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Belief Free Equilibria In Games With Incomplete Information
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Author :Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche Publisher : ISBN 13 :9782854188455 Total Pages :31 pages Book Rating :4.1/5 (884 download)
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Book Synopsis Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Johannes Horner
Download or read book Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Horner and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Book Synopsis Repeated Games with Incomplete Information by : Robert J. Aumann
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author :Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche Publisher : ISBN 13 :9782854188844 Total Pages :31 pages Book Rating :4.1/5 (888 download)
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé en anglais.
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Johannes Hörner
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Johannes Hörner and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 79 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Résumé en anglais.
Book Synopsis Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs by : Brian John Crone
Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Belief Free Incomplete Information Games by : Dirk Bergemann
Download or read book Belief Free Incomplete Information Games written by Dirk Bergemann and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
Book Synopsis Belief Free Equilibria by : Olivier Compte
Download or read book Belief Free Equilibria written by Olivier Compte and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by other players and must rely on noisy signals he receives about those actions. This is typically incorporated into models by defining a monitoring structure, that is, a collection of probability distributions over the signals each player receives (one distribution for each action profile players may play). Although this is simply meant to capture the fact that players don.t directly observe the actions chosen by others, constructed equilibria often depend on players precisely knowing the distributions, somewhat unrealistic in most problems of interest. This paper aims to show the fragility of belief free equilibrium constructions when one adds shocks to the monitoring structure in repeated games.
Book Synopsis Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information by : Abraham Neyman
Download or read book Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information written by Abraham Neyman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games by : Jeffrey C. Ely
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games written by Jeffrey C. Ely and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information by : Helmut Meister
Download or read book The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information written by Helmut Meister and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Book Synopsis Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information by : Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Download or read book Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information written by Nabil I. Al-Najjar and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Robust Equilibrium Analysis in Games with Uncertainty by : Ignacio Esponda
Download or read book Robust Equilibrium Analysis in Games with Uncertainty written by Ignacio Esponda and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria by : Yuval Heller
Download or read book Instability of Belief-Free Equilibria written by Yuval Heller and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents. Specifically, I show that essentially none of the belief-free equilibria is evolutionarily stable, and that in generic games none of these equilibria is neutrally stable. Moreover, in a large family of games (which includes many public good games), the belief-free equilibria fail to satisfy even a very mild stability refinement.
Book Synopsis Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information by : Yaron Azrieli
Download or read book Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information written by Yaron Azrieli and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider games with incomplete information a la Harsanyi, where the payoff of a player depends on an unknown state of nature as well as on the profile of chosen actions. As opposed to the standard model, players' preferences over state--contingent utility vectors are represented by arbitrary functionals. The definitions of Nash and Bayes equilibria naturally extend to this generalized setting. We characterize equilibrium existence in terms of the preferences of the participating players. It turns out that, given continuity and monotonicity of the preferences, equilibrium exists in every game if and only if all players are averse to uncertainty (i.e., all the functionals are quasi--concave). We further show that if the functionals are either homogeneous or translation invariant then equilibrium existence is equivalent to concavity of the functionals.
Book Synopsis Epistemic Game Theory by : Andrés Perea
Download or read book Epistemic Game Theory written by Andrés Perea and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2012-06-07 with total page 581 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Book Synopsis Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information by : Abraham Neyman
Download or read book Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information written by Abraham Neyman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
