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An Incomplete Information Justification Of Symmetric Equilibrium In Symmetric Games
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Book Synopsis An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games by : Christoph Kuzmics
Download or read book An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games written by Christoph Kuzmics and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consider a symmetric 2-player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoff-irrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can differ across types, aggregate play in any such equilibrium must coincide with a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the complete information game. This justifies the interpretation of certain data, including many laboratory experiments, as arising from a symmetric equilibrium, even when asymmetric equilibria exist and, in addition, subjects may be heterogeneous.
Book Synopsis Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information by : Abraham Neyman
Download or read book Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information written by Abraham Neyman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.
Book Synopsis Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information by : Abraham Neyman
Download or read book Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information written by Abraham Neyman and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Game Theory written by Drew Fudenberg and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1991-08-29 with total page 616 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.
Book Synopsis Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs by : Brian John Crone
Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games by : Dilip Abreu
Download or read book Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games written by Dilip Abreu and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Finite Symmetric Games Where Payoff Functions are Integrally Concave by : Takahiro Watanabe
Download or read book Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Finite Symmetric Games Where Payoff Functions are Integrally Concave written by Takahiro Watanabe and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we show that a finite symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium if the payoff functions of players are integrally concave (the negative of the integrally convex functions due to Favati and Tardella [Convexity in nonlinear integer programming, Ricerca Operativa, 1990, 53:3-44]). Since the payoff functions of any two-strategy game are integrally concave, this generalizes the result of Cheng et al. , [Notes on equilibria in symmetric games, Proceedings of the 6th Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents, 2004, 23-28]. A simple algorithm to find an equilibrium is also provided.
Book Synopsis Game Theory, Alive by : Anna R. Karlin
Download or read book Game Theory, Alive written by Anna R. Karlin and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Book Synopsis On Uniqueness and Stability of Symmetric Equilibria in Differentiable Symmetric Games by : Andreas Hefti
Download or read book On Uniqueness and Stability of Symmetric Equilibria in Differentiable Symmetric Games written by Andreas Hefti and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Robust Equilibrium Analysis in Games with Uncertainty by : Ignacio Esponda
Download or read book Robust Equilibrium Analysis in Games with Uncertainty written by Ignacio Esponda and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game by : Jacco J. J. Thijssen
Download or read book Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game written by Jacco J. J. Thijssen and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis On the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies in symmetric games on the cube by : John Roberts
Download or read book On the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies in symmetric games on the cube written by John Roberts and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods by : Niko Jaakkola
Download or read book All Symmetric Equilibria in Differential Games with Public Goods written by Niko Jaakkola and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto-dominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different responses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.
Book Synopsis Economic Evolution, Learning, and Complexity by : Uwe Cantner
Download or read book Economic Evolution, Learning, and Complexity written by Uwe Cantner and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 313 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The twelve papers in this collection grew out of the workshop on "Eco nomic Evolution, Learning, and Complexity" held at the University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany on May 23-25, 1997. The Augsburg workshop was the second of two events in the Euroconference Series on Evolutionary Economics, the first of which was held in Athens, Greece in September 1993. A special issue of the Journal of Evolutionary Econo mics (1993(4)) edited by Yannis Katsoulacos on "Evolutionary and Neo classical Perspectives on Market Structure and Economic Growth" con tains selected papers from the Athens conference. The Athens conference explored neoclassical and evolutionary perspectives on technological competition and increasing returns. It helped to identify the dis tinguishing features of evolutionary scholarship. The Augsburg workshop was more oriented toward exploring methodological issues in evolutiona of the papers employed new me ry and related scholarship. A number thods, such as genetic programming and experimental analysis, some developed new econometric techniques or raised new empirical issues in evolutionary economics, and some relied on simulation techniques. Twelve papers covering a range of areas were selected for this collection. The papers address central issues in evolutionary and Schumpeterian accounts of industrial competition, learning, and innovation.
Book Synopsis Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games by : Peter Dürsch
Download or read book Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games written by Peter Dürsch and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
Book Synopsis Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information by : Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Download or read book Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information written by Nabil I. Al-Najjar and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Book Synopsis Exchangeable Equilibria by : Noah Daniel Stein
Download or read book Exchangeable Equilibria written by Noah Daniel Stein and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 191 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The main contribution of this thesis is a new solution concept for symmetric games (of complete information in strategic form), the exchangeable equilibrium. This is an intermediate notion between symmetric Nash and symmetric correlated equilibrium. While a variety of weaker solution concepts than correlated equilibrium and a variety of refinements of Nash equilibrium are known, there is little previous work on "interpolating" between Nash and correlated equilibrium. Several game-theoretic interpretations suggest that exchangeable equilibria are natural objects to study. Moreover, these show that the notion of symmetric correlated equilibrium is too weak and exchangeable equilibrium is a more natural analog of correlated equilibrium for symmetric games. The geometric properties of exchangeable equilibria are a mix of those of Nash and correlated equilibria. The set of exchangeable equilibria is convex, compact, and semi-algebraic, but not necessarily a polytope. A variety of examples illustrate how it relates to the Nash and correlated equilibria. The same ideas which lead to the notion of exchangeable equilibria can be used to construct tighter convex relaxations of the symmetric Nash equilibria as well as convex relaxations of the set of all Nash equilibria in asymmetric games. These have similar mathematical properties to the exchangeable equilibria. An example game reveals an algebraic obstruction to computing exact exchangeable equilibria, but these can be approximated to any degree of accuracy in polynomial time. On the other hand, optimizing a linear function over the exchangeable equilibria is NP-hard. There are practical linear and semidefinite programming heuristics for both problems. A secondary contribution of this thesis is the computation of extreme points of the set of correlated equilibria in a simple family of games. These examples illustrate that in finite games there can be factorially many more extreme correlated equilibria than extreme Nash equilibria, so enumerating extreme correlated equilibria is not an effective method for enumerating extreme Nash equilibria. In the case of games with a continuum of strategies and polynomial utilities, the examples illustrate that while the set of Nash equilibria has a known finite-dimensional description in terms of moments, the set of correlated equilibria admits no such finite-dimensional characterization.
