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Author : Sönje Reiche
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (143 download)
Download or read book Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information written by Sönje Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Sonje Kerrin Reiche
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (593 download)
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Formation written by Sonje Kerrin Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author :
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 312 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (94 download)
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymetric Information; on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Oliver D. Hart
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 64 pages
Book Rating : 4.3/5 (243 download)
Download or read book Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
Author : Mathias Dewatripont
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 12 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (27 download)
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information written by Mathias Dewatripont and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Sugata Bag
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 42 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (129 download)
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts, Self-Investments, Asymmetric Information, Breach of Contract and the Legal Remedies written by Sugata Bag and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the early models of incomplete contract neither party used to invest in the subject matter of the contract; those models primarily kept their focus on analyzing the effect of legal rules on parties' incentives to trade or to breach. The modern models stretched beyond that to include value enhancing investments into its purview and establish an important result: (legal) penalties often are necessary to induce efficient investment; otherwise 'hold-up' (underinvestment) a general phenomenon when contracts are incomplete. But most of these models' findings are limited to typically symmetric or complete information scenario. In reality, the contracting parties usually possess some non-contractible private information either on their reliance or on their out side trading options or both (since either it is costly to describe or non-verifiable) and there may be ex-ante uncertainty associated with their valuations. So far asymmetric information has played a very limited role in the analysis of hold up problem. Therefore, in light of new and asymmetric information that the parties expected to realize subsequent to a binding contract, a systematic analysis has been attempted to see - first, how the legal remedies can solve hold up problem when parties also bear ex ante private information; secondly, how the courts of law can play a greater role than that has been realized. Focus remains on the ex-ante design of the contract, which would serve as an implicit substitute to complete contracts. Under asymmetric participation to contract, one of our main results shows that although the expectation damage remedy maximizes the social surplus for the parties across different dimensions of asymmetry (uncertainty) but induces excessive reliance. It is also found that party designed liquidated damage remedy is superior to all other court imposed remedies when one-sided asymmetry is concern. Finally we show that when dual asymmetry (uncertainty) is present in a contracting situation a high damage measure (even higher that expectation damage) induces efficient reliance by the parties. These results bear serious implications for various contract doctrines and debates.
Author : Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (841 download)
Download or read book More is Less written by Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on "contracts as reference points". Including a contingency of the form, "The buyer will require a good in event E", has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be strictly superior to a contingent contract.
Author : Patrick W. Schmitz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (137 download)
Download or read book Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem written by Patrick W. Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non-trivial. It is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a "simple" contract that the parties have written ex ante. This result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold-up problem to be solved, even if the parties' valuations are private information.
Author : Patrick Schmitz
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 13 pages
Book Rating : 4.:/5 (166 download)
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-up Problem and Asymmetric Information written by Patrick Schmitz and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 13 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Oliver Hart
Publisher : Clarendon Press
ISBN 13 : 0191521728
Total Pages : 244 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (915 download)
Download or read book Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure written by Oliver Hart and published by Clarendon Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Author : Jürgen Georg Backhaus
Publisher : Springer
ISBN 13 : 9781461477525
Total Pages : 0 pages
Book Rating : 4.4/5 (775 download)
Download or read book Encyclopedia of Law and Economics written by Jürgen Georg Backhaus and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-02-15 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Law and Economics deals with the economic analysis of legal relations, legal provisions, laws and regulations and is a research field which has a long tradition in economics. It was lost after the expulsion of some of the leading economists from Germany during 1933 to 1938, but then revived in Chicago. Both the subject of Law of Economics and the need for a concise Encyclopedia is particularly relevant in Europe today. Currently in the European Union there are several different legal cultures: the Anglo-Saxon legal framework, the German legal framework, which for example also includes Greece, and the Roman legal family—three jurisdictions which have to be covered with one and the same theory. In the EU, the task of the European Commission to interact with the various European jurisdictions means different legal cultures collaborating and some degree of harmonization is necessary. The result is an immediate need, if only for the science, to show how a given problem is solved in each legal tradition and jurisdiction. This Encyclopedia provides both a common language and precise definitions in the field, which will be useful in the future to avoid misunderstandings during harmonization of EU Law
Author : Sanford J. Grossman
Publisher :
ISBN 13 :
Total Pages : 76 pages
Book Rating : 4.F/5 ( download)
Download or read book The Costs and Benefits of Ownership written by Sanford J. Grossman and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Author : Eric Brousseau
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
ISBN 13 : 9780521893138
Total Pages : 604 pages
Book Rating : 4.8/5 (931 download)
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2002-10-17 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Author : Bernard Salanie
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 0262534223
Total Pages : 257 pages
Book Rating : 4.2/5 (625 download)
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts, second edition written by Bernard Salanie and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2017-02-17 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author : Patrick Bolton
Publisher : MIT Press
ISBN 13 : 9780262025768
Total Pages : 746 pages
Book Rating : 4.0/5 (257 download)
Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author : Robert S. Gibbons
Publisher : Princeton University Press
ISBN 13 : 0691132798
Total Pages : 1248 pages
Book Rating : 4.6/5 (911 download)
Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert S. Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Author : Philippe Aghion
Publisher : Oxford University Press
ISBN 13 : 0190259019
Total Pages : 224 pages
Book Rating : 4.1/5 (92 download)
Download or read book The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics written by Philippe Aghion and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
