion of cash flow rights for multiple shareholders creates monitoring problems for firms, leading to the agency problem and increasingly conservative accounting in financial statements. Studies have shown that managerial incentives to adopt highly conservative accounting include taxation, debts covenants, and regulations. Whilst this paper attempts to demonstrate the impact of ownership structure on conservatism, future research should carefully but not pedantically investigate this issue in more detail.

The Impact of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Audit Report Lag

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 202 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (957 download)

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Book Synopsis The Impact of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Audit Report Lag by : Siti Masitah binti Ibrahim

Download or read book The Impact of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Audit Report Lag written by Siti Masitah binti Ibrahim and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Timeliness is an essential characteristic of financial reporting to promote investors' confidence in the capital market and to enable them to make decisions. The delay in releasing the annual financial report, which is highly influenced by the length of the audit process, would make the financial information less useful as it has lost its relevancy. In addition, a new regulation on shortening the timeframe for the issuance of annual reports which was proposed by Bursa Malaysia triggers the idea of this study to extend the literature on audit report lag. Thus, the main objective of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structures on audit report lag among Malaysia's listed companies. The audit report lag is measured based on the number of days between the date of financial year end to the date of auditor report. The corporate governance mechanisms consists of board multiple directorships, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee qualifications. Meanwhile, the types of ownership structures are managerial ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership. The resource dependence theory and agency theory are applied to explain the framework of this study and tested on the sample of 243 Malaysian listed companies for the financial year ended 2012. The results show that boards with multiple directorships, government ownership, auditor type, audit opinion and firm performance have significant negative associations with audit report lag, while audit committee meeting is found to be positively significant with audit report lag. However, the other four variables (managerial ownership, foreign ownership, and audit committee size and audit committee qualification) are found to have insignificant relationships with audit report lag.

The Effect of Employee Ownership on Audit Fees, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management

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Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (124 download)

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Book Synopsis The Effect of Employee Ownership on Audit Fees, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management by : Joseph Abdel Nour

Download or read book The Effect of Employee Ownership on Audit Fees, Auditor Independence and Earnings Management written by Joseph Abdel Nour and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Employee Share Ownership (ESO) refers to a compensation practice through which an employee's wealth is directly tied to their companies'. It provides their representation in the board of directors and has several effects on the individual, corporate and macroeconomic levels. This doctoral thesis discusses the effects of employee ownership on accounting and audit practices in France, the country that has the most developed ESO in Europe. The first chapter provides a general introduction to ESO schemes and other shared capitalism arrangements in France and in the world. The second chapter focuses on agency costs and audit fees, and finds a negative U-shaped relationship between ESO and both variables. It indicates that ESO aligns the interests of employees with those of shareholders, but also acts as a managerial entrenchment mechanism. The third chapter finds that ESO reassures the company's stakeholders about the auditor's independence and allows managers to benefit from their auditor's joint-engagement benefits by purchasing more non-audit services. The fourth chapter studies earnings management through discretionary accruals and reveals that earnings management in France is rather used opportunistically by managers. It also finds that ESO helps decreasing the manipulation of earnings and reduces the opportunism of the discretionary accruals. The final chapter summarizes the thesis' results and presents its contributions and limitations. This doctorate dissertation contributes to research on corporate governance by studying ESO's effect on agency costs from several perspectives.

Hong Kong Auditing

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Publisher : City University of HK Press
ISBN 13 : 9629371413
Total Pages : 843 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (293 download)

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Book Synopsis Hong Kong Auditing by : Ferdinand A. GUL

Download or read book Hong Kong Auditing written by Ferdinand A. GUL and published by City University of HK Press. This book was released on 2007-07-01 with total page 843 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This second edition is thoroughly revised to take into account the new Hong Kong Standards on Quality Control, Auditing, Assurance and Related Services, and the numerous developments of a full range of auditing topics since the previous edition. A major feature of this book is that it boldly draws on economic theories to explain aspects of auditing. Certain general concepts which may be applicable in all aspects of an audit is discussed. Published by City University of Hong Kong Press. 香港城市大學出版社出版。